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Abstract 
The completion of projects beyond their budgets and scheduled times is one of the biggest 
problems faced by many infrastructure projects today. Large infrastructure projects are the 
most affected by these overruns. Some projects have cost overruns of the order of 200 – 
400% more than their planned estimates or contract values. Previous research has focused 
on identifying the most significant causes of time and cost overruns on projects in general and 
addressed solutions to the individual problems. Few scholars have carried out research in the 
management of large projects and how the implementation of a project management strategy 
could be used to reduce time and cost overruns and improve the delivery of these projects. In 
this research, the aim was to study how the actions of a project team in a large construction 
project affect the delivery of projects and to develop a project management strategy for the 
project owner to use on these types of projects. 
The research focused on understanding the management of large infrastructure projects 
and how its dynamics affect performance of a project team. It then investigated how the 
performance of a project team is related to competence and preparation for the project. The 
research finally provided a project management strategy that could be used in the delivery of 
large construction projects in South Africa. The work was researched from the buyer’s or 
client’s point of view. 
The methodology consisted of a thorough literature study, case studies and a 
questionnaire survey. Together, these components served to validate the findings and to 
support the proposal. 
The solution consists of the management of the external, organization and project 
environments. This is to improve the collective project competence of the team for formulation 
and execution of large projects. The proposal includes the need for a high-level project 
organisation, a risk review board, early collaboration of stakeholders, and an increase in 
labour-based activities. 
The research adds knowledge to the area of management of large projects and at the 
same time, integrates various concepts that were previously studied separately to provide a 
fresh look at the subject of management of projects. The research was focused in the Sub-
Saharan region and South Africa in particular. It is hoped that the lessons and strategy 
formulated will be used in other developing countries. 
 
Key words: large projects, management of large projects, project management 
strategy, project performance, project management competence, preparation for projects, 
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Opsomming 
Die afhandeling van projekte waarvan die begrotings oorskry word en die 
voltooiingsdatums nie nagekom word nie, is vandag van die grootste probleme waarmee 
infrastruktuurprojekte te kampe het. Dit is veral groot infrastruktuurprojekte wat die meeste 
deur hierdie oorskrydings geraak word. In sekere gevalle is projekoorskrydings tussen 200 en 
400% meer as die beplande ramings of kontrakwaardes. Vorige navorsing beklemtoon die 
belangrikste oorsake vir tyd- en koste-oorskrydings ten opsigte van projekte in die algemeen 
en bied oplossings vir individuele probleme aan. Min navorsers het tot dusver die fokus op die 
bestuur van groot projekte laat val en gekyk hoe die implementering van ’n 
projekbestuurstrategie gebruik kan word om tyd- en koste-oorskrydings te verminder en groot 
projekte se afleweringstye te verbeter. Die oogmerk met hierdie navorsing is om die bestuur 
van groot infrastruktuurprojekte te ondersoek en ’n projekbestuurstrategie te ontwikkel wat 
gebruik kan word om verkryging vir groot konstruksieprojekte te vergemaklik. 
Die navorsing fokus daarop om insig in die bestuur van groot infrastruktuurprojekte te 
bekom en te bepaal hoe ’n projekspan se dinamiek sy prestasie beïnvloed. Daar word 
vervolgens ondersoek ingestel na die mate wat ’n projekspan se prestasie met bekwaamheid 
en voorbereiding vir die projek verband hou. Ten slotte verskaf die navorsing ’n geldige 
besluitnemingsraamwerk waarvolgens ’n projekbestuurstrategie vir die lewering van groot 
konstruksieprojektegeformuleer kan word. Die werk word vanuit ’n aankoper en ’n kliënt se 
oogpunt nagevors. 
Die metodologie behels ’n deeglike literatuurstudie, gevallestudies en ’n vraelysopname. 
Saam valideer en ondersteun hierdie komponente die studiebevindings en die aanbevelings. 
Die oplossing bestaan uit die bestuur van die eksterne, die organisasie en die projek 
omgewings. Die doel daarvan is om die gesamentlike vaardighede van die projekspan te 
verbeter vir die formulering en uitvoering van groot projekte. Die spesifieke voorstel sluit in die 
nodigheid van ‘n hoë vlak projekorganisasie, ‘n raad om die risiko’s te beoordeel, vroeë 
samewerking van alle belanghebbendes, en ‘n toename in arbeids gebasseerde aktiwiteite. 
Die navorsing verbreed nie alleen die kennisveldoor die bestuur van grootkontrakte 
nie, maar integreer ook verskeie konsepte wat voorheen afsonderlik bestudeer is,terwyl dit 
terselfdertyd ’n vars perspektief op die onderwerp projekbestuur bied. Die klem val spesifiek 
op die sub-Sahara-streek en Suid-Afrika. Die lesse en die strategie wat aangedui word, word 
as moontlike voorbeeld vir ander ontwikkelende lande voorgehou. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Large projects are noted for the contribution they make to the development of a region or 
country. These projects, however, often have a poor record of performance particularly from 
the public viewpoint. A recurrent problem that often affects them is that of time and cost 
overruns (Morris & Hough, 1987; Faridi & El-Sayeh, 2006; Jergeas & Ruwanpura, 2010). What 
makes matters worse are the colossal sums of money involved which in the public view could 
have gone to other more ‘needy’ causes. Project management professionals, too, are 
concerned with the extent of overruns on large projects (Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius & Rothengatter, 
2003; Whittaker, 1999). Yet there is relatively little research that has been done on the 
management specifically, of large projects (Merrow, 2011). This may be because it is generally 
understood that all projects have similar characteristics and go through the same project life-
cycle and therefore, a general approach to the management of projects could be sufficient. 
In South Africa, the focus has been on identifying factors that constrain successful 
implementation of projects and on investigation of causes of delay on projects generally, for 
instance, Mbachu and Nkado (2007). There has been little published on the management of 
large projects and how project size affects time and cost overruns. 
Time and cost overruns are noted to be a persistent problem on projects in spite of the 
apparent progress in the project management profession and use of new techniques and tools 
(Pinto, 2010). It is not uncommon for projects to have cost overruns of up to 100 percent their 
original estimates (Jergeas & Ruwanpura, 2010). In the USA, a study done in 1985 found that 
more than half of the projects cost, on average, 189 percent their original estimates (Whittaker, 
1999). The Channel Tunnel was 80 percent overrun in construction costs, 140 percent overrun 
in financing costs and 50 percent underrun on demand (Flyvbjerg, 2011). Flyvbjerg (2011) 
further noted in the latter surveys of major projects, that nine out of ten projects, cost overruns 
of 50 – 100 percent were common and overruns of 100 percent were not uncommon. On the 
demand side, estimates were typically wrong by 20 – 70 percent compared with actual 
developments. 
Time and cost overruns seem to stem from the actions and inactions of project team 
members (AlSehaimi, Koskela & Tzortzopoulos, 2013). Whilst time and cost overruns are seen 
as the ‘problem,’ they are merely distress signals of prevailing conditions in the project 
management environment. Singling out factors or determining the most significant may 
provide some answers, but will not tell the whole picture. Management of large projects 
involves several factors with their numerous interrelationships based on the interplay of 
several hidden factors in the macro and micro project environments. A detailed investigation 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
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of the work of the project team and how they interact with the large projects environment is 
key to understanding what leads to time and cost overruns in these projects and to the 
formulation of a strategy to improve their management 
1.2 Management of Large Infrastructure Projects 
Large projects by their nature demand more on the project resources than smaller projects. 
They are demanding due to their size, complexity, schedule, urgency or demand on existing 
resources and know-how (Morris & Hough, 1987). It is also due to the various factors and 
interactions amongst the project players who are both individuals and institutions. The other 
reason is that the long-range reach of the projects spanning longer periods of time than the 
traditional project makes large projects inherently very risky undertakings. They also pose 
difficulties in decision making, planning and management since they are typically multi-action 
processes with conflicting interests (Flyvbjerg, 2011). These projects typically involve several 
stakeholders who today include project planners, users, the media community, 
environmentalists and other pressure groups such as unions. Other factors include much use 
of non-standard technology and designs, over-commitment to a particular concept at an early 
stage, large sums of money involved and project scope or ambition which typically changes 
over time due to the long project horizons (Ibid, 2011). Davidson and Huot (1989) mention that 
these projects are characterised by political planning and as such, they suffer from change of 
political policies over their duration which is often long. Their long-range duration also makes 
them susceptible to fluctuations in interest rates, inflation, material prices and scope changes. 
This, therefore, suggests that large projects merit to be treated differently from other 
projects. Some of these projects are so large and complex that they require exceptional levels 
of leadership and management (Morris & Hough, 1987). It is prudent that proper strategies 
are adopted and implemented in the planning and management of large projects to avoid 
wasting enormous amounts of resources. This is especially so for developing countries which 
have less experience with technology and have fewer resources. 
1.3 Time and Cost Overruns, a Challenge to Management of Large Projects 
Though project management today is increasingly seen as the standard way of running a 
business not only in construction and defence but also in other industries such as information 
and services, the history of management of projects has been a poor one. Many projects have 
failed to meet the time, cost and quality benchmarks set at their inception (Pinto, 2010). 
Many reports have been given of projects failing to meet the planned objectives and 
expectations in the construction industry which include the Latham 1994 report and the Egan 
1998 report in United Kingdom (Al-Khalil & Al-Ghafly, 1999; Al-Momani, 2000; Baldry, 1998; 
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Dahl, Lorentzen, Oglen & Osmundsen, 2017; Faridi & El-Sayeh, 2006; Flyvbjerg et al, 2003; 
Flyvbjerg, 2011; Klakegg & Lichtenberg, 2016; Love, Smith, Simpson & Olantunji, 2014; 
Merrow, 2011; Morris S., 1990; Morris & Hough, 1987; Odeh & Battaineh, 2000; Schwalbe, 
2007; Simbasivan & Soon, 2007; Steyn, 2009; Toor & Ogunlana, 2008; Whittaker, 1999). 
These projects have consistently overrun their planned time and cost schedules. Large 
projects appear to be the most affected (Myddelton, 2007). 
Projects in South Africa have equally been affected with major projects being completed 
late and costing more than originally planned (Baloyi & Bekker, 2011). The persistence and 
recurrence of the problem is indicative that it has not been solved in totality. 
1.4 Research in the Management of Large Construction Infrastructure Projects 
Many studies have been carried out to investigate the causes of poor performance on 
projects and specifically what causes time and cost overruns on projects. The studies have 
been done in both developed countries and developing countries (Toor & Ogunlana, 2008). 
Long, Ogunlana, Quang and Lam (2004) specifically mention research carried out in the USA 
and UK in developed countries and Turkey, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, Malaysia and 
Jordan in developing countries. The focus of most of the studies has been on identification of 
significant factors and causes of delay on construction projects in general. Fewer studies have 
investigated causes of time and cost overruns on large projects with most of these in the 
transport sector of the industry (Steyn, 2009). Furthermore, there is no evidence of research 
carried out to investigate how the working of the project team in its preparation and use of 
project management principles could potentially lead to overruns on projects. Equally, the 
predominant research method used on most studies has been that of the questionnaire survey 
with case studies in a few instances (AlSehaimi et al, 2013). 
In South Africa, there has not been decisive research in the management of large projects 
to investigate the puzzle of time and cost overruns (Steyn, 2009). The focus has mostly been 
on investigating the factors that constrain successful implementation of large projects. What 
is yet to be determined is what lies behind the factors of overruns and how these various 
factors relate to one another. An understanding of the root cause of project failure in large 
projects is needed. There is no evidence of research that has investigated the root cause of 
overruns and implementation of a project strategy. 
Anderson and Merna (2003) suggested that causes of failure originated from the front end 
during project strategy formulation in the business mode. Merrow, (2011) was of a similar view, 
namely that there is inadequate engagement with the project from the boardroom where plans 
are formulated. Tatum (1984) observed that there is no rationalised way of deciding the 
organisation structure to use on large projects. AlSehaimi et al, 2013, in summarising the 
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causes of overruns from literature, observed that they were indicative of poor planning during 
design as well as during execution. Flyvbjerg (2011) recommended that high level research 
into theories of success and failure of major projects be conducted with strong links to leading 
research in other areas such as economics, governance, planning, decision making and 
environment. 
It is intended in the current research to close the identified knowledge gap by developing 
an integrated project management strategy for use on large construction projects. 
1.5 Research Questions 
The research question to be answered through this thesis is, why and how do large 
construction projects incur time and cost overruns? The sub-questions are: (1) Is the 
involvement of the client in the planning and implementation of large projects a parameter for 
consideration? (2) What is the role of training and experience of the project members in the 
implementation of large projects? (3) Are the principles of project management consistently 
implemented in large infrastructure projects? (4) What is the role of the above points (1, 2, 3) 
when deciding the project organisational design, time and cost schedules? And, (5) What 
would be the client’s strategy for improving the delivery of large projects? 
1.6 Research Aim and Objectives 
The aim of the research was to study how the actions of a project team in a large 
construction project in South Africa affect the delivery of projects and to develop a project 
management strategy for the project owner to use on these types of projects. The objectives 
of the study were: (1) To study the nature and management of large projects. (2) To investigate 
the root cause of time and cost overruns on large construction projects in South Africa. (3) To 
investigate how the project team plans and executes projects in South Africa. And, (4) To 
formulate a project management strategy to be used on large projects to improve the delivery 
of projects and reduce overruns. 
1.7 Thesis Statement 
The thesis statement is formulated as follows: 
By preparing for projects and implementing appropriate project management strategies on 
large construction projects, and, consistently implementing project management principles, 
the client can improve the delivery of projects and reduce time and cost overruns. 
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1.8 The Conceptual Framework 
Conceptual framework, literature review and theoretical framework 
Conceptual frameworks are important in research as they explain what is going on in the 
research (Robson, 2011). They provide the mental conceptualisation of abstract ideas or 
theory plan in the research (Brynard, Hanekom & Brynard, 2014). They help the author to 
explain the concepts they are investigating (Babbie, 2014). Rocco and Plakhotnik (2009) said 
that the goal of a conceptual framework is to categorise and describe concepts important to 
the study and provide a guide on the relationships amongst the concepts.  
Conceptual frameworks, however, are associated with difficulties of understanding how 
they work, how they relate to literature review and where in research they come in. Leshem 
and Trafford (2007) noted the importance of conceptual frameworks in doctorate studies but 
they found that most candidates and some supervisors did not fully understand how they work 
or where in the work they could be located. Rocco and Plakhotnik (2009) also noted that the 
terms conceptual framework, literature review and theoretical framework are used 
interchangeably by scholars to explain each other and as steps in the research process. They 
also said that the terms serve similar functions in an empirical research study. Thus, making 
it difficult to see the difference amongst the terms. To explain the differences, they said 
literature review is an exploration of literature around the identified topic to support if a topic is 
researchable. It involves a review of closely related studies and the establishment of the 
importance of the current study in relation to the previous studies. Theoretical framework was 
said to involve the presentation of a specific theory and what has been written about that 
theory by others. It involves the development of the study through critique of concepts, terms, 
definitions and ideas on the particular theory. Conceptual framework was said to be used to 
ground the topic in the relevant knowledge bases important in the problem statement and 
research questions. It is said, the author demonstrates in the conceptual framework, the 
importance of the study by defining the main ideas and the relationships amongst them, but 
his purpose is not to investigate a singular theory. 
In this research, the conceptual framework was placed within the literature review in the 
introductory chapters to guide the reader in the conceptualisation of the research problem, the 
topics of interest or concepts and ideas and, the direction the empirical research might go. 
Whilst the whole literature review could be viewed as the theoretical/conceptual framework, 
the conceptual framework was differentiated to provide a map of concepts and their 
relationships in the research giving an idea of the theory that may emerge after empirical 
verification. The term theoretical framework was not used as the research was not 
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investigating a specific theory such as optimism bias or misrepresentation, but all theoretical 
and empirical work related to time and cost overruns in large infrastructure projects. 
The question of where the conceptual framework should be placed is an important one. 
Leshem and Trafford (2007) said traditionally, the location depended on the research method 
adopted. In inductive studies, it could be placed after fieldwork. In deductive, it could be placed 
before the research design chapter. In research with variable methods or staged research, the 
location varies depending on the type of research. Rocco and Plakhotnik (2009) said that the 
theoretical or conceptual framework could follow after the problem statement as most readers 
would want to know the purpose of the study early. 
The conceptual framework in this study 
Management of large projects is not done in a stable environment but in a dynamic state. 
The scenario is that of ever changing landscapes and characteristics. These characteristics 
and states include people, the project team, tools and techniques and the political and 
economic environments. At the centre of all these dynamics is the project team whose work 
is to marshal all the resources to ensure that the project’s objectives are met. It entails 
understanding and managing the constraints within the project organisation, sister 
organisations of the project team or project coalitions as Winch (1989) called them and, 
managing the macro environment. 
Figure 1.1 shows the author’s conceptualisation of project management performance and 
the various factors that affect it. Project management competence of the project team is shown 
to be at the heart of successful management of the project (Crawford, 2005). 
The figure shows that project management competence is a factor of how the project team 
conceives and formulates strategies, forecasts and plans on the management of the project 
at hand. Equally, it is a factor of how they respond to the different external influences that 
come upon the project. The competences are both inference and performance based 
(Crawford, 2005; Morris et al, 2006), being qualities of project managers (Ceran & Dorman, 
1995; Wirth, 1992; Muller & Turner, 2010; Petersen, 1981) and training of project managers 
(Thomas & Mengel, 2008). 
Whilst project competence starts with competence of individuals, it does not end there 
(Morris et al, 2006; Margerison, 2001). The competence of organisations and that of the 
project team is of significance as well. The framing of plans and strategies in the firms and the 
client organisation equally establishes a background of the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
project team. The preparation of the project team for the work sets the prerequisite of the 
efficiency of the team and how they will respond to the internal and external requirements. All 
the actions that the team takes in the management of the project will be from the preparation  
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Figure 1.1 Project Management Conceptual Framework 
 
Figure 1.2 The concept of project preparation and how it affects project delivery 
Source: Author 
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of the individuals, the project team and partner organisations. The preparation or lack of it 
becomes visible during the construction stage of the project. Poor preparation for the project  
affects the project management competence which leads to a poor project plan and ultimately 
poor execution. The poor project delivery again affects the preparation for the next project as 
shown in Figure 1.2. 
This study examines how the dynamics of large projects contribute to the occurrence of 
time and cost overruns. It contributes to the knowledge of management of large infrastructure 
projects. 
1.9 Possible Rival Explanations 
Two possible rival explanations are examined in the research. The first is that, poor 
performance on large projects leading to time and cost overruns is because these are public 
projects since public enterprises are often bureaucratic, politically constrained, have multiple 
and conflicting goals and have highly underdeveloped accounting and management 
information systems (Jamali 2004). The other rival explanation is that the poor performance is 
because large projects are managed the same way small projects are managed since projects 
are viewed to be the same. Shenhar & Dvir (1996) said that many scholars took it for granted 
that all projects are the same. Packendorff (1995) equally reported that there is a general 
assumption that projects are the same. 
1.10 Brief Chapter Overviews 
Chapter 1 
This chapter introduces the study and gives the aims and objectives of the research. Also 
included is an outline of the literature review on the management of large projects and the 
problems of time and cost overruns 
Chapter 2 
This chapter constitutes the focussed literature review on the management of large 
projects and causes of poor project performance on these projects. It presents the research 
that has been carried out on the research problem and the knowledge gaps identified. 
Chapter 3 
In this chapter, the method used to collect primary data is explained as well as the reasons 
for the adopted research approach. The aim of the chapter is to formulate a process to aid in 
the verification of the research argument. 
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Chapter 4-10 
The results of the research are presented in chapters 4 to 10 beginning with the case study 
results and then the questionnaire results. 
Chapter 11 
This chapter presents a synthesis of the case studies and questionnaire results. 
Chapter 12 
The chapter presents the proposed integrated management model for large projects as a 
solution to the identified research problem. 
Chapter 13 
Chapter 13 is the closing chapter of the research. The chapter provides the conclusion on 
the aims of the study, the contribution to knowledge of literature on the management of large 
projects and suggestions for further research. 
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the literature review background to the problem of time and cost 
overruns and the management of large projects. The review begins by discussing the apparent 
contradiction between the growth of the project management profession and the challenge of 
poor project performance. Various attempts that have been made to improve the delivery of 
projects are discussed. This is followed by a review of literature by scholars on the causes of 
time and cost overruns. It then identifies some of the knowledge gaps which merited research 
in the current study. 
2.2 The Review of Literature 
This literature review was conducted by the author between 2011 and 2016. The search 
of literature was made primarily from articles that discussed large projects and the concept of 
time and cost overruns using Stellenbosch University databases: Web of Science, Science 
Direct as well as the library sources for e-theses at the university and other universities in 
South Africa. 
The most common scholarly journals included International Journal of Project 
Management and Journal of Construction Engineering and Management. Most of the data 
came from the International Journal of Project Management, Journal of Construction 
Engineering and Management, Journal of Construction Management and Economics and 
Journal of Engineering, Construction and Architectural Management.  
For easier search of data, using the Web of Science, the most cited works were followed 
up. The most significant articles were identified based on the citation index and these provided 
the network of papers that discussed time and cost overruns. The selection criteria for the 
articles included the most cited works, the most influential works and those that closely 
discussed the phenomenon of time and cost overruns and the management of large projects. 
The review started with the work of Arditi, Akan and Gurdamar (1985) who began discussions 
on time and cost overruns on projects in general, the influential works of Morris and Hough 
(1987), Flyvbjerg et al ,2003, (see Siemiatycki, 2016) to later works by other scholars up to 
2016. 
The search also included books and other scholarly works to gain insights into the 
concepts of project management, success, estimating, competence and time and cost 
overruns. 
Rowley and Slack, (2004) recommended a disclosure of the tools and search methods 
used to get literature. In this research, several tools were used to locate information which 
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included library catalogues, keyword searches using search engines such as Web of Science, 
Science Direct and Google Scholar. Web of Science and Science Direct were used to get the 
professional literature on large projects and time and cost overruns. Other tools like Google 
Scholar and Mendeley were used as well to get certain articles cited but not readily available 
in the professional affiliated web sites. 
2.3 The Need for Project Management 
Project management today is increasingly seen as a way of running business, not only in 
construction and defence, but also in other industries such as technology and services (Gary 
and Larson, 2008). Söderlund (2004) said this has led to the explosive development of 
professional organisations such as the International Project Management Association (IPMA) 
in Europe and the Project Management Institute (PMI) in USA. Shepherd and Atkinson (2011) 
said that many organisations now recognise project management as key to their business 
operations. Ramazani and Jergeas (2015) also said that projects play a critical role in the 
modern enterprise as shown in increasing numbers of industries and project-based systems 
that are either complementing or replacing traditional functional and divisional structures with 
project teams. 
The resulting increased role of project management in executing projects has led to a twin 
increase in the demand for the project management profession in all industries and education 
in project management (Thomas & Mengel, 2008; Pant & Baroudi, 2008). Crawford, (2000) 
reports that PMI in USA is no longer dominated by construction, engineering, defence and 
aerospace, but includes larger numbers from telecommunications and other professions. 
Pinto (2010) said this increased growth may be partly one of the reasons leading to project 
failures as many organisations enter into projects without fully understanding how they should 
be managed and the techniques required to ensure a project delivers according to 
expectations. The author is of the view that in the desire to meet the demand for project 
management professionals, there is a possibility that training institutions have not had 
adequate time to consider the materials and other requisites needed to prepare the trainees 
for management of projects. Thus, there is a possibility that the owners and consequently 
consultants and contractors are not adequately prepared when they begin to carry out 
projects. 
2.4 Project Management Challenge 
Whilst the project management profession has been growing in demand and popularity all 
over the globe, projects still fail. Morris and Hough (1987) said that the history of project 
management has been poor. Many projects have failed to meet the time, cost and quality 
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benchmarks set at their inception (Pinto, 2010). Later scholars have equally noted the lack of 
improvement in project performance in spite of tremendous strides in project management 
knowledge (Love, Smith, Regan and Olatunji, 2014; Klakegg & Lichtenberg, 2016). 
The construction industry has been affected by management and other problems for years. 
Kagioglou, Cooper, Aouad and Sexton, (2000) observed that the UK construction was plagued 
with several problems which had not disappeared for decades. Briscoe, Dainty, Millett and 
Neale (2004) reported that many aspects of the UK construction industry’s performance have 
been heavily criticised in recent years and that the industry has suffered from cost overruns, 
programme delays and poor productivity for a long time. In agreement with this, several UK 
government reports have been written to try to find solutions to the numerous construction 
problems. These have included the 1994 Latham report “Constructing the Team” and the 1998 
Egan report, “Rethinking Construction.”  
The Latham (1994) report showed that the fragmented nature of the industry was the major 
contributor to the poor communication amongst all the parties on a construction project and 
that this tended to promote adversarial relations amongst the project participants particularly 
between the contractors and their suppliers (Briscoe et al, 2004). The report also criticised the 
industry’s heavy reliance on lowest competitive tendering and recommended that clients 
should base their choice of contractors on value for money principles using proper weighting 
of selection criteria for skill, experience and previous performance. Holt, Olomolaiye and Harris 
(1995) mentioned that the report recommended the Department of Environment (DOE) to 
come up with a rationalised document prescribing the detailed selection procedure to be used 
by the public sector. This included establishing a list of pre-approved contractors for the public 
sector and introducing a “star” system for contractor performance. The report also 
recommended that open tendering was not to be used. 
The Egan (1998) report affirmed the Latham recommendations (Kagioglou et al, 2000). It 
further identified 5 key drivers of change for the industry; (1) Committed leadership, (2) Focus 
on the customer, (3) Integrated processes and teams. (4) Quality driven agenda, and (5) 
Commitment to people. Product development, project implementation, partnering the supply 
chain and production components were identified in the integrated process. 
Both reports recommended the construction industry to learn from the manufacturing 
industry. Several movements were born from the reports which include the Innovative 
Manufacturing Initiative (IMI), the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council 
(EPSRC) funded research resulting in the formulation of the EPSRC Generic Design and 
Construction Process Protocol and the BAA Plc Process Standard formulated by British 
Aerospace Authority to guide in the management of the procurement process. 
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Anderson and Merna (2003) listed several process models made in attempts to improve 
the management of projects. The earliest of these is that discussed by Morris in 1994 which 
Anderson and Merna (2003) call the Morris Practice Model. These authors mention that the 
model lists eight principle items to be managed in a project. The project management concept 
discussed brings to view the open systems approach to management of projects to ensure 
that the project was managed in a holistic manner.  
In 1995, the British Airports Authority Project Process (BAA Project Process) was 
developed by BAA Plc to try to improve the management of their projects. The model is similar 
to the RIBA Plan of work in that it is activity driven. It is divided into phases of the key sub-
processes (Shealth, Woolley, Cooper, Hinks & Aouad, 1996): (1) Development Management, 
(2) Evaluation and Approval, (3) Design Management, (4) Cost Management, (5) Procurement 
Management, (6) Health and Safety, (7) Implementation and Control, and (8) Commission and 
Handover. 
This process model incorporates the “stage gate” approach where there is a review of a 
phase before proceeding to the next (Ibid, 1996). This helps to ensure that all the work required 
to be done in a particular phase is done. It also provides a framework for planning and 
management of projects effectively so that all required inputs in the process are planned and 
incorporated. The BAA process however was developed from BAA’s perspective to guide the 
organisation in the management of projects from conception to commissioning and handover. 
The model groups the activities into eight activities for effective management as required in 
the BAA process of design and construction. The model provides a useful reference point to 
organisations such as Sasol in South Africa who deal with development and design of products 
and eventually carry out the manufacturing process. Some of the concepts in the BAA process 
such as the “stage gate” approach were incorporated later in the EPSRC Process Protocol of 
2000. 
In 1996, the British Standards Institute formulated BS 6079:1996 to provide guidance on 
the planning and execution of projects as well as the application of project management 
techniques. This standard only offers guidance on how the project should be planned and 
managed. It shows the stages to be followed to ensure that the project is successfully 
implemented. The Standard helps people to see the various stages required to be achieved 
in a project and the techniques to be used to achieve success. 
The BS 6079 was followed be BS ISO 10006 in 1997. This standard tried to incorporate 
the issues of quality and risk management in the planning and management of projects. 
Anderson and Merna (2003) comment that the standard differentiates between the quality of 
management processes and the quality of the project product. Like BS 6079, this standard 
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does not define the project management processes, but is concerned with ensuring that there 
is quality in the process of management of projects. This standard is useful in that it provides 
the quality assurance process required in managing projects successfully. 
In 1999, the International Project Management Association, UK (IPMA) produced the ICB 
(International Competence Baseline) which describes 28 core elements which competent 
project managers and their staff should know and have experience in (Ibid, 2003). The 
Association produced this to aid in the certification of their members and only those with 
competence in the core areas were certified to work and be called project managers. 
The Association for Project Management has produced standards and other guides such 
as the APM BOK which they have revised regularly, to provide guidance in the definition of 
the broad range of knowledge of project management. The standards and guides describe the 
relevant knowledge areas required of a project manager to successfully manage a project. 
Equally, the Project Management Institute has produced the PMBOK with the revised 5th 
edition covering twelve project management knowledge areas: (1) Project life cycle and 
organisation, (2) Project management process for a project, (3) Project integration 
management, (4) Project scope management, (5) Project time management, (6) Project cost 
management, (7) Project quality management, (8) Project human resource management, (9) 
Project communications management, (10) Project risk management, (11) Project 
procurement management and (12) Project stakeholder management. 
The year 2000, also saw the development of the EPSRC Process Protocol from a study 
of about two years shown in Figure 2.1.  
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Figure 2.1: The Process Protocol map. 
Source: Kagioglou, M., Cooper, R., Aouad, G., Re-Engineering the UK Construction Industry: The Process Protocol. 
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Unlike the APMBOK and the BS 6079 and ISO 10006 which were produced for general 
guidance of project management knowledge areas, the Generic Design and Construction 
Process Protocol was produced specifically to seek to incorporate some practices from the 
manufacturing industry in the construction project management process. The protocol covers 
the whole project life-cycle from the pre-project stage to the post-completion stage. The 
process is divided into four distinct phases as shown in Figure 2.1: pre-project phase, pre-
construction phase, construction phase and post-construction phase. 
The four phases are further sub-divided into sub-phases, generating a total of nine phases. 
The protocol was developed in response to calls for improvement in the delivery of 
construction projects. Using the manufacturing industry as a model, the protocol shows the 
various activities and action required in the design and construction of projects. The “stage 
gate” approach from the manufacturing industry has been adopted in the protocol as shown 
in Fig 2.2. 
 
Figure 2.2: The "stage-gate” approach 
Source: Kagioglou, Cooper, Aouad & Sexton, (2000). 
The aim of providing the “stage gate” approach was to ensure that there is a review at 
each gate before proceeding to the next stage (Kagioglou et al, 2000). Each gate of the 
protocol represents a decision-making point where all deliverables are reviewed which in turn 
form the inputs for the next phase. The author is of the view that the gates could potentially 
be points of delay for the project as the participants review before proceeding to the next 
phase. 
In the protocol, project participants are identified by their primary responsibilities in “activity 
zones” and not by their professional or expert status. For instance, Project Board, Design and 
Construction and not, Client, Engineer and Contractor. It was hoped that this would lead to 
improvement in communication and a move away from the traditional divisive class 
distinctions. 
The model attempts to show the integrated process of project management in construction 
drawing on the manufacturing approach to management using a series of gates for approval 
of the sub-phase before proceeding to the next. What we could learn from this process 
protocol is that the project management process could be modelled after the manufacturing 
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industry with gates for review and decision making before proceeding to next phase. The 
protocol has also emphasised the pre-project phase which is normally glossed over. It has 
also tried to improve on project participant integration by identifying the participants based on 
activities rather than profession. This is true since the distinctions in the professions in 
construction are mostly for teaching and specialisation purposes. This realisation may help 
break the barriers between the professions such as the engineer and the contractor. 
The various processes and models have sought to provide a better way of managing 
projects. The principle aim has been that of developing an improved model to manage projects 
successfully. From these models, we learn that the delivery of projects could be improved by: 
(1) developing standard guidelines for every project, (2) modelling the project management 
process in comparison with other industries such as the manufacturing, (3) developing 
projects, (4) isolating process areas with project management problems to improve or correct 
the defect in the project and, (5) using the “stage gate” approach for phase-review points 
before proceeding to the next. 
All the above models have not differentiated between the different project types. None of 
them have differentiated between large and small projects but have considered the project 
management process generally. The PMBOK and the APM BOK do not identify or discuss 
large and small projects. The guidelines are for all projects. Literature shows that large projects 
have performed worse than small projects consistently (Morris and Hough, 1987; Whittaker, 
1999; Merrow, 2011). 
2.5 Project Management and Time and Cost overruns 
Many reports have been written of projects failing to meet the planned objectives and 
expectations (Morris and Hough, 1987; Steyn, 2009; Schwalbe, 2007; Flyvbjerg, 2011; 
Merrow, 2011; Love et al, 2014, Ahiaga-Dagbui, Smith, Love & Ackermann, 2015). These 
projects have consistently overrun their planned time and cost schedules. 
Faridi and El-Sayeh (2006) noted that the issue of time and cost overruns was considered 
as one of the most recurring problems in the construction industry. Jergeas and Ruwanpura 
(2010) equally noted the recurrence of this problem in the management of construction 
projects stating further, that stakeholders such as the government, investors and senior 
managers were especially concerned considering the huge investments that went into mega-
projects. Steyn (2009) quoting Flyvbjerg et al (2003) reported that project cost overruns had 
neither increased nor decreased over time as shown in Figure 2.3. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
18 
 
 
Figure 2.3 Time and cost overruns over the years 
Source: Steyn, (2009) 
The time and cost overruns do not only affect diverse industries, but also affect both public 
and private projects. They also affect small and large projects, but large projects are reportedly 
the worst affected (Morris and Hough, 1987; Whittaker, 1999; Merrow, 2011). It is reported 
that nine out of ten large projects have cost overruns (Flyvbjerg et al, 2011). 
2.6 Causes of Time and Cost Overruns 
An overrun is a situation where a planned event actually takes longer or costs more than 
it was planned. Assaf and Al-Hejji (2006) referred to a delay in construction as the time overrun 
either beyond the completion date specified in the contract or beyond the date the parties 
agreed upon for delivery of a project. Kaliba, Muya and Mumba (2008) used the terms 
schedule delay and cost escalation to refer to time and cost overruns respectively. Time-
overrun or schedule delay is defined by Kaliba et al (2008) as a situation where a construction 
project does not come to completion within the planned period. They defined cost escalation 
as the increase in the amount of money required to construct a project over and above the 
original budgeted amount. 
Various reasons have been cited in literature as the causes for time and cost overruns. 
These are mostly based on the actions and inactions of the project members whether the 
project was large or not. As to which factors are the most significant, it is difficult to determine 
as each scholar had their own way of presenting their data. Ramanathan, Narayenan and 
Idrus (2012) after reviewing factors of overruns, found that it was difficult to generalise the root 
cause of overruns as each study had a unique approach and unique rankings of the causes. 
They also found, for instance, that some that were found to be most influential in 1995 were 
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no longer in 2010. However, they noted that the factors appeared to be country, location and 
project specific. 
Love, Ahiaga-Dagbui and Irani (2016) presented two predominant schools of thought of 
overrun causation that has been discussed by scholars over the years: Evolution theorists and 
psycho strategists. Evolution theorists are those of the view that overruns are due to scope 
definition change from what was originally planned at inception. In essence, they are of the 
view that the plan at the beginning was accurate and that overruns ensued because of 
deviation from the planned scope and estimate. Eizakshiri, Chan and Emsely (2011) criticised 
this view as being flawed because it does not question the accuracy of the schedule and cost 
plan initiated at the beginning. 
The psycho strategists, on the other hand, are of the view that overruns are due to 
deception, optimism bias and planning fallacy when estimating the project plan at the 
beginning. In other words, the overruns which occur later in the project cycle are due to 
inaccurate estimates and attitudes of misrepresenting the estimate to get project acceptance. 
Love et al (2014) criticised the optimism bias and misrepresentation view as an over 
simplification of a complex problem and that it had potential to lead to adversarial relationships 
amongst the project team members and mistrust of the project team by the public. 
Two further schools of thought are that of project “pathogens” and “cost growth” (Ahagia-
Dagbui and Smith, 2014). The first theory is that there are many intermediate events and 
actions called “pathogens”’ which, unaccounted for at project estimate build-up, remain latent 
but drive up the costs later. The other theory is that cost growth is a natural phenomenon 
because projects evolve due to changes in scope, design and leadership which affect the 
initial aims, scope, skills and competence of the project team later. 
Ahiaga-Dagbui et al (2015) criticised the research approach in previous studies saying that 
it was inadequate and not able to deal with the complexity of the problem of time and cost 
overruns because it was simplistic, superficial and replicative and even stagnant. They said 
most scholars identified single points in the network of causal links without considering the 
whole project system to see how the various variables interacted with each other. They said 
even though variables may appear to be single standing, they are interrelated in a complexity 
of ways which requires in-depth understanding of how the whole system works.  
Love, Ahiaga-Dagbui and Irani, (2016), also criticised previous research that it tended to 
explain causes of overruns to be independent as opposed to interdependent causes. They 
contended that this approach of singular, cause-identification has led to inappropriate risk 
assessments and failure to identify the interdependence between cause variables. They 
recommended moving away from simply developing lists or ranks of independent factors to 
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one where the causal relationships amongst the network of factors are identified. Earlier, Love 
et al, (2014) had contended that the problem of time and cost overruns would continue unless 
research methods which enabled the actuality of the “why” and “how” projects incurred time 
and cost overruns were carried out. They recommended the review of the project delivery 
strategy or overhaul to shift towards the use of relational project delivery methods such as 
Integrated Project Delivery (IPD) or other alliances and technological innovations such as 
Building Information Modelling (BIM) at the project early stages to enhance communication 
and information management in the design and construction process. Ackerman and 
Alexander (2016), after considering that human factors had not been accounted for in previous 
research, proposed that causal mapping should be used by researchers and practitioners to 
explain project behaviour that leads to time and cost overruns. They recommended two ways 
of causal mapping: the idiographic which is concerned with understanding a situation and, 
homothetic which aims to reveal themes/patterns that can be statistically generalised.  
Klakegg and Lichtenberg (2016) on the other hand were of the view that the estimating 
process should be improved to enhance the accuracy of estimates. They recommended a 
process they call “successive cost estimating” which relies on the principle of accurate and 
realistic estimating using a series of steps. They proposed the use of triple cost estimating for 
the significant items. The process is to use experts in estimating and project management to 
forecast the future uncertainties of the project and predict the likely costs using statistics. They 
said this method had proved successful in reducing cost overruns in Scandinavian projects. 
The view of Klakegg and Lichtenberg (2016) is essentially an extension of the psycho 
strategists of improving the estimating technique to increase the accuracy of estimates. 
Equally, Awojobi and Jenkins (2016) considered improvements that could be done to the 
Reference Class Forecasting (RCF) technique to improve the accuracy of estimates.  
The author, after reviewing existing literature on time and cost overruns in Africa, Asia and 
the Middle East in 2013 using Web of Science and Science Direct electronic databases, found 
that time and cost overruns in the Middle East were viewed to be mostly caused by the client 
through design changes, late payments to the contractor and delays in decision making. The 
contractor was seen to contribute through inadequate planning and scheduling, poor 
supervision and site management and poor productivity. It was also found that the region 
experienced problems in acquiring professional and artisan skills for projects. (See in the work 
of Al Momani, 2000; Khoushki, Al-Rashid & Kartam, 2004; Merzher & Tawil, 1998) The 
reasons given for the overruns suggest that there could be poor preparation during project 
formulation in the client’s organisation and planning difficulties during tendering and planning 
before construction commencement in the contractor’s organisation. 
In the case of Asia, incompetence in the procurement system as a whole appeared to be  
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the problem. The clients were said to be inexperienced in project management, inadequately 
prepared for projects and had unclear objectives which resulted in many design changes. The 
consultants were unprepared for the task of design and document preparation which resulted 
in numerous scope changes because of constructability problems and supervision difficulties. 
They were seen to have poor management of the site, poor estimates and financial problems 
which may have been caused by poor preparation for the task (See in the work of Abdul-
Rahman et al, 2010; Doloi et al, 2012; Long et al, 2004; Morris, 1990; Ramanathan et al, 
2012). Again, like in the Middle East, these problems seem to stem from poor pre-project 
planning sometimes called front-end loading as well as contract tendering and planning by the 
contractor. 
In Africa, the causes were similar to the other two regions. The major cause was said to 
be the client’s late payments to the contractor followed by the contractor’s financial problems. 
The client was blamed for frequent design changes, incomplete designs; inadequate 
procurement systems and bureaucracies in the organisations especially for public projects. 
The contractor was blamed for inefficient management systems of labour, materials and the 
contract. (See Mansfield, Ugwu & Doran, 1994; Ogunlana and Olomolaiye, 1989; Frimpong, 
Oluwoye & Crawford, 2003; Aibinu and Jagboro 2002; and Baloyi and Bekker, 2011). Most 
scholars were investigating the overruns during construction. Hatush, Saleh and Shiki (2005), 
investigated factors during design. They found that they were mostly caused by bottlenecks 
in the preparation process such as delays in opening letters of credit thus affecting advance 
payments, instability and bad central administration, continuous change in requirements and 
long and complicated chain of procedures in the decision-making process. 
In essence, the overruns were seen to be a result of the actions of the project team 
members in the project organisation. This is the evolution theory as suggested by Love et al 
(2016). The project team did not follow the project execution plan. Thus, what they do in the 
management and governance of the project is what is seen to be leading to time and cost 
overruns as depicted in Figure 2.4 developed by the author. 
 
Figure 2.4: Working of team members in the project organisation leads to overruns 
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It also suggests that there could be some inefficiency in the project organisation or perhaps 
an environment that promotes the occurrence of time and cost overruns rather than inhibits 
them from occurring as Love, Edwards, Irani and Walker, (2009) found. Unfortunately, most 
of the scholars did not investigate the reasons behind these immediate factors leading to 
overruns (AlSehaimi et al, 2013) and how they relate to one another (Steyn, 2009). 
However, comparing overruns from general projects and those of large projects seem to 
show a pattern. Overruns from general projects seem to be caused by the internal project 
management factors whilst those from large projects appear to be caused mostly by external 
factors (Morris, 1989) some of which are set in motion imperceptibly even before the project 
starts. From the work of Morris and Hough (1987), overruns were caused by inflation, quantity 
increase, engineering changes, under-estimating, government induced changes, e.g. 
environmental requirements, increased safety requirements, interest charges and changes 
(Figure 2.5). In essence there are economic factors, government/societal factors and 
participant induced factors. 
 
Figure 2.5: Causes of overruns from the work of Morris and Hough, (1987). 
What is not routinely discussed is the response of the managing participants to these 
economic, governmental and participant induced causes. It is possible that these factors 
merely induce or trigger the fall towards overruns and the response of the participants then 
determines which direction they would fall to actualise into overruns. Flyvbjerg et al, (2003) 
somehow indicated lack of accountability and intended misrepresentation of the participants 
as the causes. 
Flyvbjerg et al (2003) after reviewing large projects in the transport sector found that the 
main reason for overruns was that the initial estimates were not realistic. They found that in 
the main, the costs of projects were under-estimated. The exchange rates, quantity and price 
changes and geological risks were under-estimated or ignored, expropriation costs, safety and 
environmental demands were ignored or under-valued. They also found that most large 
projects involve much technological innovation with high risk which often translates into cost 
increase and these were often not adequately accounted for in the initial estimates. 
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One aspect they found common on large projects is the inaccurate demand forecasts. 
These forecasts were typically wrong by 20˗70% compared to the actual development. It was 
also found that the extent and magnitude of actual environmental impacts were often different 
from forecast impacts and there was no post-project auditing. Further the regional, national or 
international developments usually claimed by promoters were found typically never to 
materialise and that, the forecast project viability differed from the actual. Forecast viability 
was often found too optimistic. 
They argued that there was a likelihood of optimism bias and misrepresentation during 
project preparation, risk negligence and a possible lack of accountability when making 
decisions because promoters would not themselves carry the risk burden, contractors and 
others stood to gain and would possibly have self-serving interests in under-estimating costs 
and over-estimating demand forecasts due to this rent-seeking behaviour. Thus, presenting a 
theory that overruns are caused by optimism bias and misrepresentation by project owners 
and planners during preparation. 
Eizakshiri et al (2011) were of the view that the intentions and motives of project 
participants potentially affected the project time. Merrow (2011) found that most corporations 
embarking on projects had outsourced many of their key competencies. Apart from 
misrepresentation and optimism bias in presentation of estimates, there is a possible theory 
that decisions are just poorly made due to lack of critical project management skills at the 
decision-making level in the project organisations. 
However, Esty (2004) was of the view that managers of large projects had more incentives 
to make careful and value enhancing decisions because they had more time as these projects 
take from 1-5 years to structure as well as the fact that there is much at stake: their personal 
wealth and reputations. This realisation then should restrain them from making poor decisions. 
He also observed that apart from incentives having a play on the decision-making process, 
manifestations of conflict in the decision-making process such as distress, agency conflicts, 
asymmetric information could also affect the decision making. 
Combining the work of Morris and Hough (1987) and Flyvbjerg et al, (2003) could provide 
some clues to what may be going on in the project organisation. For instance, the response 
of the project management team to economic factors could lead to cost overruns. The same 
is true with the governmental/society requirements. There is a possibility that certain factors 
induce certain behaviours in the project team which could potentially lead to time and cost 
overruns as shown in the author’s conceptualisation in Figure 2.6. 
Merrow (2011) from a large-scale research on major projects traced the many failures of 
large projects back to the sponsors and their financiers. These are the individuals and 
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institutions that plan the management of their organisations and the design of the project 
management structure. From the research, the root cause was seen emanating from the poor 
management of the front-end. Anderson and Merna (2003) observed that poor performance 
when re-examined often were due to poor project management especially at strategy 
formulation in the initial stages rather than poor performance down-stream. Merrow (2011) 
identified the root cause of overruns as: (1) there is much outsourcing of key  
 
Figure 2.6 Inducers of time and cost overruns 
competencies from corporations to private entities; (2) poorly informed decision making; (3) 
there is a woeful lack of accountability for results in decision making and management and; 
(4) there is a pathological focus on short-term health of the corporation and its shareholders. 
These may provide some clues as to what may be causing the managers to respond to the 
inducers in this way. For instance, outsourcing and poorly informed decision making could be 
contributing to the risk negligence, ignoring geological risks, expropriation cots and safety. 
Viewing the above causes, not only are overruns caused by actions of project members, 
but also resulting from the activities of the past. Thus, there are present dynamics such as 
rent-seeking behaviour and risk negligence as well as past dynamics such as outsourcing of 
key competencies affecting the management of the current project. Merrow (2011) in essence 
was saying problems of project failure potentially start earlier before the projects are conceived 
and prepared. Firstly, the organisations have embarked on outsourcing of their key 
competencies to other entities. This reduces the organisation’s control over the services it 
outsources (Elmuti, 2003). This could potentially leave the organisations without the various 
skills and professionals to handle projects both at planning and execution level leaving them 
to be supervisors and overseers of projects they do not fully understand (Groenveld, 2006; 
Ofori et al, 1996). Another problem, possibly resulting from the previous, is that decision 
making is often poorly informed. According to Merrow (2011), critical questions are seldom 
asked at the project conception stage in the board room. 
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The Rand Model of factors of overruns also gives an idea of what could be going on in the 
project management environment (Morris, 1989). According to this model, cost estimating 
errors, faulty execution of the project, changes in the project and changes in the project macro-
environment are seen as the principal causes of overruns (see Figure 2.7). Project definition 
and complexity determine how the costing will be done; technology selection, phasing, project 
definition and procurement affect the execution of the project; scope changes caused by 
external/environmental factors or technical problems cause changes in the project. All these 
ultimately lead to time and cost overruns. 
 
Figure 2.7: The Rand Model of factors causing cost over-runs 
Source: Morris, (1989). 
2.7 Root Cause of Overruns and the Inter-Relatedness of Factors 
As explained previously, on the problem of time and cost overruns, most scholars sought 
to identify the major or critical factors causing delays, but never went further to understand 
what may have been behind those factors, for instance, by probing deeper (AlSehaimi et al, 
2013), try to understand the mitigating factors (Olawale and Sung, 2010) and the 
interrelatedness of the various factors (Steyn, 2009).The problem is that none of the key 
factors are responsible on their own and are all inter-dependent (Clarke, 1999).  
Interestingly, Arditi, Akan and Gurdamar (1985), one of the earliest studies on the problem 
of delays, not only investigated the factors, but also went further to understand the reasons 
behind the factors using interviews though they did not investigate the interrelationships 
amongst the factors. 
Equally Chan and Kumaraswamy (1997) identified five most significant causes of time and 
cost overruns shown in Figure 2.8. They said the reasons behind these factors were 
deficiencies in the management capacity of the clients, consultants and contractors. 
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Groenveld (2006) pointed to the cyclical nature of the work flows in the South African 
construction industry as the reason behind poor capacity of the work in the industry. An 
increase in investment leads to shortage of materials and high input costs. The low work flows 
lead to retrenchments, resignations and the consequential loss of expertise and manufacturing 
capacity. Equally, Ofori et al (1996) discussed the negative impacts of work fluctuations on 
professionals and the contracting sector, which ultimately affects the planning and execution 
of projects. Knowledge and experience is lost and learning or relearning is required for each 
project, which affects the maturity of the industry. 
 
 
Figure 2.8 Causes of time and cost overruns 
Adapted from the work of Chan & Kumaraswamy, (1997). 
Morris (1989) said the reasons behind time and cost overruns in large projects were 
external factors or strategic factors such as inflation, customer change orders, geological 
uncertainty and community action. These issues were beyond the project team level and often 
started before the project was conceived. 
The review from previous scholars suggests that the factors behind the time and cost 
overruns could potentially start in the external and the organisation environment. 
2.8 Managing Large Projects 
2.8.1 The definition of a large project 
From literature, generating a definition of large projects is not straight forward (Jaafari, 
2004). This may be because the term large projects could be considered relative depending 
on the type of project, financial value of the project and the type of project owner or participant 
(Lin and Liu, 2011). Thus, a project may be considered large by one organisation or individual 
depending on their experience or knowledge. Projects involving unknown or newer technology 
would be considered complex and difficult and therefore, large. And likewise, an organisation 
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familiar with that technology would not consider such a project complex and large. This fact 
was equally noted by Morris and Hough (1987) in their study of the anatomy of large projects. 
They noted that some projects may be considered major though they may not be large 
monetary-wise but because they are complex and difficult to carry out. 
Lin and Liu (2011) in their study of the dynamics of small and large projects considered a 
project as small if it did not cost the company extraordinary amounts of financial assets or if 
its failure did not fatally affect the company. On the other hand, when a project’s failure led to 
disastrous financial consequences on the company, it was considered to be a large project. 
Some scholars find it easier to describe the characteristics of large projects than define 
them. Those who have attempted to define large projects do so with reference to the financial 
value assigned to the project. Some use the term major projects and others use mega projects. 
In this research, the terms major, mega and large shall mean the same and the term large 
shall be used. 
Esty (2004) defined large projects as those projects costing US$ 500 million or more. Tai 
and Anumba (2009) considered large projects as those that were worth more than £3.3 million 
(about US$5.5million at 2012 values). Murray (2010) defined mega-projects as very large 
projects costing more than US$1 billion. Merrow (2011) defined a mega project as any project 
with a total capital cost of more than US$1 billion as of January, 2003 or US$1.7bn in 2010 
values. Flyvbjerg (2011) defined major projects as projects costing US$100 million or more. A 
major programme was defined as a suite of projects costing US$1 billion or more. 
Nguyeni et al (2004b) researching large projects in developing countries, defined large 
projects as those costing more than US$1 million. Again, this shows the relative nature of the 
definition of large projects. In developed countries, large projects are those costing more than 
US$100 million. In developing countries, large projects are those costing more than US$1 
million. 
Perhaps the earliest comprehensive definition of large projects is that given by Morris and 
Hough (1987) who defined major projects as those which are particularly demanding either 
because of their size, complexity, schedule urgency or demand on existing resources or know-
how.  
Whittaker (1999) considered the time dimension as well to the definition of large projects. 
Large projects were defined as those projects with a duration of twelve months or more. 
Capka (2004) gave a broader view of large projects by discussing the characteristics. 
These were that they are highly complex, require exceptional skills and experience, involve 
difficult decision-making processes due to the large numbers of stakeholders, have large 
environmental and human impacts and are of long duration. The projects are fraught with risks 
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and uncertainty and have increased potential for scope creep because of the multiple 
stakeholders. 
The PMBOK does not define or identify large projects as a class of projects on their own, 
though under Procurement Management, it gets close to identifying large projects by 
recognising that complex projects could involve managing multiple contracts or subcontracts 
simultaneously or in sequence. This may be because the PMBOK was written from the 
premise of providing general guidelines on the management of projects. The PMBOK covers 
knowledge areas for general projects comprehensively. 
There are various knowledge areas in the PMBOK that are of particular relevance to large 
projects. These are: (1) Project life-cycle and environment management, (2) Project scope 
management and organisation structure, (3) Project integration management, (4) Project 
communications and human resource management, (5) Project time and cost management, 
(6) Risk management and, (7) Procurement management. 
The review above shows that there is no universal definition of large projects. Most 
scholars defined large projects from the financial point of view as those costing more than 
$100m. The major characteristics of these projects are that they are highly complex, require 
exceptional skills and experience and have high environmental and human impacts which 
make them very risky undertakings. 
In this research carried out in South Africa, a large project is defined as a project that is 
complex in terms of project delivery, involves several stakeholders and supply chain partners 
with a large scale of funding of more than US$30 million. 
2.8.2 Large projects are different 
In literature, there is no united view of the difference between large projects and small 
projects and consequently between the management of large projects and that of small 
projects. Some regard projects to be the same whilst others say that projects are not the same 
depending on size and other factors. Pinto and Covin (1989) said that academics commonly 
held the view that projects are similar whilst practitioners were of the view that each project is 
unique with different characteristics. From their research, they concluded that there are both 
similarities and differences amongst the project types as well as amongst the phases even of 
the same project. 
Shenhar and Dvir (1996) after literature review found that project management texts, 
handbooks and PMI take it for granted that all projects are similar. “A project is a project is a 
project.” They contended, however, that this was inconsistent with the fact that projects often 
have extensive differences within their systems and subsystems.  
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Packendorff (1995) also found that there is a general assumption that projects are the 
same in literature. He says this is because the processing of planning, controlling and leading 
are assumed to be the same yet the differences in the projects should make them to be treated 
differently. He identified some projects as unique and others as repetitive which from the 
organisational theory point of view, will have implications on desired competence of managers, 
choice of the planning methods and the policy composition of the team they should have. The 
other project typologies he got from the research of others include, well defined easily planned 
projects against ambiguous unpredictable projects similar to low tech/super-high-tech projects 
of Shenhar and Dvir (1996). Other categories are based on specialisations and fields such as 
civil engineering projects, transport projects, mechanical projects and building projects. 
Engwall (2003) also criticised the universal view of projects. He says this view is 
responsible for projects being viewed as a universal phenomenon so that though several 
project classifications have been suggested, there has been little theoretical impact. From his 
research findings, he agreed with Shenhar and Dvir (1996) that there are wide variations in 
projects and that projects have less common characteristics than was thought previously. 
Shenhar (2001) said that there are differences in projects. He pointed to the impacts 
projects have on the environment and the use of technology. Some projects have extensive 
impacts on the environment whilst others have little impact. Some projects use familiar 
technologies and others deal in non-existent technologies. 
Shenhar and Dvir (1996) from their case study research found that the more complex a 
project became, the more decision-intense it became, the more also it depended on highly 
educated and experienced people in specific narrow fields. For less technological projects 
such as assembly projects, it was found that small, functional and simple processes and tools 
sufficed to manage the project, but that higher technology projects required a project office to 
handle subcontracting and other integration efforts in a more formal way. The high-end 
technology projects required to build umbrella organisations to handle coordination, legal and 
external connections. In terms of communication at high-tech level, more intense and frequent 
communication is required. 
The distinction of the management of large projects compared to smaller projects has also 
been largely ignored in research as evidenced by the few scholars that have investigated the 
study of management of large projects (Morris and Hough, 1987; Merrow, 2011). This may 
have come from the lack of distinction between the different projects types by main stream 
project management professions and institutions such as PMI, APM and scholars as 
discussed before (Morris, 1997; Packendorff, 1995; Shenhar, 2001, Morris et al 2006). Yet 
there is a case that a project is a multi-faceted phenomenon contingent on the nature of the 
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task and the environmental characteristics, which is not consistent with a blanket view of a 
project applicable to all situations and circumstances (Packendorff, 1995). 
Morris et al (2006) said that the lack of distinction in the management approach was due 
to the mechanistic approach promoted by the PMBOK guide and PMI standards, which give 
a universal guide with the steps required to manage projects without consideration for 
complexity in projects, imagination and creativity. They contended that for defined work 
packages and simplistic solutions, the guides are appropriate but that projects that are more 
complex require understanding of the various interrelated factors, complex decisions and 
considerable judgement and experience. 
A review of the characteristics of large projects, indicates that they are not simplistic, but 
are complex undertakings. Endsley (1995) said that large projects are complex and dynamic. 
Capka (2004) considered large projects to be a different breed not only because of their large 
size, complexity and costliness, but also because there is ever an intense pressure to minimise 
or eliminate completely, the project’s adverse effects on the quality of life, commerce and the 
environment both during and after construction. The challenges are said to be more 
compounded when the projects are carried out in densely populated areas. Thus, the project 
risks which include politics, media, sensitive communities and, construction methods and 
techniques are high. Capka (2004) concluded that to successfully manage these projects, it is 
not only the anticipation of the complexity of the task at hand that is required, but also the 
realisation that large project management is more than just managing a lot of construction. It 
also involves the management of complex public dynamics. 
The review of literature shows that there is a general assumption in mainstream literature 
that all projects are the same whether small or large. The main reason behind this is that it is 
reasoned that the process of management is the same for all projects. Some scholars, 
however, have argued that there are differences in projects and that large projects are different 
not only due to the size, complexity and cost but also involve management of complex public 
dynamics such as environment, politics, media and community risks which require exceptional 
and experienced skills to manage. The review suggests that a realisation of a project type at 
inception would potentially help the project participants in preparing for the management of 
complex dynamics in large projects. 
2.9 Time and Cost Overruns: Influence of Project Management Competence 
Reviewing the various causes of time and cost overruns, it is clear that this is a complex 
problem. It is also indicative that project management performance is not dependent on a few 
factors, but several with numerous inter-relationships (Steyn, 2009). At the heart is project 
management competence (Crawford, 2005). This is confirmed by previous research that the 
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major cause of delay is poor management practice (AlSehaimi et al, 2013). In many studies, 
it was found that the actual performance on projects was often lower than expected (Ramazani 
and Jergeas, 2015). 
The relationship of project management competence and time and cost overruns has not 
been explored by many scholars. This may be because many concentrated on identifying the 
most significant factors of delays without necessarily investigating what was behind them. 
It is generally understood that competence of project management personnel has a major 
impact on the performance of projects and consequently the business (Crawford, 2005). The 
concern for project management competence has resulted into increased interest in project 
management training. This is seen in the exponential growth in the membership of 
professional bodies such as PMI and IPMA (Bredillet et al, 2015). As a result, various project 
management standards and guides were developed to improve on knowledge and practice. 
In project management, project management competence is seen to lead to better project 
performance which ultimately leads to improved organisational performance (Crawford, 2005) 
as illustrated in Figure 2.9. There are various factors that constitute competence which include 
personal characteristics, knowledge and ability to carry out the task. Crawford (2005) 
conceived an integrated model as shown in Figure 2.10. The model suggests that performance  
 
Figure 2.9 Project management competence and performance relationship 
Source: Crawford. (2005). 
is dependent on four characteristics: knowledge, skills, personality characteristics and ability 
to perform on the job. These are personal attributes which enable a person to carry out his 
work. Boyatzis (1982) said to do a job, a person draws from his inner resources so as to 
respond to the job requirements or request. 
From research carried out by others such as Morris et al (2006), Hartman and Dorée 
(2015) even Crawford (2005), there are other factors that affect performance in the project 
apart from the individual’s competence such as the organisation a person is working in, the 
economy of the country, the client, actions of third parties or unforeseen circumstances and 
other factors that impinge on the organisation, the project and the individual. These could be 
moderation factors or, as Olawale and Sung (2010) observed, inhibitors in the performance of 
individuals. 
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Figure 2.10 Integrated model of competence 
Source: Crawford, (2005) 
Margerison, (2001) suggested that there has been over-emphasis on individual 
competence and that this is misplaced as individual competences, though important, they 
need to be seen in the context of a team and what it requires to do. This therefore means that 
what affects effective performance is the collective competence of the individuals in the project 
environment, the competence of individual organisations in the project teams as well as 
competence of institutions in the external environment.  
Would it be that these factors affect the management of projects leading to time and cost 
overruns? Does project management competence, the collective competence and pressures 
from without affect the actions of a project team in managing large projects? How do these 
dynamics lead to time and cost overruns? It is hoped the research will provide some answers 
to these questions. 
2.10 Project Management Performance: Effect of Training and Qualifications 
Scholars have appreciated the need for training in project management and the existence 
of bodies of knowledge such as PMBOK (Shepherd and Atkinson, 2011; Cywinski, 2009, 
2004; Cicmil et al, 2006). These are essential for grounding the project manager with requisite 
knowledge to manage projects. 
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Several scholars, however, have argued that project management training has not fully 
equipped project management personnel to effectively manage projects. This is noted from 
the content and coverage of the training and the method of teaching conducted. (Ramazani 
and Jergeas, 2015). Thomas and Mengel (2008) argued that PMBOK and other standards 
focus mostly on linear, rational analytic approaches which conditioned students to think, feel 
and perform as instructed leaving them ill-prepared to deal with unexpected situations on site 
and failure to adapt to uncertainties or innovate new techniques and strategies. 
Hartman and Dorée (2015) likened the learning approach to the sender/receiver method 
where the individual acquires abstract and general knowledge through books and experts 
hoping that this will result in a change in the mental model of the learner which will make him 
competent to carry out project management. 
Shepherd and Atkinson (2011) appreciated the existence of bodies of knowledge but 
criticized that they did not address project complexity, but discussed projects as having clearly 
defined goals, well established lifecycle and largely linear in sequence which they found not 
to be suitable for complex projects. Morris et al (2006) also argued that the project 
management guides concentrated more on the series of steps required to be taken and less 
on the issues that needed to be managed. They also found them to be more execution oriented 
and hardly covered any material on project strategy and definition and management of 
external factors or human behaviours.  
Other areas of concern to scholars were that the training concentrated on certain aspects 
leaving out other equally important areas. Morris et al (2006) found that the training only 
covered the execution phase leaving out the preparatory, strategy and project shaping phase. 
Pant and Baroudi (2008) and, Bourne and Walker (2004) found that the training concentrated 
on the hard concepts at the expense of the soft concepts. 
This orientation is at variance with research on success factors of project management 
which emphasise more on the need for mixture of skills for project management personnel. 
Katz (1974) found that an administrator, who can be at any level in the organisation, needs a 
mixture of technical skills, human skills and conceptual skills to be effective. Pant and Baroudi 
(2008) found that not only technical competence is required to manage a project effectively 
but also the human management skills especially in today’s complex projects and prevalent 
specialisation. Working through others is required to accomplish project success. Equally, Loo 
(2002) found that an even split of human and technical skills were required to successfully 
manage. El-Sabaa (2001), however found that human skills of project managers were the 
most influential on project management practice. Turner and Mϋller (2003) said that the 
traditional project management competence areas are merely hygiene factors, essential but 
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do not lead to superior project performance. They proposed managing communication and 
risk as more critical. 
Buganza, Kalchschmidt, Bartezzaghi and Amabile (2013) mention other factors that could 
affect the performance of the trained personnel which have nothing to do with training. These 
include organisational factors, the characteristics of an individual and management’s 
commitment which may be supportive or inhibit behavioural changes. The poor results or 
performance could also be due to the ineffectiveness of the training, possibly due to having 
poorly designed the course.  
Wirth (1992) predicted future trends such as projects becoming global, industry 
fragmentation and multi-project management which would require managers to deal more with 
external factors and diverse skills of people. This requires moving away from the traditional 
technical issues to more relational issues. Morris (2013) called this the “Third Wave” in project 
management history where there is a move to managing the project’s external environment, 
including stakeholders, consideration of the influence of the project on the parent organisation 
and the external environment proactively and not reactively only. 
The review shows that knowledge through prior training is essential to project 
management competence. However, the training has been criticised in its approach and 
orientation. Most scholars have argued that the training has tended to concentrate on technical 
and hard concepts leaving out human management skills. This is seen by many to be at 
variance with research results which show that a mixture of both technical and human 
management skills is essential to successful delivery of projects. This suggests that the 
unbalanced approach to project management training could potentially affect the delivery of 
projects. 
2.11 Preparing for the Project: A Potential Factor in Project Competence 
Many factors have been identified as the causes of time and cost overruns. These include 
delayed payments from the client, incomplete designs and poor project planning and 
supervision by the contractors as described earlier in section 2.5. One area that has not 
received attention by researchers and practitioners is the preparation of project participants 
for the project (Ribeiro and Ferreira, 2010). The preparation is at two levels. Preparation for 
the job or position in the organisation and preparation for the project work. 
From the Concise Oxford English Dictionary (2008), to prepare is to make ready for use 
or consideration. It is also to make or get ready to do or deal with something. Preparation is 
defined as the action or process of preparing or being prepared, something done to get ready 
for an event or undertaking, a specially made up substance, especially a medicine or food. 
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For this research, preparing for the project is defined as the process or action that is 
undertaken to make ready the participants to plan and execute the project. 
Preparing for a position at work or career is mostly understood to be done through training 
and education through professional institutions such as PMI and the university or college 
degrees. The training and application of knowledge thereafter gives the trainee the necessary 
skills and competence to carry out the tasks in project management. This training however, 
has been criticised by some scholars that it does not prepare the participants for the actuality 
of project management due to its approach and orientation.  
Edum-Fotwe & McCaffer (2000) said that the training leaned heavily on the technical skills 
leaving out other areas. Equally, Cywinski (2009) found that the technical training was narrow 
which made it difficult for trainees to manage the reality of projects which are strewn with a 
broad array of human relations issues. Pant and Baroudi (2008) said that a mixture of both 
technical and people skills was required as project management involved a juggling of several 
issues at the same time. Winter, Smith, Morris and Cicmil (2006), Papke-Shields, Beise and 
Quan (2010), Ramazani and Jergeas (2015) also found that the preparation of project 
management personnel for projects through training in the classroom did not meet the actuality 
of projects particularly the relationship issues with today’s complex projects which involve 
multi-relationships, multi-organisations, people and many unknowns. 
Cicmil et al (2006) criticised project management research and training that it portrayed 
project management personnel as competent, purposive, decisive and rational when the 
actuality of projects showed that the project environment is messy with a lot of social issues 
to be solved. Equally, Miller and Lessard (2008) found that showing project management to 
be comprised of discrete elements did not reflect the actuality of projects which have 
overlapping phases from inception to completion.  
Preparing for a position at work or career is also through the Influence of the ideas and 
theories held in the industry and training domains as well as national and regional cultures 
and beliefs. These have an influence on the preparation and execution of projects by the 
trained project management personnel. Some theories and beliefs even work at variance with 
project management principles. 
Lee and McCalman (2008) contrasted the cultural orientation of the Japanese and the 
western United States of America. They found that the Japanese belief systems in their social 
life and at work encouraged trust and collaborative behaviour which is important in project 
management. The American belief system, however, encouraged competitive behaviour, 
expectation of compensation for work to be carried out and use of contracts to enforce 
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compliance which were at variance with the trust and team building required in project 
management. 
Phua and Rowlinson (2003) found that not only was motivation and commitment of team 
members strongly linked to national and organisational cultures, but that also other factors 
affected collaborative efforts and team building. These include professional orientation as well 
as sub-cultures found in organisations 
In terms of preparing for the project or project shaping, the early stages of the project, also 
called the front end (Smith & Winter, 2010; Merrow, 2011) are found to be critical and crucial 
to the outcome of the project (Söderlund, 2002; Gareis, 1989; Morris et al, 2006, Merrow, 
2011). Management of the early phases of the project affect the success of the entire project 
(Söderlund, 2002). Gareis (1989) found that both pre-project and post-project phases affect 
the execution phase. Smith and Winter (2010) from their research noted that projects must be 
soundly based to be successful and that “projects that fail have the seeds of their failure 
implanted from the onset.” Likewise, Gareis (1989) said energy, impulses and objectives 
invested at the beginning are factors that affect project performance.  
Morris et al (2006) wondered why the PMI and other standards seem to imply that project 
management is limited to the execution phase. If the case is that efficiency and effectiveness 
of delivery of a project is established at the front end, then it is important that project managers 
are part of the planning and management of this phase to set up the success frameworks of 
the project. 
Another area of concern is that of knowledge management. Abdul-Rahman, Yahya, 
Berawi and Wah (2008) found that project learning could help parties to mitigate project 
delays, yet surprisingly, project knowledge is not properly managed nor prioritised by top 
management. Ribeiro and Ferreira (2010) found that there is a lot of loss of experience on 
previous projects, especially the tacit knowledge because many organisations do not have 
systems of capturing and storing information. The inadequate work flows in the industry also 
have a potential to affect the adequacy of the preparation, planning and execution of projects 
as knowledge and experience is lost due to technical and professional turnovers (Ofori et al, 
1996; Groenveld, 2006). 
Results of the literature review show that many scholars agree that training is essential for 
preparing participants for project management. However, they criticise the approach of 
training that it does not prepare participants for the actuality of projects. It has been found to 
be technical oriented leaving out other equally essential areas such as human relations 
management. Other scholars brought out that beliefs and cultural orientations also affect 
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preparation and management of projects. The implication for this research is that these areas 
may be potential factors requiring attention in the preparation and management of projects. 
2.12 Risk Management, Estimating and Decision-Making 
The importance of risk management, estimating and decision-making in projects is 
acknowledged (Charrette, 1996; Busby & Payne, 1999; Flyvbjerg, et al 2003; Flyvbjerg, 2011). 
Several studies have been done with many scholars devoting attention to a specific area rather 
than a combination to see how these could potentially relate to each other and lead to time 
and cost overruns.  
Walker (1997) found that power games within project teams affected decision-making. 
Those with more power prevailed over those with less power. For instance, the consultant and 
contractor would avoid going against the client’s decision in order not to jeopardise future 
relations. Lui et al (2003) found that expertise and knowledge power could be used by 
specialists to influence decisions. 
Flyvbjerg (2011) found that certain circumstances influenced the behaviour of project 
participants. He found that the outcome of the decision the participants required influenced 
their behaviour in estimating and risk management of the projects. There was optimism bias 
and misrepresentation in estimates where managers ignored or under-estimated project costs 
because they wanted the project to be accepted. Jennings (2012) found that adversarial 
politics, organised interests, pursuit of ideological agendas and, other group-think behaviours 
affected decision-making. 
Charrette (1996) discussed the behaviour associated with risk stigma. Project participants 
ignore risks or consider them to be lower because admitting project riskiness is associated 
with not fully comprehending the problem or being pessimistic. This results in lower estimates 
and risk management difficulties due to the mind-set. 
In optimism bias it was found that managers ignored or underestimated the risks which 
affected their estimation of costs and decisions regarding proceeding with the project in spite 
of evidence to the contrary, thus falling victim to what is called “the planning fallacy” where it 
is difficult to adjust to other plans and figures and hope that “everything will go according to 
plan” (EGAP) (Flyvbjerg et al, 2003). Jennings (2012) discusses optimism bias and 
overconfidence when planning as well. These all affect the estimate and the plan for risk 
management. 
Busby and Payne (1999) found that human decisions are affected by illusion of control, 
love of decomposition of tasks and the outside view. The first is where participants take future 
events to be more predictable than they really are so that in planning they over-estimate how 
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much they can influence them. For the second, when estimating, the project is decomposed 
to the lowest costs and these costs added up to determine the total cost without considering 
that previous tasks have influence on subsequent ones as well as the effect of errors one task 
upon the next task. Lastly, use of past similar outcomes and applying them to the current tasks 
assuming that the occurrence of events including unexpected events from the past will be the 
same on the current task. This potentially leads to under and overestimating the project tasks. 
Tatum (1984) found that managers in large projects used experience and not rational 
processes to make decisions on organisational structures to use. Furthermore, he found that 
political and random choice processes also influenced the decision-making. Hartman (2008) 
said decision-making is not easy in large projects because the large project environment is 
volatile and complex with several forces and factors affecting. This makes it highly uncertain 
and susceptible to numerous changes, yet decision-making is assumed to be based on the 
Newtonian model which requires complete information and perfect rationality which rarely 
happens in practice. Leaders depend more on using human values to make decisions. 
Coming to risk management, it is generally assumed as important, but it is not formalised 
in the project management system in many cases (Tah & Carr, 2000). This is surprising since 
the most common unexpected risks are the factors behind overruns. Loots (2013) found the 
most common unexpected risks as (1) latent conditions such as ground conditions, (2) delays 
due to inadequate design and scope changes, (3) shortage of skilled personnel and increased 
cost of resources, (4) site access issues, (5) delays with the approval process. Further, as the 
size of the project increases, so does the complexity and consequently its riskiness due to the 
increased number of players and unforeseen delays. On large projects, public dynamics play 
into the management and execution of the project (Capka, 2004). The project manager has to 
deal with tough politics, commercial, regulatory and governance environments (Loots, 2013). 
These issues, therefore require risk management to be at the fore front of management. 
However, Tah and Carr (2000) said it is done on an adhoc basis and appears to be 
dependent on the skills, experience and risk orientation of the individual participants. 
Chapman and Ward (2003) said that for risk management to be effective, there must be a 
culture of reporting in the organisation which may not be the case where the process is not 
formalised. Charette (1996) says few managers see the need to make risk management a 
separate, formal or even the main activity especially for large and complex projects. This 
severely hinders the success of large projects. It is worsened also with the traditional bid-build 
procurement method that is commonly adopted in projects which leaves out other participants 
in the formative stages. Whilst it is acknowledged that risk should be allocated to the party that 
can best handle it (Flyvbjerg et al, 2003), the contractor who manages construction risk comes 
later in the process when the project strategy and approach has been concluded.  
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Baloi and Price (2003) said that risk management is beneficial if implemented in a 
systematic manner from the planning stage and throughout the project. It also needs to be 
understood that there is a risk dependence chain (Tah & Car, 2000). Certain risks are related 
to other risks which are related to other risks. Some risks lead to others which trigger others 
still. Risks are dynamic throughout the project’s lifecycle. Therefore, planning once and 
everything goes according to plan is not ideal for risk management especially, the uncertain 
large project environment. 
Tah and Car (2000) said that communication of construction management risks is poor, 
incomplete and inconsistent throughout the supply chain in the project lifecycle. There is also 
a problem of not having a unified system of risk management amongst the team members as 
each uses different techniques and methods for risk identification, analysis and management. 
The implication of this is that risk management may not be effective. 
Considering the high risks and uncertainties involved in large projects, Loots, (2013) and 
Charrette, (1996) recommend that decision making should proceed cautiously, investigating 
the potential risks of the actions and decisions taken. Equally, the sharing of knowledge and 
information on risks from various parties may be paramount as each party understands their 
risks and how they will impact on their work but rarely understand the impacts of their actions 
on the other participants. 
The review shows that there are certain factors that influence the behaviour of project 
participants in decision making which include power games, optimism bias, misrepresentation 
and cultural orientations of the participants. This then affects the estimating and risk 
management that is carried out. Furthermore, some scholars have noted that risk 
management, though acknowledged to be important, is not formalised in the management of 
projects. The review suggests that there is a possible link between the behaviour of project 
participants and the occurrence of time and cost overruns. 
2.13 Conclusions 
Time and cost overruns have been a persistent problem in infrastructure projects over the 
years. Various attempts have been made to solve this problem and to improve the delivery of 
projects which include the United Kingdom reports of Latham in 1994 and Egan in 1998. In 
the reports, the problem in the industry was seen to be rooted in industry fragmentation, poor 
communication and adversarial tendencies by project participants. They recommended 
improvement in the procurement processes which included partnering and less use of 
competitive tendering. Academic and industry professionals recommended other 
improvements that included streamlining the procurement process using gate/review points in 
the project life cycle. 
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Various factors have been cited by scholars as the causes of time and cost overruns which 
include numerous change orders from the client, delayed payments to the contractor, 
incomplete designs, slow decision making, poor planning and scheduling by the contractor, 
poor site and supervision management, poor productivity and contractor’s financial difficulties. 
The overruns were seen to be the results of actors failing to meet the time, quality and cost 
plan conceived at planning or tender stage or simply the actions and inactions of the project 
participants. 
Not many attempted to investigate the reasons behind the factors leading to overruns or 
to link them to other management theories to get a deeper understanding of project 
participants’ behaviour in projects and how that could lead to overruns. This may have been 
due to the aim of most of the researchers and the research methods used. Most wanted to 
find out the significant or most significant factors that cause overruns of projects in general. 
The predominant research method used has been the questionnaire or opinion survey where 
a list of causes is drawn from previous studies and given to respondents to rank or confirm 
that these were the problems faced in their projects, or that these were the major causes of 
over-runs of projects in general. In some cases, the researcher sought to find whether there 
was consensus amongst the different project management players on the causes of over-
runs. 
Recent scholars have disputed the often-cited causes of overruns saying they are not the 
root cause of overruns. They noted that opinions and not actual project data is used, the 
opinion survey used by most was not well suited to get a deeper understanding of the causes 
of overruns and that previous studies placed primacy on what the contractor could do to 
eradicate delays and took it for granted that the planned programme was accurate. A 
prominent finding in recent studies is that overruns are caused by optimism bias and 
misrepresentation by the project participants. 
Other scholars have contended that large projects are essential to society and have 
experienced more time and cost overruns compared to smaller projects, but have not received 
much scholarly attention. They are poorly understood, often inadequately managed and suffer 
more from time and cost overruns. From literature, the reason could be that scholarly books, 
articles, textbooks and professional institutions have not differentiated large projects from 
small projects. All projects are considered to be the same. Some scholars have, however, 
contended that large projects are complex, require higher technologies, skills, experience and 
have large potential to affect the community’s quality of life, commercial businesses and the 
environment during and after construction. Large projects involve management of complex 
dynamics, which require higher competencies. 
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The importance of project management competence has been discussed in literature and 
its link to business performance is well understood. However, the relationship between project 
management competence and time and cost overruns in large projects has not been explored. 
Competence has been modelled to be dependent on a person’s knowledge, skills, personal 
characteristics and ability to perform on the job. Some scholars have argued that effective 
performance goes beyond an individual’s competence and includes contextual considerations 
such as organisation, economy, the team, actions of third parties and unforeseen 
circumstances. This suggests that the collective competence of individuals in the project 
environment, in the organisation environment and external environment affects the 
management of the project and could potentially lead to time and cost overruns. 
Training and qualifications are closely related to competence. The view of most scholars 
and the industry is that knowledge of project management standards and procedures received 
through training is the key to effective project performance. Some scholars, however have 
argued that project management training has not fully equipped project management 
personnel to effectively manage projects. The standards have been criticised to be linear and 
rational analytic approaches. These have conditioned students to think and perform as they 
have been instructed leaving them ill-prepared to deal with uncertain and difficult situations in 
a project. The training is criticised for concentrating on technical skills leaving out equally 
important human aspects such as communication.  
Preparing for projects, of which training is a part, has received little attention as well. 
Preparation is at two levels: preparation for the career position in the organisation and 
preparation for a specific project. Preparation for a career, which was discussed before, has 
been criticised for its approach and technical orientation which leads to insufficiently prepared 
project management personnel to manage the actuality of projects filled with much social 
issues to resolve. The rational deterministic approach has been criticised as well. It orients 
project participants to fail to adapt to change and look outside for solutions instead of at 
themselves. Other areas that are seen to affect preparation and eventual execution of project 
work are ideas and theories held in industry, training domains as well as professional 
institutions, national and regional cultures and beliefs.  
In terms of preparing for project work or a contract, there are two areas of concern: the 
involvement of the project participant at the front end and the management of knowledge in 
project organisations. The early phases of a project are important as these affect the success 
of the entire project. Previous research says that projects that fail have seeds of failure 
implanted from the onset, yet in project management literature and standards, the project 
manager is hardly involved in the front-end. He is limited to the execution phase. In spite of 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
42 
 
his knowledge and experience in project management, he is not involved in shaping the project 
in the early stages. 
Whilst it is agreed that knowledge management is essential to project performance, 
scholars say that it is not properly managed and this affects preparation for future projects. 
There is much experience lost on previous projects due to problems of capturing, storage and 
re-use of previous project information. It is also compounded by the cyclical work flows in the 
industry which result in employee turnover with consequential loss of technical and 
professional expertise. 
This suggests that preparation for a project involves not only career training but also the 
ideas, theories and cultures in professional institutions and countries, shaping of the front-end 
and knowledge management. 
In decision-making, particularly, estimating and risk management, various factors that 
affect decisions have been presented by scholars. There are political games and power plays 
in organisations which influence the way decisions are made. There is a stigma associated 
with admitting the riskiness of a project as it could be seen as an admission of failure to 
manage the problem, leading to a behaviour of considering risks to be lower in spite of contrary 
evidence. This potentially leads to failure to prepare and manage risks due to the mind-set. 
Furthermore, humans are affected by illusion of control and love decomposition of tasks which 
makes them think they can manage a three-day task in one day and fail to consider the effects 
of interdependence of tasks due to decomposition. 
Scholars have noted that risk management is acknowledged to be important but it is not 
formalised in the project management system. It is often done on an adhoc basis and is 
dependent on the skills and risk orientation of the individual participant. Few managers see 
the need for risk management and it is worsened by the procurement approach commonly 
taken which does not promote a unified system of risk management among project 
participants. 
From the review of literature, it is seen that most studies investigating time and cost 
overruns were on general projects, with few investigating overruns on large projects. Most 
studies used the questionnaire survey method. Furthermore, there was not much attempt 
made to find the interrelationships amongst the various causes or linking them to other 
management theories to get a deeper understanding of behaviour in projects and how that 
could affect overruns. 
The aim of the research, therefore, using a combined case study and questionnaire survey 
method, explained further in the next chapter, was to study how the actions of a project team 
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in a large project affect the delivery of projects and to develop a project management strategy 
for the project owner to use on these types of projects. 
  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
44 
 
Chapter 3 Research Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter is described the research approach adopted for this study of the 
management of large construction infrastructure projects. The rationale for choosing the 
research approach, the research propositions, and the unit of analysis, selection of cases and 
participants and ethical issues are discussed. Also included is the explanation of the methods 
of collecting data and its subsequent analysis. The chapter is concluded with the limitations of 
the study. 
3.2 Research Design 
Yin (2014) explains that there are three conditions which help in determining which method 
to use in a particular study. These are (1) the type of research questions posed, (2) the extent 
of control a researcher has over actual behavioural elements, and (3) the degree of focus on 
contemporary as opposed to entirely historical events. On the type of research questions 
posed, he explains that, research normally answers questions of, “what?” “who?” “where?” 
“why?” “how?” “how many?” and “how much?” Experiment, history and case study research 
strategies or approaches address research questions of “how?” and “why?” Surveys and 
archival analysis, address questions of “who?” “what?” “where?” “how many?” and “how 
much?” On behavioural events, only the experimental method requires control of behavioural 
events. Lastly, experiment, survey and case study focus on contemporary events. History 
focusses on historical and archival analysis on both historical and contemporary events. 
The research question for the current study was, “Why and how do large construction 
infrastructure projects incur time and cost overruns?” The case study method was therefore 
the most appropriate method of research for the study. However, to improve reliability of 
results, triangulation of data, of methodology and of results was used (Robson, 2011, Love, 
Holt & Li, 2002). A mixed method of case studies and questionnaire survey was adopted in 
the research. Love et al (2002) explained that a mixed method approach was more adapted 
to construction management research as it dealt with both natural sciences (the positivist view) 
as well as the social sciences (the interpretist view). A singular method would make one leave 
out other aspects that the different approach would have brought in. Therefore, in order to get 
a complete picture of a given phenomenon, a blend of methods should be used. They 
explained the ways of triangulating that could be used as (1) by time source where the results 
are from different time intervals, (2) by source nature where results are from different sources 
such as documentary and interviews, (3) by collaboration of investigators where the results 
are from more than one investigator, (4) by methodology where different research approaches 
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are used, (5) by interdisciplinary involving more than one professional discipline, and (5) by 
validation of input of results 
In this research, the case study method was chosen as the primary method of research 
and the questionnaire survey as the secondary method. The case study method was chosen 
to get in-depth understanding of the actuality of projects. The questionnaire survey chosen to 
see how generalisable the case study results are in South Africa as well as investigate how 
large projects are managed and to get the perceptions of the professionals on the problem of 
time and cost overruns on large projects in South Africa. 
3.3 The Case Study Method 
The case study method was chosen as it deals with the “why?” and “how?” questions. The 
method is also more appropriate for contemporary events and the researcher has no control 
over the actual behaviour of the elements. Another reason is that the case study research 
method enables one to carry out an in-depth investigation of the phenomena which makes it 
suitable for investigating the factors that lead to time and cost overruns. 
Strengths of the case study method 
The case study method has various advantages over other methods. Darke, Shanks & 
Broadbent (1998) say that case study research allows investigation into contemporary events 
in their natural setting and enables a focus on understanding the dynamics in the single 
setting. Hofstee (1998) also explains that case study research is useful when detailed 
knowledge is required of any particular case for whatever reasons. Equally, Fellows and Liu 
(2008) explain that case study research encourages in-depth investigation of particular 
instances within the subject and also provides insights and ideas as well as helps to describe 
phenomena. 
These attributes are particularly useful in this study where the underlying reasons for the 
time and cost overruns in projects are being investigated. A holistic approach appears to be 
useful as it enables the study of the multitude of factors and how they interact in their context. 
The detailed knowledge to be gained will also help in providing insights and ideas on 
determining the project management strategy for large projects. 
Weaknesses of the case study method 
Fellows and Liu, (2008) mention two major limitations of the case study research strategy. 
These are; observer biases and the problem of controlling extraneous variables. In the case 
of the observer biases, it is pointed out that the researcher’s biases can potentially affect the 
interpretations in the analysis. The other problem is that the researcher may be affected in his 
observations of the phenomena based on his or her experience or inclination which effectively 
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affects the reliability and validity of the results. Yin, (2014) advises that using multiple sources 
of information helps to reduce the observer biases. Documentary analysis, questionnaires, 
intensive interviews and observation are the multiple sources that were used to gather data in 
this research. 
Extraneous variables are factors or events not strictly being studied which may affect the 
research. In experimental research, to remove this problem, the study is normally carried out 
in a controlled environment so that the researcher can manipulate the isolated variables and 
see the effect. In case study research, the phenomenon being studied is investigated in its 
natural setting. This then makes it difficult to rule out alternative explanations from what has 
been observed. Yin, (2014) mentions two concerns with extraneous variables. The first relates 
to the causal relationship of x factor leading to y when there could be another third factor. The 
second is that of inferring from observation that a particular event is due to some earlier 
occurrence. He proposes two ways of dealing with this problem. One approach is that the 
researcher should design the research to deal with rival explanations, for instance having case 
studies which replicate the theory and others which disprove the rival explanations. The other 
method is to take steps in the analytic phase to deal with the alternative explanations. 
Another weakness of the case study research approach is that it is not highly regarded by 
some scholars and is often taken to be for exploratory research (Yin, 2014). Hofstee, (1998) 
cautions that the researcher needs to be careful with the method as there is a potential of 
losing focus with the method and the difficulty of generalizability of results as well as 
subjectivity. He recommends using this method with others to avoid biased results. He also 
recommends reading several articles that have used the case study approach to get guidance 
on how others used the method. Yin, (2014) explains that taking steps in preparing for the 
case study research as well as drafting a research protocol, which should be adhered to would 
improve the validity and reliability of the research method. 
In recognition of the potential problems as identified by other scholars, articles were 
considered in project management and other disciplines that have used or discussed the case 
study approach as well as the formulation of the research protocol, shown in the Appendix A, 
to minimize the weaknesses observed. 
3.3.1 Research instruments 
The main instrument for the case study research was the interview. It was supplemented 
with documentary evidence and observation. Robson (2011) explains that the case study 
method is essentially a multi-method research strategy enabling a researcher to use various 
data collection methods which include interviews, documentary evidence and observation. 
These techniques are discussed in the next paragraphs. 
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Interview guide and research protocol 
An interview guide was developed to use in the field when carrying out the interviews (see 
Appendix B). A research protocol was also prepared for each case study (Yin, 2014, Creswell, 
2014). The protocol contained the interview guide, the procedures and general rules to be 
followed in the field. It basically had four sections: (1) case study research overview, (2) field 
procedures, (3) case study questions (4) case study reports and analysis plan. 
The case study questions were in two sections, (1) personal data and (2) project specific 
data. The project specific data included variables of project structure, involvement of the client 
and other project participants in the planning and execution of the project, qualification and 
experience of project members, experience during planning and execution of the project, use 
of project management principles, preparation for the projects, selection of sites, decision 
making, time and cost overruns and reasons for the overruns. Similar to the approach taken 
by Hartman and Dorée (2015), in the interviews, the respondents were allowed to reflect and 
reconstruct the activities of the project and what may have led to time and cost overruns and 
the effect or involvement of various personnel. 
Validity and reliability of research 
Creswell, (2014) explains that validity and reliability for a qualitative research is different 
to that of a quantitative research. Validity for a qualitative research means the researcher 
checks for accuracy of the findings by employing certain procedures. Reliability refers to the 
researcher’s consistency in his investigation across the different projects or cases. The 
strategies used to validate research results in this study were: using multiple sources of data 
also called triangulation (Fellows & Liu, 2008; Love, Holt & Li, 2004, Yin, 2014), checking 
results with respondents, using rich descriptions to convey what actually happened in the 
research, presenting contradicting evidence, and spending more time in the field. The 
strategies to improve reliability included setting up a research protocol, and checking 
transcripts for errors. 
Interviews  
The major data collection method used in the case study research was that of interviews 
with respondents. The method used is similar to that adopted by Giezen (2012) who was 
investigating ways of reducing mega project complexity. He used two types of interviews; the 
narrative and the reflexive. In the former, the respondent was allowed to recall as much as he 
could on the past events without any interruptions. It was considered that this method would 
help the respondent to recall the defining moments of the project management process. In the 
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latter, the respondents were asked questions on particular issues. It was hoped this method 
would provide insights into the perceptions of the actors.  
Interviews have advantages and disadvantages, as explained by Robson (2011), 
compared to other techniques. The first advantage is that they enable a researcher to quickly 
find out things or what is going on by directly asking the ones involved in the activity or process. 
They are, therefore, a short-cut to answers to research questions unlike methods such as 
observation which may take longer before the answers are found. This is useful especially for 
investigative research. In the current research, the actors in the management of large projects 
are in the best position to explain what they think leads to time and cost overruns in the 
projects. The second advantage is that interviews offer a researcher the opportunity to modify 
the line of enquiry as well as probe further and investigate underlying motives and actions. 
The third advantage is that face-to-face interviews enable the researcher to get non-verbal 
messages from respondents which may not be apparent in a method such as the 
questionnaire survey. 
The disadvantages relate to the length of time it takes to carry out the interview and the 
skills of the researcher. The first disadvantage is that interviews could be time consuming thus 
leading to respondent fatigue which could affect the focus of the researcher as well as the 
answers given by the respondent. Both the respondent and the researcher may eventually 
want to complete the process which could affect the clarity of the information being obtained 
or given out. The respondent fatigue may also affect the respondent’s behaviour in subsequent 
research. The second disadvantage is that interviews require skill and experience to carry out, 
especially the ability to probe and follow up leads. Sometimes non-verbal cues could be 
different or conflict with verbal ones and this requires skill for one to get the right message 
being conveyed. The third disadvantage is the lack of standardisation of the method which 
could result in difficulties of reliability and biases. Maintaining high levels of professionalism, 
using both structured and unstructured interviews and thorough preparation and planning are 
recommended to deal with these disadvantages (Robson, 2011). Other disadvantages 
mentioned by Fellows and Liu (2008) are that interviews are labour intensive and that the 
results of the research could be influenced by the way the questions are asked or probed. 
To deal with the disadvantages, a pilot interview with two experienced construction 
professionals was carried out to see whether there is clarity in the matters being discussed 
and the length of time it would require. A research protocol was also prepared to be used to 
provide the template and standard to guide the research process. 
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Documentary evidence 
The documents included the materials and reports compiled by the various organisations, 
particularly the client. Examples of these are the project charter, client’s brief, consultant’s 
brief, tender documents, final accounts, periodic reports, minutes of meetings and project 
handover/commissioning reports. Documentary evidence was used because they give an in-
depth insight into the activities during the life of a project, especially that the originators and 
managers of the project compile them. The other advantages according to Robson, (2011) 
are that the documents enable unobtrusive evaluation, the data are in a permanent form which 
enables re-analysis and the data lends itself to possibilities of longitudinal research where a 
series of documents are available. The disadvantages are that the documents may be limited, 
they may not meet the needs of the current research as they were written for other purposes 
and, they may give a biased view as well as overlook issues not recognised or those which 
the owners choose not to highlight. The multi-source approach helps to minimise this 
weakness.  
Observation 
In this method, the researcher observes the activities as they happen to understand the 
phenomenon. The advantages of this method are that it enables collection of data in a more 
direct, free from poor memory and the likelihood of the respondent presenting themselves in 
more favourable light (Robson, 2011). In this way, it helps to get data in a real-life situation 
compared to other techniques such as interviews and questionnaires. Robson (2011) further 
says that observation also enables one to get data from what people say and do as opposed 
to only what people say as there is often a mismatch between what people say and what they 
do. 
There are various disadvantages of this method. It is not easy or trouble free. The observer 
is perceived to affect the situation. The method is time consuming and there is ever a danger 
for observer bias in recording events based on personal experience. There is a danger of 
people being affected in their response by the presence of the observer, the ‘Hawthorne 
effect,’ (Fellows & Liu, 2008). Ensuring the observed are unaware of being observed and, the 
researcher participating in the research as a participant observer are methods used to counter 
reactivity. To avoid the problem of time, a structured approach was used which entailed 
identifying activities, individuals and organisations to be observed.  
3.3.2 The unit of analysis 
The unit of analysis is considered essential in case study research. It helps to clearly 
delineate what is to be evaluated in the research. Yin (2014) mentions two essential 
characteristics which should be clearly identified. These are; defining the case and bounding 
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the case. The first refers to the need to identify a phenomenon for study which is not vague. 
The second refers to the need to identify the boundary of the case which could be geographic, 
particular time period or some other context. 
The unit of analysis or the case identified in this research was “the workings of project 
members in formulating and implementing a project.” The aim was to see how the actions of 
the project team affect the delivery of projects. In terms of bounding the case, the context of 
workings of project members was in a large infrastructure project in a developing country. This 
entails understanding the dynamics of a developing country and understanding the 
characteristics of a large project. The embedded unit of analysis was time and cost overruns. 
3.4 The Questionnaire Survey 
The questionnaire survey method was chosen to aid in determining what method of 
management is used in managing large and small projects in South Africa as well as to 
generalise the results from the case studies. This also required a numeric verification of the 
number of professionals who manage projects in this particular way. The survey was to 
complement as well as to compare with the results from the case study. It was carried out after 
the case studies. Lastly, the method was chosen because it is useful in determining the 
opinions, beliefs and attitudes of the professionals in the management of projects (Yin, 2014).  
In the research, the aim of the questionnaire survey was to find out the beliefs and attitudes 
of professionals with regard to the management of large and small projects. This requires 
reaching out to many professionals in various institutions and locations in the vast country of 
South Africa. Since many cannot be reached, a convenient method is to get a sample of the 
population. The survey method is well placed to generate this type of information as the basic 
purpose and rationale of the questionnaire survey is to generalise from a sample of a 
population so that inferences can be made on any characteristic or behaviour of a population 
(Creswell, 2014). The other advantages of the survey method are that due to anonymity, they 
encourage frankness and they can be used to collect generalizable information from anyone 
(Robson, 2011, Hofstee, 2011).  
The disadvantages of questionnaire surveys include the possibility that data may be 
affected by the characteristics of the respondents e.g. memory and knowledge; the possibility 
that respondents would not report their beliefs, attitudes; questionnaire surveys typically have 
low response rates and that respondents would possibly not regard the survey as serious 
(Ibid, 2011). 
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3.5 Study Design 
The research question was “Why and how do large construction infrastructure projects 
incur time and cost overruns?” 
To discuss the question, the following sub-questions were considered: (1) How is the 
client’s involvement in planning and implementation of large projects? (2) How does the 
training and experience of project members affect the implementation of large projects? (3) 
How are the principles of project management implemented in large construction infrastructure 
projects? (4) How does the involvement of the client, training and experience of project 
members and consistent use project management principles affect decisions for project 
organisational design, time and cost schedules? (5) What would be the strategy for improving 
the delivery of large infrastructure projects? 
 
Figure 3.1 Research procedure 
 
Gain insights into reasons for time and cost overuns in large projects
Develop general concept of large project management and evolution 
of overruns
Understand the causes of time and cost overruns in the project. 
Generate theory of overruns causation
Investigate whether or not the theory observed in typical case study is 
true in these case studies
Investigate whether or not the non-overrunning cases prove the 
theory in typical and overrunning cases. Derive lessons from the non-
overrunning cases to produce a project management strategy to 
reduce overruns
Confirm whether the results from the case studies are generalisable 
to South Africa. Understand the practitioners' views of the problem 
and how they think it can be solved to validate the project 
management strategy
Comparing results from the case studies and questionnaire surveys, 
conclude the research on the problem of time and cost overruns in 
large projects in South Africa
Produce the project management strategy
Literature Review
Conceptual 
understanding of 
overrun causes
Select typical 
overrunning case
Select two similar
overrunning cases
Select two non-
overrunning cases
Conduct
questionniare 
survey
Conclude the 
reseach
Generate the 
project 
management 
strategy
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3.5.1 Research procedure 
A sequential research approach was adopted (Creswell, 2014). Firstly, a literature review 
was carried out using Stellenbosch University electronic data bases: Web of Science and 
Science Direct, to gain insights on the management of large projects and the problem of time 
and cost overruns. (See Figure 3.1). A conceptual understanding of the causes of time and 
cost overruns and poor management of large projects was formulated followed by 
identification of a typical overrunning project for study to understand why and how the overruns 
were caused. Two similar overrunning projects were identified to confirm or not the 
observations in the typical overrunning project. This was then followed by a study of two non-
overrunning projects to confirm the observations in the overrunning projects and to provide a 
basis for lessons of how a large project was successfully managed. These successful projects 
would form the background from which the proposed solution was formulated. 
A questionnaire survey was then carried out to confirm whether the results could be 
generalised to the whole of South Africa as well as to validate the formulated strategy. This 
was then followed by conclusions and final formulation of the project management strategy. 
3.5.2 Selection of people and organisations 
Research methodologists recommend a series of necessary steps in the formulation of the 
research design and plan which includes identification of a population and sample which is 
representative (Fowler, 2009). The population is the group of people or entity that we wish to 
study or draw conclusions from (Babbie, 2011). Since it is difficult to study or observe everyone 
in the population, sampling provides a means of collecting data from the population. Further, 
sampling saves time, simplifies the research, cuts down costs and is a useful way of 
determining the specific properties of a population (Brynard, Hanekom and Brynard, 2014). 
Case study method 
Case studies do not use representative sampling commonly used in questionnaire surveys 
(Darke et al, 1998; Flyvbjerg, 2006; Yin 2014). This is because a very large sample of cases 
would be required which is impossible to achieve for empirical verification. The other reason 
is that these types of studies are less concerned with generalisation, but focus on 
understanding social phenomena in their natural setting or context (Darke et al, 1998). 
Non-probability sampling is used in case studies, specifically, purposive sampling and 
snow ball sampling. As explained by Robson (2011), in purposive sampling, the sample is built 
up in the research using judgement as to the typicality or interest based on the theory being 
investigated. Creswell (2013) also explains that this method relies on determining a sample of 
people or organisations that can best inform the researcher about the problem at hand. In 
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snow ball sampling, the researcher identifies individuals from the population of interest and 
these in turn, help to identify other respondents. 
Purposive sampling was, therefore, adopted for this research. This involved identification 
of projects and individuals from whom the data would be gathered. Like Walker (1997) noted, 
a decision had to be made on whether one key player or several team members were to be 
interviewed. He chose the construction team as they were considered the most reliable source 
of knowledge about the projects being studied since they were seen as the ones who dealt 
with construction delays or cessation of work due to re-design. Even in this research, the 
construction team is the one that has to deal with time and cost overruns and any mitigation 
measures required. However, in the current research, it was considered equally important to 
understand the planning and decisions made before the commencement of construction. This 
knowledge, the construction team would not have as they get involved in the project life-cycle 
much later after the design has been finalised. It is also noted by some scholars that the 
problem of overruns starts in the front-end of the project (Merrow, 2011). 
This, therefore, meant that the views and experiences of the client and consultant team 
were of importance to the research. Respondents were identified based on the function they 
had in the management and execution of the project. The typical case was of the client, 
consultant and contractor. 
Single or multiple case study research could be carried out (Yin, 2014, Darke et al, 1998). 
In a single case study, one case is identified and studied in-depth. The situations in which a 
single case study is used include where the case study represents a critical test of theory or 
best represents the study of the theory or where the situation provides a unique instance for 
study and may not be repeated (Yin, 2014). Multiple case studies are used to investigate 
whether a single case situation is generalizable to others. It is used in three ways. (1) Predict 
similar results called literal replication, (2) predict contrary results but for predictable reasons 
also called theoretical replication, and (3) cross case comparison (Ibid, 2014, Darke et al, 
1998). 
Multiple case study was adopted in this research. Creswell, (2013) recommends that not 
more than four or five case studies should be included in a single study. Such a number gives 
the researcher ample opportunity to identify themes of cases as well as enable him to carry 
out theme analysis across the cases. Harding (2013) recommends strategies to use in 
selecting the cases: (1) select extreme or deviant cases, when it is thought this could give the 
best understanding of the field as a whole, (2) selecting typical cases to understand the field 
from the centre or average, (3) selecting maximum variation of cases in the sample to 
understand the range of differences in in the population. 
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In this study, a total of five cases were identified. Firstly, a typical case was identified. To 
see whether the results from the study would be similar for other projects or not, literal and 
theoretical replication studies were identified (Yin, 2014). The studies were as follows: (1) 
Case Study One (public project: stadium) – typical large project with time and cost overruns, 
(2) Case Study Two (public project: power plant) – literal replication study, (3) Case Study 
Three (private: transport project) – literal replication study, (4) Case Study Four (public project: 
dam) - better performed project, theoretical replication study (5) Case Study Five (private: 
commercial building project) – better performed project, theoretical replication study. The two 
good cases were studied together with the poor cases not only to verify the observations from 
the overrunning cases but also to aid in finding the solution to the observed problem. The two 
good cases gave the concept for the solution that was eventually proposed. 
Questionnaire survey 
For the questionnaire survey, multistage or clustering was used to identify the population 
sample. This method is said to be useful where the names of the people to be considered are 
not known (Creswell, 2014). This involved identifying, based on the unit of analysis, the 
organisations and individuals to send the questionnaires to. It required identifying the groups 
or clusters and then sampling within them. This improves the reliability of the research results 
(Brynard et al, 2014). The individuals and organisations at the heart of managing projects were 
identified as the client, consultants and contractors. The client is represented by the 
consultant; therefore, consultants and contractors were considered adequate for the research. 
It was therefore, decided that the questionnaires be sent to this group.  
In the South African construction industry, the various sub-groups include architects, civil 
and structural engineers, quantity surveyors, project managers and contractors. These are 
affiliated to different bodies such as South African Institute of Civil Engineers (SAICE), South 
African Institute of Architects (SAIA), Association of South African Quantity Surveyors 
(ASAQS), Consulting Engineers South Africa (CESA) and Construction Industry Development 
Board (CIDB). CESA was chosen for the consultants and CIDB for the contractors. It was also 
decided to collect data from the Construction Management Programme (CMP) 2014 
participants at Stellenbosch University. The CMP is an intensive four-week middle 
management course offered annually at Stellenbosch University. 
CESA was chosen, being an organisation that was representative of all consulting 
engineers and allied professions involved in the built, human and natural environments who 
are affiliated to it unlike the other bodies which were found to be devoted to a singular field. It 
was also found to readily enable access to information such as membership and contact 
details of members which most other associations did not provide. The membership was also 
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categorised to indicate the type of work or level of projects the members were involved in. 
Lastly, most of the firms involved in large projects were found to belong to this organisation. 
The organisations in the large projects category were identified. 
CIDB for the contractors was chosen as it provided a comprehensive listing of all 
contractors, required by law in South Africa, to carry out public sector works. The contractors 
in Grade 9 who carry out work of R130m and above were identified.  
CMP participants were chosen because they comprise a diverse group of professionals in 
the construction industry from client organisations, consultants and contractors. These are 
professionals in the middle and senior management positions in their respective organisations 
with several years of experience in the management of projects. 
Determining the right sample size is never given a definite answer by scholars (Fowler, 
1984). Brynard et al (2014) emphasises that the sample must be representative of the 
population. They provide a table that could be used as a guide in determining the size. Using 
the guide, the sample sizes in Table 3.1 were adopted. Since the population sizes were small 
questionnaires were sent to all people in the groups. 
Table 3.1 Population and samples of the questionnaire survey respondents 
Group Population % Sample 
Required 
Suggested 
Sample 
Actual 
CESA 46 64% 29 46 
CIDB 98 45% 44 98 
CMP 40 64% 26 40 
The survey instrument 
The platform that was used to collect data was the Stellenbosch University web-based 
software, Checkbox. Participants were invited to the survey by email. By clicking a link, they 
could answer the questions. They were given an option to save and later return to continue 
with the survey. They also had an option of opting out of the survey. The software method was 
used because of its merits of easier reach to respondents, quicker possibility of response and 
low cost (Robson, 2011). The method also renders itself easier for use of software for analysis 
of results. The potential disadvantages of the method include the possibility of low response 
rates with lengthy questionnaires, possibility of misunderstanding the questions and the 
researcher’s lack of control on the order the questions are answered or not answered at all 
(Ibid, 2011). 
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The questionnaire contained 45 questions, both open ended and closed questions. In the 
closed questions, the respondents were asked to rank or tick the answers that represented 
their response to the question (see Appendix C). This was useful to compare their responses 
with previous literature review. Open ended questions enabled the respondents to indicate, in 
their own words, the best response to the questions. This was thought more appropriate to 
enable them to describe or list their responses without being influenced by the expected 
answers. 
3.6 Research Analysis 
3.6.1 Case study 
Various approaches could be used for qualitative data analysis. Harding (2013) 
recommends four methods. (1) Thematic analysis which involves identifying themes coming 
out of the data. This could be done by examining commonality for instance, common 
experience, and common opinion. (2) Comparative analysis which involves comparing or 
contrasting data from different respondents until no more issues or themes arise anymore. (3) 
Content analysis where the researchers work through each transcript systematically to see 
how certain factors arise which are recorded by codes. (4) Discourse analysis which focusses 
on patterns of speech and the way the language is used to convey meaning. 
Yin, (2014) proposes (1) relying on theoretical propositions which form the basis of the 
units of analysis and (2) generating case descriptions of the areas of analysis to be 
considered, (3) pattern matching, (4) explanation building and (5) time series analysis.  
Using a thematic analysis, theoretical propositions, generating descriptions, pattern 
matching and explanation building, the analysis of the case study results was carried out. 
3.6.2 Questionnaire survey 
The following steps were followed to analyse the results: (1) Report on the response from 
the respondents to the survey; (2) Determination of response bias using wave analysis 
(Creswell, 2014). Wave analysis involves investigating the responses that came in later with 
the earlier ones to determine whether there was a significant change in the responses; (3) 
Descriptive analysis of results using tables and figures using various statistical measures such 
as means and standard deviations. Since the questionnaire survey was complimenting the 
main research method, it was thought prudent not get into extensive and detailed statistical 
analysis. The results were then presented using tables and figures from which interpretation 
of the results was generated. (4) Report on the conclusions from the survey and implications 
of the research and comparison with the case study research. 
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3.7 Approach to Triangulation of Results in the Research 
As explained under section 3.2 Research Design, triangulation was embedded in the 
method of research that was adopted: (1) Different sources of results were used which are 
documentary analysis, interviews and questionnaires. (2) Two different research approaches 
were used, namely case studies and questionnaire survey. (3) Input results from one method 
compared to the other which was done using rich descriptions from case study results and 
descriptive statistics from the questionnaire survey results.  
Within the case studies, the strategy was to embed triangulation of results from one case 
study to the next. A typical overrunning project was identified and the results from this study 
were validated using the other two overrunning case studies. This is called literal replication, 
as discussed earlier (Yin, 2014). The results from the overrunning project helped in 
understanding how the actions of the project team led to time and cost overruns giving insight 
to what could be theorised to be the reasons leading to time and cost overruns. The next 
overrunning case study was attempted to see whether what was observed in the typical case 
was true or not and whether the theory could be accepted or not. The last replication case 
was done to confirm further the results observed in the first and second study as at the mouth 
of two or three witnesses a matter is established (Deuteronomy 19:15; Mathew 18:16 Hodder 
& Stoughton New International Version). 
Furthermore, theoretical replication studies and the strategy of investigating rival 
explanations were carried out. This involved identifying non-overrunning case studies to 
understand whether these would confirm the opposite of the results in the overrunning projects 
as well as to confirm the theory proposed under the typical overrunning projects. It also 
involved disproving other identified possible rival explanations for the phenomenon under 
study. 
The questionnaire survey was done after the case studies to confirm the nature of the 
problem in South Africa as well as to confirm the results from the case studies to the whole of 
South Africa. The questionnaire survey was also used to eliminate the often cited short-coming 
of case study research of lack of generalisability of results (Hofstee, 1998).  
The triangulation of case study results to the questionnaire survey was discussed as the 
questionnaire results were presented following the adopted sequential presentation of results. 
3.8 Limitations 
Time and financial constraints were the major limitation to the research. The research may 
have benefited from total immersion in projects from inception up to completion and handover 
to enable total observation of all the activities of the participants and the consequences of 
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these. This would require a longitudinal study of projects over the years of the project duration 
but due to time limitations this was not possible. Due to the same reasons, not all large projects 
were investigated, but projects were purposively selected to enable an in-depth investigation 
of the phenomenon of overruns on the projects. The study was also confined to construction 
infrastructure projects in South Africa. It is believed that the results of the research are 
applicable to SADC countries and other developing countries. 
3.9 Ethics 
Ethical considerations are important in research for two reasons: (1) To ensure the 
participants are protected from potential harm and other negative consequences of the 
research (Robson, 2011). (2) To ensure that that the researcher carries out an honest 
research that is not fraudulent in any way (Harding, 2013). The second reason also 
incorporates the first requirement in that it seeks to regulate the behaviour of the researcher 
not only in his conduct but also in how he relates with the participants. He is required to uphold 
high moral research ethics. 
Fellows and Lui (2008) discuss a researcher’s ethical conduct on the basis of respect for 
persons, beneficence and justice. Respect for persons requires that participants are not forced 
to be involved in the research and that those with diminished autonomy such as children are 
afforded adequate protection and assistance when they take part. Beneficence refers to 
protecting people’s decisions and all endeavours to protect them from harm that may ensure 
from the research. Justice concerns fairness to all persons without isolating the rights of any 
one participant. This also refers to fairness in selecting of participants to the study. 
In summary, ethical considerations encompass the researcher’s conduct when he is 
carrying out the research and when he is disseminating the results (Lundin, 2011). That is, his 
conduct during literature review, data collection, use and disposal as well as the handling of 
data, analysis and reporting of results (Fellows & Lui, 2008). The work of the researcher is to 
ensure, in the three areas of research mentioned above, the research participants are 
protected and that he conducts himself morally following acceptable and recognised ethical 
considerations. 
To guide in ethics, ethical codes and guidelines are often adopted by institutions that carry 
out research (Lundin, 2011). In conformity with such requirements, Stellenbosch University, 
where the author carried out the current study, set up research ethical guidelines which all 
scholars and researchers are to strictly adhere to (see Appendix F). The research is only 
approved and allowed to proceed once the university research ethics committee is satisfied 
that the measures to uphold ethical conduct are satisfactory. The requirements in the code 
include explicit explanation of the measures the researcher will take to ensure participants are 
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informed of the research purpose, information to be gathered and how the researcher will 
ensure the participants’ privacy will be protected, the risks to data protection and how the 
safety thereof will be adopted. 
The potential ethical problems in this study were the disclosure of the names of projects, 
organisations and individuals concerned and project facts, particularly from case studies. The 
potential problem was that the disclosure of the project facts was likely to affect the way people 
would view the individuals and organisations and how these individuals managed the projects 
concerned. The specific measures taken were to ensure anonymity of individuals and 
organisations concerned. This was done by not disclosing names of individuals and 
organisations, but where it would help clarify a particular issue, positions were disclosed. 
Another measure was that permission was sought from the respondents to disclose project 
names and facts without identifying the organisations and individuals concerned. This was 
granted. In some cases, non-disclosure documents were signed where organisations did not 
want data disclosure without their consent.  
In line with the requirements of the university, ethical approval from the University Ethics 
Committee was also obtained. All reasonable attempts were made to protect information that 
was collected and this was used only for this research. The data will be kept in the repository 
of the departmental head at the university and only used with approval or consent of the 
organisations concerned.  
3.10 Conclusions 
The research approach that was selected for this study is the mixed method approach with 
the case study as the primary method and the questionnaire survey as the secondary method 
using the multi-source strategy for data collection. The techniques used were interviews, 
documentary analysis, observation, and questionnaires. The first three techniques were used 
to obtain information on the selected case studies. The questionnaire surveys were used to 
gain insight into the management of large and small projects generally. 
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Chapter 4 Research Results 
4.1 Introduction 
The objectives of the study were: (1) To study the nature and management of large 
projects. (2) To investigate the root cause and effects of time and cost overruns on large 
construction projects in South Africa. (3) To investigate how the project team plans and 
executes projects in South Africa. (4) To formulate a project management strategy to be used 
on large projects to improve the delivery of projects and reduce overruns. 
The primary method of research that was used is the case study approach using 
interviews, document analysis and observation where possible as discussed in Chapter Three. 
Five case studies were carried out. Table 4.1 gives the list and characteristics of the studies 
investigated. The results of each case study are presented in a chapter beginning with Chapter 
4, Case Study I, Chapter 5, Case Study II, Chapter 6, Case Study III, Chapter, and 7, Case 
Study IV and Chapter 8, Case Study V. This is then followed by a case study comparison, 
Chapter 9. 
Table 4.1 Cases studies investigated 
 
The second part of the research involved questionnaire surveys to construction personnel 
in South Africa to understand how large projects are managed in the country and specifically, 
whether there is any difference in management of large projects and smaller projects. Results 
from the questionnaire survey are presented in Chapter 10. This is followed by a synthesis of 
case study and questionnaire results in Chapter 11. The proposed strategy is presented in 
Chapter 12. Chapter 13 presents the conclusions for the study. 
4.2 Case Study 1 Project Description 
This is a case study of a project team in a public project which had time and cost overruns. 
The project is a stadium that was built to be used in the 2010 FIFA World Cup. After the award 
to host the 2010 World Cup to South Africa in 2005, it was decided a stadium would be built 
in the city to host the semi-finals. Selection of the site was a difficult task from the early stages 
with many residents and environmental pressure groups against the chosen site. Due to lack 
of experience in this type of work by the client and local consultants, foreign consultants were 
contracted to work with the locals. Competitive tendering was used on the project to select 
Case Study Project Description Project type Research
Case Study I Stadium construction Public Typical overunning project study
Case Study II Power plant construction Public Literal replication study
Case Study III High speed rail construction Public/private Literal replication study
Case Study IV Dam construction Public Theoretical replication study
Case Study V Commerical building construction Private Theoretical replication study
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contractors. Due to the large size of the project, both consultants and contractors formed joint 
ventures. The project incurred cost overruns, but was completed in time.  
Using idiographic causal mapping (Ackerman & Alexander, 2016), the case study will show 
why and how the project incurred time and cost overruns. It will show how the lack of project 
experience by the project participants made them ill-prepared for the project and how that 
affected their implementation of the project. The case study will also show the effect of 
pressure on the project team’s decision making. 
4.3 Respondents 
Six respondents were interviewed. These were the client’s representative, project 
manager procurement (overall), project manager (site supervision), quantity surveyor, 
electronics consultant and contractor’s project manager (Table 4.2). The others such as 
architects and structural civil engineers were not available at this particular time. 
Table 4.2 Case Study I respondents 
 
4.4 Contract Data 
Table 4.3 Case Study I contract details 
 
Table 4.4 Case Study I cost break down 
 
 
Project Position Organisation Organisation Position Experience
1 Project Manager (Site supervision) Consultant Project Manager Project Management Executive 23 years
2 Part of lead Quantity Surveyor Lead Quantity Surveyor Manager practice Lead 8 years
3 Client Representative Client Technical Director 35 years
4 Project Manager (Procurement) Consultant Project Manager Managing Director 34 years
5 Electronics Consultant Consultant Electronics Regional Engineer about 7 years
6 Project Manager (Construction) Contractor Managing Director 16 years
Client's estimate R1,2bn
Consultant's estimate R2,857bn
Tender sum/contract R2,998bn
Final contract R4,110bn
Cost increase 37%
Planned completion date 11-Jun-10
Actual completion date 08-Jun-10
Description Tender Sum Final Account
Preliminaries R 487 270 887,00 R 567 977 013,00
Measured Works R 2 142 729 113,00 R 3 037 799 669,68
Total R 2 630 000 000,00 R 3 605 776 682,68
Add 14% VAT R 368 200 000,00 R 504 808 735,58
Total R 2 998 200 000,00 R 4 110 585 418,26
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The contract data shows an increase in the cost from the initial estimate (Table 4.3). The 
project, however, was completed before the planned completion date and in time for the World 
Cup. 
A contract breakdown analysis of the tender sum shows that preliminaries were 22% of 
the contract, measured works, 22% and provisional sums 56% of the contract (Table 4.4). 
More than half the work was in provisional sums showing that most of the work was not 
completely designed at tender stage. 
4.5 Time and Cost Overruns and the Management of the Project 
From the interviews and documentary analysis, the reasons for time and cost overruns 
and how the project team managed the project were reconstructed (See Figure 4.1). 
There were six ways that led to time and cost overruns. These are shown in Table 4.5. (1) 
Location problems, (2) Pressure from the local community and media against the project, (3) 
The client’s insufficient budget, (4) The project participant’s under-estimation of the project’s 
complexity, (5) procurement requirements, (6) FIFA/City requirements. Most of the root cause 
of overruns originated from the external environment followed by project environment and then 
organisation environment (See Table 4.6 & 4.7). 
Table 4.5 Root cause of time and cost overruns on stadium project 
 
 
Factor Reasons
1 Location problems
Resistance from public golf and  local community Community fears of impact of project:
Area will be flooded by spectators
Value of the properties would be downgraded
Resistance from golf fraternity Historic significance of location
EIA rejection of chosen location Found the alternative location more suitable
Different ground conditions of EIA location Design had concentrated on original location
New location sub soil conditions different from the first location
2 Pressure from local community and media against the Public fears of project impact:
project Mar tourist attractions in the area
Mar location's historical siginifcance
Project would be costly when there are other needy causes
The project cost would bankrupt the city
Effect of Afrophobia pressure from Western countries on South 
Africa's ability to host World Cup
Threat of court action
3 Client's insufficient budget Lack of experience of similar projects
Under-estimating project complexity
Subtle pressure from public perception that project costly
4 Under-estimating project complexity Lack of experience of similar projects
5 Procurement requirements Longer process of statutory requirements:
Anti-corruption practices
Competitive tendering
6 FIFA/City requirements New requirements
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Figure 4.1 Stadium project overall time and cost overruns 
City
approves 
project idea
Location 
sought
Lack of 
experience
Budget 
& cost 
concept
Under-estimating 
project 
complexity
Pressure 
from locals 
& media
Insufficient 
client's 
budget
Consultant
advises budget 
revision
Client 
considers 2 
locations
Client seeks 
approval from 
National 
Treasury
Budget
revision
Approval 
delays
Securing 
funds 
delayed
Part 
payment to 
consultants
Delay of 
design 
production
Client asks 
consultants to 
develop concept 
only
Higher 
tenders
Locals and golf 
fratenity resist 
location 1
Client seeks 
EIA 
approval
Slight 
approval 
delay
Location 
2 taken
Consultants 
begin design 
on location 2
EIA rejects location 
2, approves 
location 1
Location 2 
abandoned
Approval 
made
Design 
commences on 
location 1
Full 
contract
Temporal 
contract
Consultant's 
time reduced
Insufficient 
time
Incomplete 
design
Specialist
areas not 
designed
Design
Changes
BOQ 
provisional 
sums
Fifa/City 
requirements
Location 1 
sub-base 
different Piling 
abandoned
Firm ground 
can't be 
found
Contractor
assesses 
document
Construction
method 
changed
Contractor 
claim
Scaling 
down 
project
Areas of 
cost-cutting 
proposed
Constructability 
problems
Stiffeners & 
bracing 
introduced
Rocky sub 
base
Decide to erect 
building on 
short 
excavation
Piling 
chosen for 
sub-base
Method 
found 
costly
Method 
abandoned
Erect 
building 
partly above
Time 
lost
Increased 
time
Increased 
cost Project will 
be delayed
Member 
can't stand 
load
Difficulty of 
inserting 
concealed 
services
Accelerate 
project
Change 
concrete to 
steel members
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
64 
 
Table 4.6 Root cause and the environment they originate from 
 
Table 4.7 Comparison of factors per environment 
 
4.5.1 Location problems 
The problem of location brought about many effects on the project, which ultimately 
resulted into time and cost overruns. There were four principle reasons for the location 
problems. The first was that there was resistance of the local community, environmental 
pressure groups, construction professionals and the media was against the project. The local 
community and the various pressure groups feared that the general location of the project 
would disrupt the tourism potential of the area, degrade the value of the location and bankrupt 
the municipality. The second was that the client was considering two locations in the area with 
location 1 as their preferred, but the golf community resisted this location because of its 
historical significance. There was a 100-year-old golf course on this location. The client 
therefore moved to location 2 and began conceptual designs on it. The third was that when 
the EIA report came out, location 2 was rejected and location 1 chosen instead. The client 
therefore moved to location 1 again and began conceptual designs based on this location. 
The fourth was that the ground conditions on location 1 were different from those of location 
2 on which the design had at first been based on. This led to design changes, construction 
method changes, project delays and the need to accelerate the project with its consequential 
increased costs in order to complete the project before the World Cup. 
Equally, due to the delay in approval of the client’s revised budget, there were funding 
constraints in paying the consultants which affected their design work (see Figure 4.1). A 
combination of location problems and delayed budget approval led to reduced time to design 
the project thus resulting into incomplete designs. 
 
 
Description Environment
1 Location problems External
2 Pressure from locals and media against the project External
3 Client's insufficient budget Project
4 Project participants' under-estimation of project complexity Project
5 Procurement requirements Organisation
6 FIFA/City requirement External
Environment Percentage
3 External 50%
2 Project 33%
1 Organisation 17%
6 Total 100%
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Discussion and implications 
Going through the effects of the location factor helps in understanding why the consultants 
did not complete the concept design and how that led to design changes, constructability 
problems and eventually time and cost overruns. It also helps us understand how the project 
team managed the project. This is in line with Söderlund (2004) who proposed that contextual 
investigation would help understand and build better theories on project management. The 
results confirm previous research that incomplete designs and design changes often said to 
be factors of time and cost overruns are not the root cause (Love, Edwards, Irani and Walker, 
2009). The results also show that: (1) An interplay of factors led to time and cost overruns 
(Steyn, 2009). In this case, the problem of location was a combination of resistance of the 
local and golf fraternity as well as the EIA decision which led to the delay of design production 
and consequential incomplete designs because the time for document preparation was 
insufficient (Loots, 2013). (2) The external factors affected the management of the project. (3) 
The shortage of time affected the behaviour of the project team. They resorted to short-cuts 
in the delivery of the project documents. In this case, they left un-designed the specialist areas 
and used more provisional sums to produce tender documents. This confirms the work of 
Mitropoulos, Abdelhamid and Howell (2005) from their research on conditions that lead to 
accidents that pressure makes workers susceptible to use any means or make do to complete 
tasks leading to poor working conditions and quality. Atkinson (1998) also found that 
incomplete investigations by consultants, incomplete documentation and higher risks and 
tender figures were likely consequences of financial, time, cultural and social and global 
pressures. 
4.5.2 Pressure from the public against the project 
Pressure from the public and media affected the project, its budget and concept 
development. Due to this pressure, the behaviour of the team was affected in two ways (1) 
the client was inclined to have a lower budget due to sustained criticism that the project would 
be very expensive, (2) the consultants considered the various objections from the local 
community and professionals which tended to make the project to cost more. Thus, pressure 
from the public made the consultants to be less cost-conscious, but made the client to be more 
cost conscious. The result was an iconic building but with a lower budget which was a 
mismatch. The resistance from the public and media only finally ended when the contractor 
set up an information centre promoting the benefits of the project to the public and the country 
as well as giving them an opportunity to voice their concerns. 
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Discussion and implications 
There were two effects of the resistance against the project. (1) The pressure on the 
designers/client put them on the defensive to substantiate and defend the location and the 
type of design on this location. (2) It instilled fear in the public of the suitability of the project, 
the location and the design. With this fear, the public in turn exerted pressure on the client, as 
well as the design and construction team on the unfeasibility of the project. These two had a 
combined effect of taking away the project team’s effort from that of devising a project solution 
to that of defending the project. The result was that the client had several court interdicts, the 
project start was delayed and they then had to quickly appoint a contractor before the project 
could be stopped. A review of the professional team on the project clearly shows that there 
was no professional dealing with the communication with the public. It only comprised 
technical design professionals. The results suggest that for this type of project, high level 
communication to the public should be considered and needs to be a key position in the project 
team. It also suggests that in the project team, there was concentration of technical and design 
professionals leaving out communication and public relations competencies and this led to 
failure of the project team to prepare for the management of the public. 
4.5.3 Insufficient budget 
As explained above, the factors of time and cost overruns and their effects are often 
interlinked. The lower budget was in a large measure influenced by the pressure from the 
public. There were two other factors as well. (1) The project team lacked the design and 
construction experience of stadia as the country had not had such projects for several years. 
Thus, they had lost the professionals and the competence (Ofori et al, 1996). (2) The project 
complexity and cost were under-estimated due to the lack of experience. When appointed to 
design, the consultants quickly understood the budget was insufficient. The budget was 
revised and approval was then sought from the National Treasury. Approval, however delayed. 
This resulted in reduced consultants’ design time and consequently, incomplete designs. 
Discussion and implications 
The results show that the client under-estimated the budget due to lack of experience and 
pressure from the public. Flyvbjerg (2011) found that large projects are under-estimated due 
to optimism bias and misrepresentation. These appear not to have been the primary 
motivation on this project. The results also show that the pressure had two different effects on 
the consultants and the client. The client became more cost conscious whilst the consultants 
became less cost-conscious. Furthermore, the results show that the insufficient budget 
affected how the project team managed and responded to the challenges of the project. (1) 
When the budget approval delayed, the client asked consultants to carry out partial concept 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
67 
 
designs. (2) Due to reduced time, the project team resorted to short-cuts in the management 
of the project which concurs with the work of Love et al (2009) who found that under certain 
latent conditions such as lack of time, people resort to certain practices to solve problems such 
as recycling design details from another project. (3) The incomplete design led to higher 
tenders as contractors perceived the project to be riskier. (4) The project participants were all 
decided not to delay the project in any way and they relaxed the project management 
principles such as deciding on a course of action after investigating alternative options. The 
phase/gate approaches to project management were not their immediate concern. 
4.5.4 Under-estimating the complexity of the project 
The project participants under-estimated the complexity of the project. Respondents said 
this was mostly due to lack of specific project experience. They had not built stadia in the 
country for several years and, as Ofori et al (1996) and Groenveld (2006) said for 
circumstances such as this one, the stadium construction expertise had been lost due to 
relocations and retirement. The result of lack of experience was a lower client’s budget and 
failure to design specialist areas before tender. This resulted into budget revisions, delay in 
design production, incomplete designs and, time and cost overruns. 
The stadium was designed to have raking pylons each with its unique elevated point, glass 
topped roof and fabric curtain walls. The construction of the roof and the raking pylons were 
especially challenging. Most of the respondents said construction implications were not fully 
appreciated at tender award. 
A further complication was the revision to the drawings. The diameter of the stadium and 
the size of the raking pylons was reduced to keep the project within the revised budget. 
However, the stiffness of the pylons was now reduced. They therefore had to introduce down-
stand beams, bracing and other additional members, which offset the savings, intended. The 
quantity surveyor said the additional costs were actually more than the savings they had 
intended. 
Discussion and implications 
From the results, under-estimating project complexity was due to lack of experience in 
similar projects by the client and the project team. The effects of under-estimating the project’s 
complexity were an insufficient project budget, budget revision and approval from National 
Treasury, insufficient consultants’ time to design, incomplete designs and tender documents, 
higher tenders and constructability problems. These all led to time and cost overruns on the 
project. The results still show interplay of factors and their effects. Under-estimating project 
complexity resulted into an insufficient budget as well as the need to revise the budget whose 
delay affected the consultants’ preparation for design production. An insufficient budget and 
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under-estimating the project’s complexity are both due to lack of experience. The project team 
decided to revise the design to be within the budget, but because they under-estimated the 
complexity of the project, they did not evaluate the resultant complications until construction. 
4.5.5 Procurement requirements 
Being a public entity, the municipality was required to conform to the various statutory 
requirements which include the anti-corruption practices, competitive tendering and 
engagement with the public to get support before carrying out the project. These led to a longer 
duration of the project before commencement and more cost. The procurement requirements 
were compounded by threats from the local affluent community of court action to stop the 
project. This made the client to quickly appoint the contractor before the project could be 
stopped. 
Discussion and implications 
The procurement requirements were necessary, but they tended to lengthen the 
procurement process. Competitive tendering meant more time to prepare documents, call for 
participation and then tender evaluation. The competitive tendering method also meant a loss 
on the contractor’s contribution to constructability issues. The threat of court action from the 
local community made the client appoint the contractor even before the designs were complete 
in order to avoid the work from being stopped. 
4.5.6 FIFA/City requirements and other factors 
There were not many design change requirements from the City and FIFA. Most of the 
design changes were due to the changed ground conditions because of location problems and 
insufficient budget discussed before. The installation of VIP areas with special finishes and 
entrance and exit ways separate from the public were later incorporated in the design. 
Installation of more LCD screens and CCTV cameras were also included, which increased the 
cost of the project. It took a while for funding approvals to be made for the extras. There was 
also a change to the initial concept of a multi-purpose stadium, which would have 
dismountable sections such as seating when not in use to one more directed towards soccer 
with fixed seating. 
The timing of the project also contributed to the increase in the costs. There was a change 
of local government as well as keen construction prices at this time. The project was approved 
when one political party was in charge of the local authority. After elections, another political 
party took over the running of the municipality and they started the whole process of project 
approval again. This led to reduction in project time as the completion date was immoveable.  
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There were keen prices of construction and materials locally as well as internationally at 
this time. There were also several projects being carried out at the same time resulting into 
increased competition for materials, labour and equipment. These led to higher tenders for the 
World Cup projects. 
Discussion and implications 
The requirements of the client led to design changes on the project, but these were not 
significant. Most of the design changes were due to location related problems and the 
insufficient budget. The results do show, however, that the client’s change orders affected the 
project’s design and construction and had a potential to delay the project and increase costs. 
The timing of the project also affected the cost levels of the project. There were several 
projects being carried out around the country and the prices of resources locally and 
internationally were higher at this time. This led to higher costs of resources and contractor’s 
tenders. This suggests that the timing of the project may be important in the expected pricing 
levels of the projects and that regulating the numbers of large projects could be useful in 
“cooling off” the contractors’ pricing and cost of materials. 
4.6 Conclusions and Implications for Management of Large Projects 
The factors that led to time and cost overruns on this project were: (1) location problems, 
(2) pressure from the public and media, (3) client’s insufficient budget, (4) participant’s under-
estimation of the project’s complexity, (5) lengthy procurement requirements and, (6) 
FIFA/City requirements. 
The results showed that the dominating factor behind the client’s insufficient budget and 
participants’ project complexity under-estimation was the lack of project specific experience. 
Furthermore, the insufficient budget was also due to the pressure from the public’s perception 
that the project would be costly and bankrupt the city, lack of project specific experience as 
well as the client’s under-estimation of the complexity of the project. The different ground 
conditions were due to local community location resistance as well as EIA request to change 
the location. 
There were various effects of the overrun factors on the management of the project. (1) 
The project team moved from one location to another due to local community resistance and 
EIA location change request which resulted into different ground conditions and reduction of 
consultants’ design production time. (2) Lower project budget, iconic design and quick 
contractor appointment due to public pressure. (3) Budget revision, National Treasury 
approval, reduction in consultants’ design production time due to insufficient budget. (4) 
Insufficient budget, budget revision and National Treasury approval, reduction in consultants’ 
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design production time, provisional sums and not designing specialist areas, higher tenders 
due to under-estimating project complexity. (5) Longer procurement process due to 
procurement requirements and; (6) Design changes, change in construction methods, 
acceleration and increased costs due to client induced changes. 
The most common effect found in most factors is the reduction in the consultants’ time to 
produce designs which led to incomplete designs, design changes, higher tenders, need to 
reduce project scope to be within the budget and constructability problems. The results show 
that the factors often cited as causes were found to be effects of the real causes in this 
research confirming the results from other scholars (Flyvbjerg et al, 2003; Jennings, 2012). 
The results showed that design changes and incomplete designs were as a result of location 
problems and insufficient budget which were themselves due to lack of project specific 
experience of the project team and pressure from the public. 
The results also show that there were many inter-relationships amongst the originating 
causes as well as amongst the secondary effects. This suggests that the factors behind time 
and cost overruns occur before incomplete designs or design changes. It may also mean that, 
the recommendation often made by scholars for the client or consultants to complete the 
designs and avoid design changes would not address the real problem. The solution may lie 
in improving the project team’s relevant experience and the management of the public to 
minimise resistance to projects. 
It was also found that most of the root cause of overruns came from the external 
environment as also observed by Morris (1989). These were then followed by project factors 
and then organisational factors. This is in line with the nature of large projects. Most of the 
project management issues have much to do with external factors (Capka, 2004; Morris & 
Hough, 1987). This suggests that the management of the external environment is important 
to the management of large projects and that if not well managed, time and cost overruns are 
a possibility on the project. 
From the research, it was also found that the behaviour of the participants was often 
altered by the various pressures which include lack of time, inadequate budget and public 
pressure. Tatum (1984) found that decision making on projects was based on intuition rather 
than a rational basis. In this research, it was found that the pressure affected the way the 
decisions were made and consequently, the strategy and management of the project. Due to 
lack of time and with the knowledge of a project of national interest and the pressure of Afro 
phobia, the project participants used short-cuts and did not follow through the project 
management processes such as value engineering and seeking alternative solutions before 
deciding. Again, due to public pressure the client became cost conscious whilst the 
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consultants became less cost conscious as they explored the solutions to the project. This 
suggests that decisions in large project management are more influenced by external pressure 
than internal rationalisation. 
The results confirm that the involvement of the client is a parameter of consideration as 
their lack of experience and preparation affected the project in the definition of the project as 
well as the budget. The results also confirm that the training and experience of the project 
participants has an important role in the management of large projects as it affects the project 
competence and eventually performance (Crawford, 2005). They also showed the relationship 
between experience and preparation. Lack of experience leads to poor preparation for the 
project. The experience and the size of the project was also related to the form of organisation 
used on the project. Consultants formed joint ventures to increase their project competence 
and financial capability.  
The research also showed that there were certain conditions that favoured the occurrence 
of time and cost overruns. These were the lack of project type experience, pressure from the 
public, insufficient client budget, location problems, incomplete designs, insufficient time to 
prepare for the project, use of short–cuts, inconsistent use of project management principles 
and under-estimating the project’s complexity. This compares with the research of the accident 
causation modelists who found that there were certain hazardous circumstances that led to 
accidents (Mitropoulos et al, 2005). 
It could therefore be theorised that the lack of experience of the project participants made 
them ill-prepared for the project and this affected how they managed the project. The pressure 
from the public and project approval delays, which made them not to use project management 
principles consistently resulting into time and cost overruns, compounded it. 
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Chapter 5 Case Study II 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a literal replication study to see whether the results in the first study 
are applicable to this case. The project executing team is in a state-owned enterprise (SOE). 
The results will show that the factors are similar to the first case study. Firstly, the problems 
originate from the external environment to the organisational and then the project environment. 
They will also show that the lack of preparation and experience of participants in the project 
team affected the management (competence) of the project team and their response to the 
constraints brought by the external, organisational and project environments. 
5.2 Project Description 
The project is a power plant that was conceived as part of the strategy to meet the 
increasing demand for electrical power in South Africa. The power was to be generated from 
a coal-fired plant using some advanced technology of ensuring minimal disturbance to the 
environment using flue gas de-sulphurisation (FGD) and water conservation. The project 
comprised 6 units of 800MW each. It was planned that the first unit would be operational by 
December 2014 and thereafter a unit each year up to 2018. The planned cost of the project 
was estimated to have been R118bn (September 2014). 
The project consists of boilers, turbines and air-cooling units together with their attendant 
civil works. The SOE broke down the project into various packages and contracted these to 
several contractors. The main mechanical works, boilers and turbines, were contracted to two 
contractors to design and construct complete with the attendant civil works. 
The project has experienced cost and time overruns and the completion dates and 
estimates have been changed several times (it was ongoing at the time of the research). 
5.3 Respondents 
A total of 16 respondents were interviewed. These included the project director, 
construction managers and contract managers on the client’s side and project and 
construction managers on the contractor’s side. Only one respondent indicated that they used 
to read journals. Most read magazines such as Engineering News, internet and information 
from their professional institutions. This represents 6% who read journals. Most of the 
respondents are experienced with the years of experience ranging from 5 to 22 years. This 
indicates that most professionals were not abreast with the latest or current research in 
management of projects. 
Table 5.1 shows the list of respondents. 
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Table 5.1 Power plant project respondents 
 
5.4 Contract Data 
Figure 5.1 shows contract data that was obtained on the project from public sources as 
well as from the interviews. The results show the project has incurred both time and cost 
overruns. The project value was earlier estimated to be R80.6bn, was later revised to R80bn, 
R118bn and then R172bn. The completion date equally was adjusted from December 2014 to 
December 2018. 
 
Figure 5.1 Power plant project contract data 
Project Position Organisation Qualifications Experience
1 Senior Contracts Manager Client BSc Chem 20 years
2 Contracts Manager - Civils Client B Tech Civil 10 years
3 Contracts Manager - Flue Gas Client B Tech Mechanical 10 years
4 Contracts Manager - Boilers Client B Tech Electrical 11 years
5 Construction Manager - Civils Client B Mech, MSc Project 20 years
6 Civil Design Partner organisation B Tech Civil 8 years
7 Contracts Manager - Mechanical Client B Tech Mechanical 5 years
8 Project Execution Manager Partner organisation BSc Construction Management 22 years
9 Construction Manager - Civils Client B Tech/BSc Supply
10 Contracts Manager - Balance of Plant Client Manager practice Lead 6 years
11 Site Manager Contractor B Mech, MSc MBA 10 years
12 Contracts Manager - Instrumentation Client B Tech Electrical 13 years
13 Construction Manager - Turbines Partner organisation BSc Project Management 14 years
14 Project Director Client B Eng Mechanical 21 years
15 Commissioning Manager Contractor B Mechanical, MSc 18 years
16 Planner Contractor B Mechanical 12 years
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Reviewing the packages shows that overall, there was a delay of about a year to start 
work. The Flue Gas package was planned to start in March 2010, but was actually commenced 
in August 2011. The results are similar with the other packages. The contract value for the 
package was R2.7bn. By September 2014, the contract value was R3.6bn yet only 48% of the 
construction work had been carried out. Indicating that the contract value would possibly rise 
to R7.2bn at contract completion. The Turbines package gives some insight into the planning 
and actual implementation of the contracts. The project comprised 6 units with each unit to be 
completed in 25 months with about two months between the units. By September 2014, Unit 
1 was 72% complete but 24.3 months late. Units 2-6 had not been started at all. 
5.5 Time and Cost Overruns and the Management of the Project 
The results show that the reasons for the overruns and the approach to the management 
of the project were similar to the stadium project case study. The reasons for overruns on this 
case study were: (1) Insufficient budget; (2) Delayed project start; (3) Ground conditions; (4) 
Pressure from public/media; (5) Under-estimation of project complexity; (6) Procurement 
strategy; (7) Lack of experience; (8) Lack of preparation and, (9) Productivity problems. These 
are shown in Figure 5.2 and Tables 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4. 
Table 5.2 Root cause and the environment they originate from 
 
Table 5.3 comparison of factors per environment 
 
5.5.1 Insufficient budget 
The client organisation, due to the delay in approval of the new build project, was put in a 
“crisis mode” as time for design and construction of the new power plants was reduced. To 
ensure a steady supply of power and for future supply, they decided to embark on two large 6 
x 800MW units super critical power plants. Their finances, however, could not allow  
Description Environment
1 Insufficient budget Organisation
2 Delayed project start External
3 Ground conditions External
4 Pressure from public and media External
5 Under-estimating project complexity Project
6 Procurement strategy Organisation
7 Lack of experience Project
8 Lack of preparation Organisation
9 Productivity problems Project
Environment Percentage
3 External 33%
3 Project 33%
3 Organisation 33%
9 Total 100%
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Figure 5.2 Power plant project overall time and cost overruns 
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progressive simultaneous power plant projects. The project was put on finance moratoriums, 
where additional funding and contracts were suspended, twice lasting a total of 18 months. 
This resulted in the project stalling with required subsequent packages not to be awarded 
leading to delay to all the packages. It eventually put the project out of course from the planned 
targets. 
The major reasons for the insufficient budget was the pressure to solve the looming power 
crisis and the pressure from the public and media on the perceived inability of the organisation 
to solve the power crisis. Another reason stems from the decision to build the two super-critical 
plants. The client did not consider the complexity of building two large plants simultaneously. 
They based their assumptions on the previous project experience in that they had built several 
plants in a period of about five years. However, the power plant construction industry had been 
dormant for about 50 years with the possibility that the skills and manufacturing base was non-
existent. 
Table 5.4 Power project root cause of time and cost overruns 
 
Discussion and implications 
As in the case of stadium project, the results show the effect of pressure on the project 
team’s management of the project. Due to the pressure of looming power deficits and pressure 
from the public and media on the ability of the organisation to carry out the projects, the client 
decided to embark on two super-critical plants at the same time. According to the respondents, 
Factor Reasons
Insufficient budget Pressure to solve looming power crisis
Embarking on building two large super critical plants at same time
Two funding moratoriums
Delayed project start Delayed project approval
Ground conditions Started project without site identification
Chosen site was hilly and required cut & fill and piling
Pressure from public and media Public anxiety of power shortage
Pressure from media of power utility's capacity to complete projects
Pressure on power utility and project executing team to complete 
projects
Under-estimation of project complexity Lack of experience of similar projects in immediate past
Under-estimating project complexity
Optimistic estimating based on past experience
Procurement strategy Strategy was chosen on past practice basis
Lack of experience of similar projects in immediate past
Lack of experience Lack of similar projects in the country
Loss of skilled man power due to lack of projects
Lack of preparation Delayed project start, lack of time
Lack of experience of similar projects in immediate past
Optimistic estimating based on past experience
Productivity problems Inexperienced workforce
Outsourcing of work
Shifting organisation culture
Cultural dynamics
Package interface problems
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the standard plants are 500-600MW units. 800MW units are higher end technology units not 
commonly carried out in the world. Equally, the client decided to use newer Flue Gas 
Desulphurisation (FGD) and air cooling technology. The organisation’s finances were thus 
stretched and resulted in moratoriums which affected the progress of the power plant project. 
Equally, the pressure made the client and project team to disregard or be optimistic of their 
ability to carry out the project. 
5.5.2 Delayed start to the project 
The client organisation foresaw early in 1999 the future power deficits, but the approval 
was delayed until 2005 because the view of government at this time was that independent 
power producers (IPPs) should contribute 30% and not the power utility alone. Unfortunately, 
the IPPs response was poor and no contracts were signed. By this time, the power reserve 
margins were getting in the negative and under this pressure, the power utility decided to 
revive old power plants but were not sufficient. By this time, the organisation was in a “crisis 
mode.” They decided to resubmit the project proposal to build a total of 6 units at two power 
plants. However, due to intense public pressure and the dwindling reserves, they decided to 
build a total of 12 large capacity units at the two plants with 6 at each plant. 
The threat of dwindling reserves and public pressure may be the reason that led to the 
approval of the project. The approval was given with the understanding that construction would 
be complete within 6 years. The organisation therefore had less time to prepare for the project. 
They had to decide whether to go through the project life cycle of obtaining the site, design, 
bid and build or use virtual designs, bid and build. The first route would last 18 months and 
the latter 9 months. Due to lack of time, they decided to use virtual designs. The lack of time 
also led them to rush the contracts resulting in ill-defined and missing scopes in packages. 
Discussion and implications 
The delayed approval of the project had various effects on the project. (1) Time for the 
organisation to carry out extensive feasibility studies was reduced, (2) The procurement 
strategy was rushed, (3) The client used of virtual designs and other short-cuts to start 
construction in the earliest possible way. Again, as seen in the stadium project, the pressure 
from the public and the threat of dwindling reserves influenced their decisions and strategies 
of project execution. They used short cuts, which are prone to errors as noted Love et al 
(2009). This shows that the reason behind incomplete or ill-defined packages and use of virtual 
designs was lack of time due to delayed project start. The other reason behind was lack of 
project specific experience of the project staff. They had not built power plants for over 50 
years. A consequence of such a situation, from the research by Groenveld (2006) and Ofori 
et al (1996) was that they had lost experienced staff due to relocations and retirement. This 
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affected their planning and preparation for the project. This concurs with Merrow (2011) who 
found that many failures of large projects could be traced back to the sponsors and their 
financiers. 
The results, as observed in the stadium project, suggest that management of large projects 
involves more than the management of the project environment. It also involves the 
management of the parent organisation as well as the external environment. It also involves 
management of public dynamics (Capka, 2004). The results also suggest that the problem of 
time and cost overruns began in the external environment (macro-project environment) – lack 
of power plant construction projects and government policy on power supply. These resulted 
into lack of experience and lack of time in the organisation environment, which eventually led 
to construction delays in the project environment. The implication for research and 
management of large projects is that the potential solution to reducing time and cost overruns 
may not reside in effecting improved techniques in the project environment, but perfecting the 
whole process from the macro environment to the organisational and project environments.  
5.5.3 Ground conditions 
Various factors were associated with the site and the chosen location. From the 
respondents, one of the most important consideration was the proximity of the coal reserves. 
From the final scoping report (Ninham Shand & Eskom, 2009), the location of the plant was 
also related to the efficient conveyor distance of not more than 30 km from the reserves. The 
chosen site was a wetlands area surrounded with a farming community. The actual location 
was shifted on recommendations from the EIA report. This area, unfortunately, was sloping. 
Cut and fill was therefore required and approximately 13 million m3 of soil had to be moved. 
Unit 1 was located on a hill and this had to be levelled. Respondents indicate that, in some 
areas they had 40 metres of fill. 
The complication in the process was that the actual site had not been selected when the 
approval was granted in 2005. Due to lack of time, pressure of imminent power deficits and 
pressure from the public and media, bidding documents were prepared using virtual designs 
subject to re-measurement on site. However, the conditions on site were very different. The 
ground was uneven and this required cut and fill and piling works in the fill area. As a result, 
the site preparatory works took longer than anticipated leading to delays in the sub-structural 
works and the subsequent works.  
Discussion and implications 
A review of the activities that led to the actual site provides some insight into how the 
project ended up with the difficult ground conditions. The first was that the site had not been 
identified and consequently the feasibility studies carried out did not include the site. Secondly, 
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the location problem was closely associated with the delayed approval of the project which 
affected the time for preparation and eventual execution of the project. Thirdly, there was 
sustained pressure from the public on the firm’s ability to provide power and forestall the 
imminent power crisis. Fourthly, the organisation was under extreme pressure due to 
dwindling power reserves which, by 2004 it had become clear that in a few years the reserve 
margins would get into the negative territory (Eberhard, Kolker & Leigland, 2014) whilst the 
net capacity of the power utility was on the decrease and the demand on the increase 
(Department of Energy, 2015). The results of the difficult ground conditions, was the 
lengthening of the preparatory and sub-structural works leading to project delays and cost 
overruns on all the packages. 
The results show that the root cause of the problem of ground conditions was the lack of 
preparation by the client. This was mostly due to the delayed project approval which reduced 
the project team’s time to prepare for the project. When the approval was granted, the threat 
of power deficit had already set in. With the pressure from the public, the organisation 
prepared project documentation on the basis of virtual designs and partial geotechnical 
information. This confirms the observation in the stadium project case study of the effect of 
pressure from the public and insufficient time on the management of the project. They used 
short cuts in document preparation and partial geotechnical information. 
5.5.4 Pressure from the public/media and depleting power reserves 
There was sustained pressure from the public and media regarding the project and when 
it would be completed. This project was part of the power utility’s capital projects aimed at 
increasing the country’s power supply which was dwindling (Ninham Shand & Eskom, 2009). 
The project approval, however, took long and part of the public were in favour of IPPs. 
Therefore, the onset of delays attracted a lot of attention from the public. This resulted in 
mounting criticism of the management of the project. Due to the delay of project approval and 
the looming power deficits, the power utility took one year to plan for the two power plants 
mentioned before instead of the normal 4 years (Mantshantsha, 2016). Furthermore, 
according to the Project Director, to cut on time, the power utility opted to use virtual designs. 
Consequently, they did not prepare concept designs based on the site. However, the site 
conditions were different from their virtual design assumptions resulting into longer site 
preparatory works and delays to subsequent construction works. 
Discussion and implications 
The results confirm the effect of pressure on a project team and its management of the 
project as observed in the earlier case study. Due to public pressure and the fear of dwindling 
reserves, the power utility decided to use a shorter procurement route and virtual designs and 
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proceeded with the project. The consequence was that there was little time for geotechnical 
studies and when the contractor moved on site, the work was more than anticipated which led 
to delays and a longer construction process which they were trying to avoid in the first place. 
Also, the choice of constructing super-critical units (800MW) as opposed to sub-critical units 
(500-600MW) was due to the need to solve the increasing problem of dwindling power 
reserves. This, however, was at variance with the skills in the organisation and the 
manufacturing ability of the country at this time to skill and supply the equipment. Furthermore, 
the power utility, being a state-owned enterprise (SOE), adopted a competitive multi-
procurement approach with conditions of employment of locals in labour and sub-contracting. 
A combination of these several factors led to a more complicated design and procurement 
process which required the organisation to be more involved in the project and yet they lacked 
the skills and management capacity having not built power plants for about 50 years. The 
result of all these factors was a longer construction process and cost overruns. 
The results show that the project team was highly influenced by public pressure, dwindling 
power reserves as well as the delayed start to the project due to past decisions in the higher 
organisation corporate ladder and the government. It shows that due to pressure, the client 
used a shorter procurement route, virtual designs and started the project with little time for 
geotechnical studies. He also chose to construct two larger power plants concurrently, which 
were more complicated than the capacity of the industry and the client’s experience could 
match. This suggests that the performance of the project team was affected by public pressure 
and past decisions made before and during project formation. It shows the need for a long-
term approach to project management as observed by Merrow, (2011). 
5.5.5 Under-estimating the project complexity 
Most of the respondents explained that the complexity of the project was under-estimated 
by both the client and the contractors. For the client, the main reason for under-estimating was 
that they had constructed several power plants in a similar space of time in the past and were 
confident that they could carry out two large projects at the same time. The decision was also 
partly due to pressure of power deficits as explained under section 5.5.4. This somehow 
reinforced their optimism that they would complete the projects in time. Another reason for the 
optimism was that they would use global and experienced contractors. 
The contractors, too, under-estimated the volume of work and got more than they could 
manage. Using fleet contracts arrangement, the contractors had projects at both the two 
plants. They were optimistic that the work would easily be carried out in South Africa. They 
assumed that, (1) they would easily get resources, (2) the quality of work would be as they 
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had experienced elsewhere in the world and, (3) that they would manage the manufacturing 
and construction process and carry out the work the same way they had done elsewhere. 
However, when the work was started, it turned out differently. It was taking longer than 
they had anticipated and the project suffered various interface and construction management 
challenges. Firstly, the preparatory works took longer than they had planned and most were 
not done when the subsequent works were required. The roads, the water and waste water 
reticulation systems were not in place as the packages had not been allocated or were taking 
longer. In a number of cases, they had to re-route and re-plan which led to more costs and 
construction delays. The ground conditions also were different from what they had anticipated. 
There were also numerous problems and access delays on site. Actual productivity was lower 
than anticipated which prompted the client to get more involved in the project. 
Discussion and implications 
The results show that both the client and the contractor under-estimated the complexity of 
the project and this affected the assumptions they had about the project and the methods of 
delivery they adopted. For the client, due to the successful power plant construction in the 
past, they were confident that they would carry out two large power projects concurrently in a 
period of five years. They also looked to the global contractors to be experienced and able to 
manage the two projects in the planned period. The global contractors equally were optimistic 
that they would manage the two projects as they had done elsewhere in the world.  
Their optimism made them to under-estimate the complexity of the project and this led to 
poor preparation and execution of the project. They were affected by what Busby and Payne 
(1999) calls illusion of control where participants feel that they are able to control and contain 
the situation. When the work was carried out, they encountered several logistical problems. 
The preparatory works and subsequent works were out of sequence and taking longer than 
they had anticipated.  
The results suggest that the project team was inadequately prepared because of under-
estimating the complexity of the project due to optimism in their capacity to carry out the work 
based on their previous experience and performance of similar works in other places in the 
world.  
The results confirm previous research by Flyvbjerg (2011) that under-estimation is due to 
optimism bias. However, strategic misrepresentation was not found in this case study. But that 
lack of time, optimism and lack of experience led to under-estimating the complexity of the 
project. 
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5.5.6 Procurement strategy 
Most respondents found the procurement strategy adopted by the client as an important 
factor that led to time and cost overruns. There were four aspects to the strategy. (1) The 
power utility appointed contractors on the basis of open competitive tendering being an SOE. 
They also used fleet contracts on the two power plant projects with the case study project 
starting a year later. The contractors who were appointed at the first project for a particular 
package automatically became contractors for that package at the case study project. This 
meant that the design for the first project one was adopted at the case study project with some 
local modifications. (2) The organisation used multi-procurement with all contracts managed 
by the client. The project was broken down into various packages reaching about 65 at the 
time of the case study. These included the preparatory works such as roads, water reticulation, 
water treatment plant, sub-grade civils, grade civils, mechanical and electrical installations. (3) 
The project design and construction was outsourced and the work of the client was to manage 
the interface of the contracts. The main contracts were boilers and turbines and these 
contractors designed both the mechanical/electrical works and civil works. (4) Alignment of 
the work/packages to the contractors and the project timeline (Figure 5.3). 
 
Figure 5.3 Relationship of multi procurement strategy to project completion 
The results of the strategy were that, (1) the actual full scope of the project was unknown 
at concept stage until the outsourced component had been designed and that data given to 
the next package to design and then pass it on to the next. (2) The contracts had dependencies 
of one upon another with packages dependent on feeder contracts for information to design 
and then execute (3) The contractors needed access to sites as well as data from the feeder 
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contract to design their part. Unfortunately, the feeder contracts starting with preparatory 
works were delayed which resulted into a whole chain of delays on the project package 
spectrum. (4) There were several contractors on site at once resulting into access delays and 
interface management problems which often led to clashes, claims and doubling of 
contractors’ tasks, time and cost overruns. As a result, no one was able to fulfil what they had 
promised because of other contractor’s delays and their own delays. This made it difficult for 
any contractor to attempt to accelerate their works. (5) The alignment of contracts was based 
on specialisms and not the power block, mismatching with the organisational objective of 
supplying power per block. With the built-in dependencies on the feeding and proceeding 
contracts, it meant that a delay on one package not only affected the proceeding packages in 
the block but also the packages in all the other blocks since it cut across the blocks (Figure 
5.4). The reason behind the adoption of this alignment was that, this was the “organisation’s 
way.” They had used this strategy in previous contracts. A Construction Manager said, it 
worked then because organisations were not multi-disciplinary unlike this time. One 
organisation would not only supply turbines, but also boilers and air-cooling systems. It was 
therefore possible to give a complete power block to one organisation and a second block to 
another. This would have also been in line with the required connection to the grid which was 
per unit. These decisions were made in the higher organisational levels, the board room. 
 
Figure 5.4 A contrast of package alignment against organisational objective 
Discussion and implications 
The results show that the choice of the procurement approach led to many complications 
in the management of the project and was a leading factor to time and cost overruns. The set 
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up put more responsibility on the client to manage and coordinate the various organisational 
and task interfaces yet he lacked specific project experience in the management of this type 
of project and did not have the staffing levels to manage the interfaces. All the delays were 
the responsibility of the client. This made him to be more involved in the project and thus 
increased his risk. 
The contracts had dependencies of one with the other in terms of work continuation as 
well as data for design of the subsequent contract. Unfortunately, the feeder contracts delayed 
and that affected all the subsequent contracts which made it difficult for any contractor to 
accelerate their works. It was also difficult to know the full project scope until the components 
had been designed and data given to the next package. Furthermore, the large numbers of 
contractors on site resulted into access delays, doubling up of contractors’ tasks, time, and 
cost overruns. 
The results also show that alignment of packages, based on specialisms and not power 
blocks, contributed to the overall project failure to meet the organisational objective of 
supplying power per power block unit. When one package was delayed, it affected all the 
power block units as the contract was across the units (see Figure 5.4). 
The results suggest that the procurement method adopted affected the preparation and 
management of the project. Furthermore, that the decisions that were made at the higher 
levels in the organisation and the decisions made before the start of the project affected the 
preparation and management of the project. This suggests that management of the project 
should not start at project execution, but earlier in the board room. It also shows that decisions 
are not influenced by pressure only but also by past practices. 
5.5.7 Lack of experience 
Most of the respondents were of the view that the client lacked experience to carry out a 
project of this nature due to the lack of power plant construction projects for a long period of 
time. It meant that they had lost the skilled resources and quantities to execute the project. 
Even the construction and manufacturing capacity in the country was lacking as well due to 
the dormant industry. This keenly affected the international contractors as they had to revive 
a dormant industry in skills and manufacturing capabilities, which risks they never considered. 
The effects of the lack of experience were that the budget was insufficient, the complexity of 
the project was under-estimated, they were inadequately prepared for the project and they 
had numerous problems due to the procurement method that was adopted. The results 
suggest that experience is an important factor that should be considered in the management 
of large projects. 
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5.5.8 Lack of preparation 
Most of the respondents were of the view that the client had not been prepared when they 
embarked on the project. This was seen from the numerous problems on site, the incomplete 
designs, running out of funds in the midst of the project twice, the full scope of the project was 
not known at project start due to outsourcing and lack of experience in the type of work. This 
made them fail to anticipate delays and problems of the project. Outsourcing made them to 
be removed from the axis of action. 
The results of inadequate preparation were, (1) preparatory works took longer than 
anticipated leading to delay in subsequent works, (2) the conceptual design was incomplete 
and when conditions were different on site, it resulted in time and cost overruns, (3) they had 
access and interface management difficulties on site which all delayed the packages 
substantially. For the Control and Instrumentation package, the execution was overrun 5 
times. The package, which was planned to be completed in 2016, was now planned to be 
completed in 2022 (as at September 2014). This showed that the competence of the project 
team was affected. It was noted, however, during the collection of information that, after 
appointment, the Project Director instituted a thorough strategy of recruiting members to the 
executing team from within the country and outside. They later involved an experienced 
organisation to complement the lack of skills in project construction management. They also 
developed comprehensive project management work procedures similar to the procedures in 
Case Study IV and Case Study V, the better-performed projects. These measures improved 
the management of the project, but the project continued to experience time and cost 
overruns. The reason may be that when the procedures came in later, the seeds of overruns 
had already been established. The project start had already been delayed when the 
procedures were instituted which reduced time to prepare documents and carry out thorough 
feasibility studies. In addition, the lack of experience in power plants by the executing team 
and lack of understanding of local conditions by the contractors affected the competence of 
the project team. 
There were several factors behind inadequate preparation. (1) The delay in project 
approval reduced the client’s and executing team’s preparation. (2) Pressure from dwindling 
power reserves made the organisation quickly get to procure the project before the design 
documents and site had been established. (3) The client lacked the experience in power plant 
construction due to the dormancy in the industry as described before. A combination of these 
factors and the procurement strategy affected their preparation and consequently resulted into 
time and cost overruns. 
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The contractors were said to have been prepared, but they overlooked the local conditions 
of productivity and the working culture differences with the local people. 
Discussion and implications 
The results show that the client was inadequately prepared for the project when it was 
embarked on. This is seen from incomplete designs and funding problems which resulted in 
suspension of award of contracts after award of the main contracts; turbines and boilers. The 
major reasons for lack of preparation were lack of specific project experience, delay in project 
start due to late project approval, commencing the project before complete investigations 
because of pressure of waning power reserves and criticism from the public. The results also 
show that the executing team had instituted well-prepared project management procedures 
similar to those prepared by the better performed case study projects. These improved the 
management of the project, but the project continued to experience time and cost overruns. 
This suggests that the project management procedures were not sufficient to prevent the 
occurrence of overruns. It also implies that a project management strategy should consider 
the pre-execution phase as well as the execution phase to manage time and cost overruns 
effectively. 
5.5.9 Productivity 
Most respondents said poor productivity was a contributor to time and cost overruns. This 
was in both the executing team and the contractor’s organisations. In most instances, the  
planned activities were found to be completed late, or taking longer than they had planned. 
Apart from the other factors mentioned before, poor productivity was identified to be at the 
heart of the problem. This was both at individual worker level and organisational level (Table 
5.5). 
The results show that several factors affected productivity on the project. (1) Inexperienced 
workforce. The reasons were that most were working for the first time, supervisors were not 
used to managing large numbers of people and the workers and unions had rights. These 
resulted in workers failing to understand and appreciate working conditions. They would strike 
and stop work for any reason. Their assumed rights and the backing of the unions also 
reinforced their desire to strike or stop work for any reason. (2) There were poor skills amongst 
the workers because of their unwillingness to learn on the job and lack of patience. These 
resulted in failure of the workers attaining higher skills levels such as high-tech welding. After 
working for a month, they would want to take over the position from the supervisor and when 
they do not succeed, they would leave for other contracts. (3) Reduced worker productivity. 
This was due to a combination of factors: lack of supervision and self-discipline; worker  
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Table 5.5 Factors leading to poor productivity on the power plant project 
 
attitude that work can be done any time, today or the day after, it did not matter; effect of 
government policies and promises of work to the local community; assumption of worker rights 
and influence of unions. The effects of these were: failure to keep to lunch times; failure to 
complete tasks on time and speedily; assumption of the right to be employed, demand for 
more and strike if not granted. (4) Cultural dynamics in the work place for both the executing 
team and the contractors. In the executing team, the client had partnered with a construction 
management organisation from the United States of America which was experienced in power 
construction. The aim was to improve the competence of the executing team. The Americans 
were employed in the executing team to be construction managers assisted by the South 
Africans. However, the incompatibility of the cultural orientation affected the performance at 
work. The Americans had a militant and non-personal approach to work and this was at 
variance with the democratic, friendly and personal approach of the South Africans.  
Equally, for the contractors, the two leading contracts; boilers and turbines were 
supervised by construction managers from Germany. Since the project was taken to be high 
Factor Reasons behind Effects
Inexperienced workforce Most working for the first time Failure to understand and appreciate working conditions, 
strike/stop work for any reason
Supervisors not used to managing large 
numbers
Overwhelmed with volume of work and resources required
Rights and unions Desire to strike/stop work for any reason
Poor skills level Not willing to learn hands-on over time Poor skills and lack of high level skills such as high tech-
welding
Lack of patience on the job Desire to take over as supervisor after working for a month
Leave for other contracts
Failure to learn other skills that go with the job such as 
decision making
Reduced worker productivity Lack of supervision, lack of self discipline Failure to keep to lunch times
Large numbers of people at plant cafeteria
Worker attitude that work can be done any time Not completing tasks on time or speedily thinking if not done 
today, they can be done tomorrow
Government policies and promises of jobs to 
locals
Attitude that they have right to be employed and will be 
employed for a long time
Eskom providing amenities and other 
requirements to workers
Attitude to demand for more and strike if not given
Rights and unions Strike/stop work for any grievance
Cultural dynamics Contractors
Germans : Impersonal, direct, militant approach 
to supervision
Incompatible with South African personal friendly, family life 
and democratic approach to work & led to clashes, strikes
Executive team
US  Americans : militant, not concerned with 
personal issues in employees lives
Incompatible with South African supervisors: democratic and 
interactive and concerned about personal life which led to 
clashes and slowed work as workers disappeared from work 
and came back when they wanted
Lack of specialised 
organisations in power plants
Dormant power plant industry Contractors had to revive the industry using older people 
specialised in maintenance of equipment, lack of company 
culture, affecting supervision and management
Most work was outsourced Company policy of using various contractors for 
services
Laxity of control by executing team as project control was in 
contractors hands leaving executing team to know less about 
the work, "police without guns"
Shifting organisation culture Contractors had numerous staff changes 
especially supervisors
Affected approach to work, contract agreements leading to 
loss of knowledge and unending learning curves
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profile, construction managers from parent organisations in Germany, were appointed to 
supervise the projects. The Germans were the supervisors and the South Africans the 
tradesmen. The Germans were reported to be impersonal, direct and militant in their approach 
to supervision, which often unsettled the tradesmen whose approach was democratic, 
personal, friendly and concerned about family life. The effects of all these were that the 
workers would disappear or be not willing to work because of feeling they were not consulted 
or talked to properly or their family and personal life not considered. (5) Lack of specialised 
organisations in power plant construction due to a dormant industry. The contractors had a 
task of reviving a dormant industry with lack of skills and expertise, which affected supervision 
and execution of work by trades. (6) Most work was outsourced due to the client’s policy of 
using various contractors. This however resulted in laxity of control by the executing team. (7) 
Shifting organisation culture due to numerous staff changes in the contractors’ organisations. 
This affected the approach to work, contract agreements and loss of organisational and 
package knowledge leading to unending learning curves. 
Discussion and implications 
The results show that there were several factors that affected productivity in the project. 
These include workforce inexperience, poor skills, worker attitude and lack of supervision, 
difference in cultural orientation between the supervisors and the workers, dormant industry, 
outsourcing and shifting organisation culture. These factors were triggered in the three 
environments: external, organisation and project. This suggests that the project management 
performance is not only affected by workers’ skills and competence as shown in the integrated 
competence model by Crawford (2005). It is also affected by other factors in the project 
environment, the client’s organisation as well as the macro project environment, which include 
the actions and policies of the governments, unions and other players in the economy. This 
concurs with Margerison (2001) who found that individual competence should be seen in the 
context of the project team.  
5.6 Conclusions 
The factors that led to time and cost overruns on this project were: (1) Insufficient budget, 
(2) Delayed project start, (3) ground conditions (4) pressure from public/media, (5) under-
estimation of project complexity, (6) procurement strategy, (7) lack of experience, (8) lack of 
preparation, (9) productivity problems.  
The results show that the insufficient budget was due to pressure on the client of the 
looming power deficits and the delayed start to the project. These made them embark on two 
large supercritical plant projects concurrently. It was also due to the client’s lack of specific 
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project experience as well as under-estimating the complexity of the project because of 
optimism bias and lack of experience. 
The delayed start of the project was due to government’s reluctance to approve the power 
utility’s plan to build new power plants. Their policy at this time, driven by public sentiment, 
was to have independent power producers (IPPs) contribute to the supply. The government 
finally approved the project plan after the IPPs contracts failed to materialise. By this time, 
however, there was reduced time for the power utility to plan and construct the projects before 
the onset of load shedding due to dwindling power reserves. With combined pressure of 
dwindling reserves and the public criticism, the power utility opted to use a shorter 
procurement route with the consequential ill-defined packages, access problems and poor 
project preparation. 
The problem of ground conditions was also due to the delayed project approval, which 
affected the time for preparation and execution of the project. There was also pressure and 
criticism from the public as well as dwindling power reserves. The project team therefore, used 
shortcuts to recoup the lost time and this consequently affected the geotechnical studies and 
the preparatory works on the site. These were not done adequately, leading to time overruns 
on the initial project works affecting all the subsequent works. 
Public pressure played a significant role in the management of this project. The results 
show that public pressure influenced the decision-making process in the project as was seen 
in the stadium project. Due to public pressure and criticism, the utility and the project team 
rushed the procurement process. They decided to build two large projects concurrently, which 
was at variance with the skills of the client and industry. This resulted into a complicated design 
and procurement process. They also decided to use virtual designs and started the project 
with little time for geotechnical studies. 
The results show that both the client and the contractors under-estimated the project’s 
complexity. This was due to their optimism based on their past performance. It was also 
influenced by public pressure, dwindling power reserves and, lack of specific project 
experience. The project team was therefore inadequately prepared to execute the project. 
The problem of lack of specific project experience was the springboard of most of the 
factors seen in this project. It affected the project team’s preparation for the project, 
procurement strategy adopted, under-estimating the project’s complexity and the formulation 
of the budget for the project. 
Several factors affected productivity on the project. These include inexperienced 
workforce, poor worker skills, lack of supervision, cultural dynamics in the workplace, dormant 
industry, outsourcing and constant change of contractor’s management staff.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
90 
 
As in the stadium project, the most common effect found in most factors was the lack of 
time because of the delayed start of the project and pressure and criticism from the public. 
This affected the actions of the client and the rest of the project team. The project team used 
virtual designs, inadequate geotechnical studies and a complicated procurement process, 
which led to access difficulties and time and cost overruns. Clearly, the actions the project 
team took affected the delivery of the project. These actions were often reactions to the 
external factors in the macro and micro project environments. Several decisions made in the 
macro environment by the government and unions and, decisions in the parent organisation, 
all had an effect on the response the project team took in managing the project. 
The results also show again many inter-relationships amongst the root cause as well as 
amongst the secondary effects confirming that the time and cost overruns problem is multi-
faceted as observed in the stadium project. It was also found that most causes on this project 
were from the external environment as observed in the stadium project. The major driver of 
the overruns was the lack of project specific experience, delayed start of the project, pressure 
from the public and waning power reserves as well as poor productivity.  
The results from this research, therefore, affirm that the lack of project specific experience 
of the project participants, delayed project approval, pressure from the public affected their 
preparation for the project and use of project management principles, which led to time and 
cost overruns. The results from this case study, therefore, confirm the theory proposed in the 
stadium case study (case study I) that the lack of project specific experience of the project 
participants, public pressure and project approval delays made them ill-prepared for the 
project and this affected how they managed the project. 
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Chapter 6 Case study III 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a case study of a project team in a large public-private high-speed 
passenger rail project that was affected by time and cost overruns. The project was chosen 
firstly, because it incurred time and cost overruns, though it was well-managed. Secondly, 
because, whilst it was a PPP project managed by private hands, it incurred time and cost 
overruns. Thirdly, to investigate the rival explanation that time and cost overruns are incurred 
on projects because they are public projects. The case study will show that a privately 
managed project is still susceptible to time and cost overruns indicating that there could be 
other reasons. The case study will also show that time and cost overruns are due to ill-
preparation by the project team at inception and that, improved management of the project 
during execution could not prevent the project from incurring time and cost overruns. 
Furthermore, the case study will show that teamwork is essential for effective execution of the 
project and that, the breakdown in teamwork leads to reliance on contracts for performance 
enforcement which results into claims and time and cost overruns eventually. 
6.2 Project Description 
This was a high-speed passenger rail transport project in South Africa. The aim of the 
project was to stimulate investment and social economic development in the area as well as 
to reduce the travel time and cost in the congested area of the province. It was also aimed at 
promoting public transport and improving its image to the public. The project consisted of 
designing and constructing a rail line of about 80km to service 10 stations, some elevated, 
some underground and some on grade. To maintain the required gradient and route, several 
roads had to be redirected resulting into construction of new bridges. A total of 50 road and 
rail bridges were constructed. 
The project incurred cost and time overruns though it was well managed. 
6.3 Respondents 
A total of four respondents were interviewed who included three from the concessionaire 
and one from the client (Table 6.1). These were all involved in the project with most from the 
formation of the project up to the completion and hand-over to the operations and maintenance 
phase. The limitation in the research was that the numbers of the respondents were 
significantly less than those of the other case studies. This was because other members who 
were physically involved in the project were not available at the time of the research. However, 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
92 
 
it was endeavoured to ensure that at least a representative from the two parties was 
interviewed to provide information on how the project was carried out. The years of experience 
for the technical executive and the client’s representative were not obtained at the time of the 
research, but these were highly experienced and senior civil engineers. 
Documentary evidence was also used to supplement the information that was obtained 
from the interviewees. This was either obtained from the representatives and their 
organisations or from the freely available information from the media. 
Table 6.1 High speed rail project respondents 
 
With regards to journals, none of the respondents said they read research journals. They 
mostly read technical magazines and other media from their head office or professional 
affiliation. 
 
Figure 6.1 High speed passenger rail project details 
Project Position Organisation Position Qualifications Experience
CEO Turn Key Contractor Director BSc Civil 36 yrears
CEO Turn Key Contractor Contract BSc Civil 40 years
Technical Executive Technical Executive BSc Civil
Client Representative CEO Rail Management BSc Civil
Project Details
Phase I
Airport line
Planned duration 48 months
Realigned duration due to start delays 45 months
Original start date June 2005
Revisions January 2006, June 2006
Actual start 28 September 2006
Contract completion date 27 June 2010
Actual completion date 8 June 2010
World Cup start date 11 June 2010
Phase II
Planned duration 54 months
Actual start 28 September 2006
Contract completion date 27 June 2011
Actual completion June 2012
Phase III
Actual completion June 2013
Project costs
Guesstimate by province R7bn
Concession offer R14bn
Contract after negotiations R25bn
Provisional final project costs R25.7bn
pending outstanding legal settlements
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6.4 Contract Data 
The project was planned to start in June 2005, but due to prolonged negotiations, it was 
actually started in September 2006. The original duration was 48 months, but adjusted to 45 
months. From a unitary project, it was later phased into three, due to project start delays and 
other external and project factors explained under section 6.5. 
The project costs changed from the estimated figure to the projected final cost. The details 
are given in Figure 6.1. 
6.5 Time and Cost Overruns and the Management of the Project 
The reasons for the overruns are similar to the other two case studies. (1) The project start 
was delayed. (2) There were land acquisition problems. (3) The influence of the World Cup. 
(4) Water in the tunnel. (5) The client’s insufficient budget. (6) Environmental concerns. (7) 
Pressure and public resistance to the project. (8) Design changes. These are shown in Table 
6.2, 6.3 and 6.4. As shown in tables 6.3 and 6.4, most of the causes originate from the external, 
project and then organisation environment as was the case in the other two case studies. 
Table 6.2 High speed rail project root cause of time and cost overruns 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Factor Reasons
Delay to start the project The concession negotiations took longer
Land acquisition problems The land acquisition process took longer due to court cases and 
negotiations bottlenecks
Influence of the World Cup The World Cup became a completion date milestone to the 
project 
Water in the tunnel Water levels in the tunnel were higher than planned as well as 
that the contractor was asked to redo the section for not 
following the client's specifications
Client's insufficient budget The client lacked experience in the construction of rapid 
passenger railways and there was sustained pressure from the 
public
Environmental concerns The project had higher than average environmental 
requirements
Pressure and public resistance There was concern from the public on the impact of the project 
especially displacement of people along the route and that the 
cost would be too high for the province
Design changes The geotechnical conditions along a section of the route were 
different from the anticipated
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Table 6.3 Root cause and the environment they come from 
 
Table 6.4 Comparison of environment of root cause 
 
6.5.1 Delay in project start 
The negotiations took three and half years to conclude from 2003 to June 2005. The 
prolonged negotiations reduced the project time for design and construction. This was 
compounded with the need to complete the project before the 2010 World Cup. With the 
pressure of the public on the project team, they decided to accelerate the project to ensure 
that they completed it in time for the World Cup. This led to cost overruns. 
Discussion and implications 
The possible reasons for the prolonged negotiations include, (1) the client’s lower budget, 
which made the parties to consider the required solution against the client’s proposals, and 
other amendments, (2) the complexity of the project had been under-estimated and this was 
quickly realised during the negotiations. Various amendments and different assumptions were 
required which were the product of experience with the input of the concessionaire who was 
well experienced in high speed passenger rail systems. Whilst the client had carried out much 
preparatory work for the project, they lacked experience in rapid passenger rail systems and 
this affected the project assumptions and the solutions proposed for the project. This confirms 
the results in the first and second case study that experience affects the preparation for project 
delivery. Passenger railway systems had not been built in the country for a period of close to 
50 years before this project and consequently, the necessary experience did not exist. It was 
noted by the respondents that the province did not have the numbers and the skilled personnel 
with passenger railway construction experience due to passenger rail construction production 
inactivity for half a century. In this period, the projects related to railway freight services and 
maintenance of existing stock. 
Description Environment
1 Delay to start the project Project
2 Land acquisition problems External
3 Influence of the World Cup External
4 Water in the tunnel Project
5 Client's lower budget Organisation
6 Environmental concerns External
7 Pressure and public resistance External
8 Design changes Project
Environment Percentage
5 External 56%
3 Project 33%
1 Organisation 11%
9 Total 100%
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6.5.2 Land acquisition problems 
The client had land acquisition problems and this resulted in delays to give land to the 
contractor which affected his construction programme. Due to the bottlenecks, the land 
allocation was not uniformly done which affected their planned execution from one end of the 
project to the other. There was also the combined influence of the delayed start to the project 
and the World Cup factor which exerted more pressure on the project team. The response of 
the team was to have several concurrent work sites along the route to accelerate the speedy 
delivery of the project. The lack of uniform land acquisition, therefore worked at variance with 
the planned delivery of the project to be in time for the World Cup. 
Discussion and implications 
The reasons for the delay in land acquisition were twofold, (1) there were several court 
cases from the private land owners who were unwilling to give their land, (2) the client had 
planned to use the Land Expropriation Act, but later discovered that most of the land belonged 
to public entities. He could not therefore use expropriation but negotiations. However, the 
negotiations and court processes took long to resolve. 
The reasons behind the bottlenecks were the ill-preparation of the province for the land 
acquisition process. They had not done a project of this nature and scale for a long time. They 
did not have the experience and the skill and numbers of people to carry out the work. The 
land acquisition process was lengthy and they were under-resourced to deliver the land in the 
required time frame. The Concessionaire Technical Executive mentioned that the client had a 
seven-man team which they considered inadequate for this enormous task with issues from 
court cases to negotiations. They had under-estimated how long it would take to sort out the 
land issues possibly due to optimism bias as found by Flyvbjerg, (2011). Equally, they had 
concentrated on the technical aspects of the project of design and construction than this 
aspect. It may also have been reflective of the technical orientation of the personnel on the 
project from both the client and the contractor which concurs with the observation of Edum-
Fotwe & McCaffer, (2000) that there is a higher technical orientation in construction project 
management. This problem was also noted in the stadium project where the public 
communication role was neglected. 
6.5.3 The World Cup factor 
The World Cup factor affected the project significantly. This also shows the effect of 
external factors on the project team’s management of the project. With the award of the World 
Cup to South Africa, there was public pressure and a perception that the project would 
enhance the World Cup. The Finance Minister promised that the project would be ready and 
assist the World Cup. Thus, the commencement of the tournament became a milestone for 
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the project. The negotiations, however, took longer than anticipated and this was worsened 
with the land acquisition problems and the budget approval delay. They had hoped to start the 
project in 2003 then 2004, 2005, the beginning of 2006 and eventually the middle of 2006. 
This would have given the project 48 months to complete. However due to the delay they now 
had exactly 45 months to the tournament. 
The contractor was therefore tasked to devise a plan as it was clear the target completion 
date would not be achieved. The solution was to change the design to fit in the reduced 45 
months which was to end on 27 June. Since the tournament was to commence on 11 June, 
this would be half way through. Acceleration was therefore required. The contractor 
investigated which parts of the project would be useful to the World Cup and put these on 
Phase I and the rest on Phase II and run the projects concurrently. Due to this commitment, 
Phase I was completed on 8 June, 2010, 3 days before the commencement of the tournament. 
Discussion and implications 
The results show that the World Cup and the influence of the minister of finance, external 
factors, significantly affected the planning and execution of the high-speed rail project. The 
opening of the World Cup became a milestone for the project. Since the completion date was 
difficult to achieve, the project team decided to split the project into Phase I and Phase II. They 
also decided to accelerate the project to meet the completion date. The results also show that 
the project plan and eventual execution of the project was due to a combination of the World 
Cup factor and the prolonged negotiations (project factor). 
6.5.4 Insufficient budget 
The client had a lower budget and this was realised during negotiations. This was one of 
the reasons that led to lengthy negotiations. They needed to agree on a budget that could 
meet the client’s requirements and the concessionaire’s expectations and capabilities. Various 
reasons are given in literature for under-estimation: Optimism bias and misrepresentation 
(Flyvbjerg, 2011); Flawed decision making due to lack of good judgement to predict event 
(Busby & Payne, 1999); Organisational pressures and poor record keeping (Ibid, 1999). 
On this project, three factors contributed to the lower budget. (1) Lack of experience of the 
client in high speed passenger rail systems construction, (2) optimistic assumptions on the 
project, (3) under-estimating the project’s complexity as seen in the land acquisition problem 
and, (4) pressure from the public. 
The results of the lower budget were that (1) the project start was delayed due to the 
negotiations and the need for National Treasury approval of the revised budget which delayed, 
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(2) the project scope was changed to be within the budget, (3) there were design changes to 
the project, all leading to time and cost overruns on the project. 
Discussion and implications 
The results show that lack of specific project experience, optimism bias, under-estimating 
the complexity of the project and pressure from the public were the major drivers for the lower 
budget on this project. This was a similar experience on the other two case studies discussed 
before. The results also show the effects of the lower budget on this project. The project start 
was delayed, the project scope was changed to meet the lower budget and changes to the 
design were made to accommodate the reduced scope. This was equally seen on the stadium 
project. 
The lower budget constrained the solutions devised, thus restricting innovation in the 
design. One area affected by the restricted budget was the construction of the tunnel. The 
client requested for a single bore tunnel as opposed to a double by-directional tunnel because 
of lack of funds. A single bore tunnel, however, required the creation and construction of a 
way leave and signalling system. A further operational consequence was the increase in the 
train time because of the waiting period at the way leave and a possible failure of achieving 
the planned ridership. 
The results confirm the observation in the other case studies that lack of experience in the 
project type and pressure from the public lead to under-estimating of project budgets. It also 
shows how under-estimating affects the project decision making process and the potential to 
lead to time and cost overruns. 
6.5.5 Environmental requirements 
Most of the respondents were of the view that the environmental requirements were 
onerous and mostly higher than average. The client wanted best environmental practices to 
be instituted after a tour of other projects around the world. These considerations, however, 
were said to have raised the cost of the project. The client desired a lower cost of the project, 
yet they also wanted the highest environmental standards which was difficult to achieve. It is 
similar to the experience at the stadium project where the public wanted all their concerns to 
be taken care of but desired a project that would cost less. This highlights the problem of 
conflicting interests in large projects (Capka, 2004; Morris & Hough, 1987). 
From the interviews, it was also noted that the client paid much attention to environmental 
risks and their mitigation than the construction risks. The explanation was that, construction 
risks are the contractor’s obligation based on the principle that risks are given to the person 
best able to handle them. The consequence of this was that an opportunity to plan for the 
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project risks in totality in the early stages of the project was lost. It was further compounded 
by the procurement process which allowed the contractor to get involved later in the project 
when the project approval and budget have been agreed. 
Discussion and implications 
The results show that the environmental risks were a major client’s concern on the project 
whilst construction risks were left to be managed by the contractor. This removed the 
opportunity of project risks to be planned and managed in totality by the project team from the 
beginning. The results also show that there was a conflict of interest in the project with clients 
and the public desiring a lower cost of the project but desiring their mitigation and 
environmental concerns to be managed potentially leading to a difficult project and a possibility 
of time and cost overruns. 
6.5.6 Public resistance and pressure 
Similar to the other two case studies, pressure from the public was significant on this 
project as well. Therefore, due to public pressure, the cost of the project was kept lower which 
however, led to project complications and increased costs, notwithstanding. It shows that the 
lower cost or estimate often seen as a solution to constrained budgets has unintended 
consequences of project complications, longer project durations and increased costs. 
The public was concerned that the project would be expensive and that its construction 
would displace many people along the route. This therefore resulted in resistance to the 
project by the general public, private and public entities that were to be affected by the route 
to be taken. Land acquisition was therefore a difficult task for the client as some property 
owners and the public took the matter to court. For public entities along the route, negotiations 
took longer than the client had planned. These all resulted in construction delays. 
The project team later responded by setting up a communication and liaison system to 
answer the many questions raised by the public on the project. They set up community 
information centres and a hotline. This helped in reducing the public resistance to the project.  
Discussion and implications 
The major concern of the public was the displacement of the people along the route and 
the perception of the high cost of the project on the public purse. Whilst the cost and 
suppression of environmental effects were considered, the plan and mitigation of public 
resistance was not equally planned and managed resulting in land acquisition problems and 
public pressure. The setting up of a liaison and communication system later with the input of 
the contractor helped in resolving many of the matters that affected the public. This helped 
inform the public about the project and respond to any queries on the project. 
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The results suggest that public relations and liaison system in management of large 
projects is not given high priority and is a potential cause of project disruptions and time and 
cost overruns. It also suggests that the contractor is instrumental in the formulation and 
implementation of the communication system of public relations as noted in the stadium 
project and the high-speed passenger rail project and that a consideration of his input in the 
early stages of the project could potentially improve the management of the projects. 
6.5.7 Water in the tunnel 
The client had specified pre-grouting in the tunnel to contain the higher underground water 
levels in this area, but the contractor carried out post-grouting and presented their reasons for 
preferring post grouting. The client therefore decided to take the matter to arbitration where it 
was ruled in the contractor’s favour. The client, not satisfied, later took the matter to court. The 
court ruled in the client’s favour and the contractor was asked to rectify in accordance with the 
specification. By the time the final verdict was given, the project was almost completed. Since 
the rectification was going to take some time, the tunnel section was set aside from the rest of 
the project for the contractor to work on it. This was the birth of Phase III of the project and it 
took about two years to complete this section. It was also the birth of a strained relationship 
between the client and the contractor resulting into claims and counter claims on project costs. 
Discussion and implications 
The results show that disagreement on the method of construction to use in the tunnel 
affected the client-contractor relationship in the project. They now resorted to arbitration and 
eventually went to court. The contractor was asked to redo the section when the project was 
well-nigh complete which lead to delays in completing the project in totality. From this moment, 
onwards, the relationship in the project changed from that of teamwork to the use of contracts 
to enforce project requirements. 
6.5.8 Lack of experience 
The client had taken time to prepare for the project, but they did not have the experience 
of building a new passenger railway system as they had not built passenger railways for close 
to twenty-five years. Their professionals were skilled in freight railways and infrastructure. 
Consequently, the client was not well informed on passenger railway systems and modern 
high-speed passenger rail construction, which affected the initial planning for the project. 
The contractor, on the other hand was experienced in passenger rail construction. The 
concession team comprised mechanical/electrical, railway track, coach and civil engineering 
experts from around the world. This team was influential in devising improved design and 
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construction management capabilities in the project. However, the contractor came in after 
the project had been defined and budgets set and approved by National Treasury. 
Discussion and implications 
The lack of knowledge and experience of running a high-speed train system affected the 
client’s planning for the project. From the interviews, for instance, it was brought out that the 
client planned for use of longer trains, which consequently required longer stations when 
shorter trains were possible and that would have made the stations shorter and reduced the 
overall cost of the project. They would also have more trains leading to improved returns on 
the cost of the project. Another matter that was brought out was that they had opted to have 
an automatic protection system without the counterpart operating system which would have 
made them to get more trains. When these matters were brought out during negotiations, the 
client said it was late to change the plan at that stage and that for transparency, they would 
need to give chance to other bidders as well and that would take a lot of time. 
Thus, the input of the project from the client ultimately affected the planning and 
management of the project by the project team. The client’s lack of project specific experience 
affected the evaluation of the problem and the solutions devised or sought from the 
contractors. The knowledge of what is available on the market to fit with what the client needs 
is important and it requires a team of professionals who have experience and technical know-
how for the project.  
6.5.9 Design changes 
The design changes were due to the lower project budget, prolonged negotiations which 
led to scope reductions, as well as the different geotechnical conditions of the soil along the 
route. The first two were products of lack of project experience and pressure from the public. 
The problem of geotechnical conditions arose from the fact that the project team was not 
granted permission/access into all the land to carry out exploratory bore holes because of 
owners’ resistance to the project. The result was the team had to depend on partial 
investigation to design. There were several objections in one area because they wanted the 
project stopped and this is where the design had to be changed. 
Discussion and implications 
The results show that design changes were effects of a lower budget, prolonged 
negotiations and refusal of landowners to grant access to the contractor for geotechnical 
investigations. Because of a lower budget, the project team changed the design to fit in the 
budget available. The project was broken into phases to meet the reduced time and the World 
Cup requirements. The project team furthermore, used partial geotechnical information 
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because of resistance from landowners. This led to design changes when the conditions 
during construction were different. The results confirm what was observed in the other two 
case studies that design changes are effects of other factors in the external environment. 
6.6 Conclusions 
The results in this case study show that the problems of time and cost overruns were due 
to various factors which had multiple inter-relationships. The causes were (1) The project start 
was delayed. (2) There were land acquisition problems. (3) The influence of the World Cup. 
(4) Water in the tunnel. (5) The client’s insufficient budget. (6) Environmental concerns. (7) 
Pressure and public resistance to the project. (8) Design changes. 
The project start was delayed due to prolonged negotiations which resulted in reduced 
design and construction time leading to pressure on the project team in the management of 
the construction process. The project also experienced land acquisition delays because the 
acquisition process took longer than anticipated. The client had under-estimated the 
complexity of the land acquisition process. This was because they had not done work of this 
magnitude for a long time and they lacked the experience, skills and numbers to carry out the 
work. Equally, in the project organisation, there was more emphasis on technical proficiency 
neglecting softer issues like land negotiations. This orientation was equally seen in the stadium 
project in regard to communication with the public. 
The World Cup factor significantly affected the planning and executing of the project as it 
became a completion milestone. It also led to the splitting of the project into Phase I and Phase 
II. The project was also accelerated to ensure that Phase I which was seen to be beneficial to 
the World Cup was completed before the commencement of the tournament. The insufficient 
budget, on its part, was due to lack of specific project experience, optimism bias, under-
estimating the complexity of the project and pressure from the public of perception of 
costliness of the proposed project. The effects of the insufficient budget were delayed start to 
the project and change in the project scope and design. 
The client focussed on environmental risks and left construction risks to the contractor. 
This removed the opportunity for holistic planning and management of the project’s risks in 
totality. The management of the public and the perception about the project were not 
adequate. This resulted in land acquisition problems on the project. The cost of the project 
was also kept lower partly because of pressure from the public. This however resulted in 
project complication and increased costs as was equally seen on the stadium project. 
The water in the tunnel, resulting from the disagreement between the client and the 
contractor on the method of water exclusion in the tunnel led to a break in teamwork between 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
102 
 
the client and the contractor. The effect of the disagreement was a delay to the completion of 
the project and the onset of Phase III. 
Design changes were due to the insufficient client’s budget, prolonged negotiations as well 
as different geotechnical conditions along the route. The lower budget and prolonged 
negotiations were due to the client’s lack of project specific experience and public pressure. 
Geotechnical problems were due to the inability of the project team to carry out all geotechnical 
surveys along the route because of resistance from some owners of land. 
The results show that the factors were mostly external-environment caused as observed 
in the other two case studies. In this case study, the problems began with the inadequate 
relevant experience of the client which itself was due to the lack of high speed passenger rail 
construction for several years. The lack of capacity and skills led to ill-preparation for the 
project which resulted in a lower budget, land acquisition problems and under-estimating of 
the project complexity. The lack of experience in combination with the pressure from the public 
and optimism bias led to under-estimating the project complexity and the project cost. 
The results also showed that there were multiple effects of factors upon others and 
eventually leading to time and cost overruns. The results also showed that the insufficient 
lower budget led to delay in project start, reduction and change in project scope which 
eventually led to design changes and construction complications. Suggesting that whilst a 
lower budget or scaled down project appears desirable, it can potentially lead to design 
complications and even more cost increases.  
The results also showed that the project management team was affected by external 
environment factors such as the World Cup factor, public pressure and resistance and 
environmental requirements; organisation factors such as delay to the project start, insufficient 
budget and project factors such as water in the tunnel. The project team not only dealt with 
factors in the project environment, but also effects of external and organisation environment 
factors. 
Similar to the other two case studies, the major contributing factors to the time and cost 
overruns on this project were lack of specific project experience, delayed start to the project, 
and, pressure and resistance from the public. The other factors specific to the case study were 
land acquisition problems, the environmental requirements, the World Cup Factor and design 
changes due geotechnical conditions.  
The results from this case study show a positive relationship with the theory that the lack 
of project specific experience of the project participants, delayed project approval, pressure 
from the public affected their preparation for the project and use of project management 
principles which led to time and cost overruns.  
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Chapter 7 Case Study IV 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a case study of a project team working on a river dam project in the 
Western Cape, South Africa. The project was selected because it presented a case of a project 
that was completed within time and budget. This is similar to the study by Giezen (2012) of a 
deviant case (Harding, 2013). This is a project that did not conform to the normal rule of 
overrunning large projects. The dam project was completed within time and cost. The aim of 
the case study was to see whether it would confirm the opposite of a typical overrunning 
project or theoretical replication. The case study will show how project specific experience of 
the client, the project development manager, consultants and the contractor impacted the 
project team’s preparation and eventual execution of the project. The case study will also show 
why the rival explanation that successful implementation of a project is on the basis of whether 
it is a public or private project should be rejected. The successful study provided input to the 
eventual formulation of the proposed strategy for the management of large projects. The study 
was included because it demonstrated how a large project could be successfully carried out. 
It showed how the involvement of a project development organisation could lead to successful 
project delivery. 
7.2 Method of Analysis 
The analysis was directed at finding out how prepared the participants were in carrying out 
the project. The following questions were used: (1) Were the project participants prepared for 
the project? (2) Did they use project management principles consistently? (3) Were the 
participants experienced? (4) Was there a lack of time? (5) Was there resistance to the 
project? (6) Was multiple competitive tendering used? (7) Was the budget insufficient? (8) 
Was the project completed within time and cost planned at tender? 
To understand the above, the analysis was centred on extracting information from 
interviews and documentary evidence. 
7.3 Project Description 
The project comprised construction of a 68m high x 929m long wall, concrete faced bottom 
and an embankment of riverbed mined rock, supplement scheme, 2 pump stations and a 12km 
pipeline. The project was completed on time and within budget. The budget was R1.5bn and 
completed March 2009. The project was a management partnership of the user client, the city 
council and the user client’s project implementation manager. 
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7.4 Respondents 
Four respondents were interviewed. These are the project director (contractor), the project 
manager (consultant), the concrete manager and technical manager (Table 7.1). The number 
of respondents is less than the other case studies. The major reason for the smaller number 
of respondents was that several personnel who had participated in the project could not be 
located at this point in time due to relocation and retirement. Another reason was that some 
personnel could not find time to be available for the interviews. In spite of this limitation, the 
author endeavoured to find representatives who could give information for the principal parties 
to the project. 
Table 7.1 Dam project case study respondents 
 
7.5 Preparation for the Project 
Amongst the project participants, the client was acknowledged by all respondents to have 
been adequately prepared and experienced in this type of project. The client was the 
Department of Water Affairs and Sanitation, a public entity. The client took several years 
preparing before they commenced construction works on the project. On an earlier similar and 
larger dam project than the case study project, the client had set up an independent semi-
autonomous department to finance and manage the construction of dams and tunnels as 
projects development managers. Before embarking on the project, an experienced Canadian 
firm was appointed to assist in building up the capacity of the department in training and 
management of the project. The project was successfully executed enabling the department 
to gain the relevant knowledge and experience in dams and tunnels construction project 
management. The semi-autonomous department managed this project exclusively as the 
client, sourcing project finance, appointing consultants and contractors and handed over the 
project to the water affairs department after successful completion. 
On the case study project, the project development manager was again appointed to 
finance and construct the dam. The project development manager and the owner client had 
previously carried out extensive studies on the possibility of a water project in the area 
concerned. They had even investigated the possible dam types on the site. It took them about 
three to four years before commencing whilst looking for funding sources. Most of the 
respondents acknowledged that the project development manager was a high profile 
Project Position Organisation Qualifications Experience
Project Manager Consultant Civil Engineering 31 years
Project Director Contractor Civil Engineering 47 years
Concrete Manager Contractor Civil Engineering 50 years
Technical Manager Contractor Civil Engineering 22 years
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
105 
 
organisation with very experienced personnel who had been working on dams, tunnels and 
other civil engineering construction projects over time. 
Equally, the consultant was prepared for the project as they had intelligence information 
of the imminent project. They also had extensive experience in this type of work having been 
involved in the earlier dam project with the same partners in a similar joint venture. Not only 
did they have the experience, but had worked as a team for the same client, the project 
development manager before. When they took up the task of designing, preliminary feasibility 
studies had been carried out by the project development manager on the identified site. They 
took up these studies and developed them further. 
The designs were complete before construction. The Project Director (contractor) said this 
was one of the few projects he had worked on where drawings were complete. This made the 
work of construction easier. There were very little provisional sums on the project. Only the 
penstocks were on provisional sums. The drawings were said to have been thorough and 
complete which made preparation for the work easier for the contractor. The final amount was 
not very different from the tender figure. 
The contractor was also said to have been prepared for the work but, due to limited time 
available before construction and the competitive tendering environment, he was less 
prepared compared to the other two participants. This is said to have been the reason the 
tender figure was 20 percent lower than the actual cost. Another factor was the contract 
requirement of 20-30% local labour content which was difficult to achieve. The contractor was 
further required by law to conform to the country’s social inequality reversal programme called 
Black Economic Empowerment (BEE). This required them to include black owned enterprises 
in the project. They identified 18 sub-contractors, but only one or two actually got involved in 
the project with the rest being only interested in attending meetings and allowances. 
The spirited work of the parties in preparation for the project was instrumental in the 
successful execution of the project. The results concur with the work of Gareis (1989) who 
found that the pre-project phase and the post-project phase affect the performance phase. 
The energy and impulses invested in the preparation for the project are important factors that 
allow the project team to perform successfully (Ibid, 1989). Furthermore, even though this was 
a public project, it was successfully carried out within time and cost showing that successful 
implementation was not on the basis of whether it was public or not. The rival explanation that 
a project will incur time and cost overruns because it is a public project is, therefore, rejected. 
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7.6 Use of Project Management Principles 
The participants are said to have followed the traditional project management principles. 
The client gave the consultant authority and autonomy on the project. All the communication 
to the contractor was through the consultant. Short-cuts were not an occurrence on this 
project. The design concept was complete before tender and was based on the actual site 
after extensive feasibility studies were carried out. The site had been identified and the 
necessary permits including project and funding approval had been handled before the 
construction works were commenced. The project development manager engaged the 
community early in the project before commencement of construction and came up with a 
labour database that was to be used in recruiting the local people in the project. The 
community liaison was continued and improved as the contractor became involved in the 
project. 
The owner client had carried out studies on water improvement in the province and 
earmarked the site as a possible location for a dam. These studies were later picked up by 
the project development manager and handed over to the consultant’s joint venture that 
consolidated the project into the actual construction concept based on the site. This reduced 
the risk of location-induced design changes later on in the project life cycle.  
The management of environmental, project and funding approvals before commencement 
of the project reduced the risk of delay to the start of the construction process or delay of the 
on-going construction process. There was, therefore, less pressure on the project participants 
to find short-cuts or other means of accelerating the project. The community engagement 
helped to diffuse the rising resistance to the project reducing the possible stoppage of the 
project and hence pressure of reduced project time. 
7.7 Qualifications and Experience 
As noted before, the project participants were experienced in managing and constructing 
projects of this nature. All of them were experienced in dam construction. This helped in the 
formulation of design and project management strategies for the project. The estimation for 
the project was R1.5bn and the contract was R1bn. The consultants and the contractors, too, 
had extensive experience in dam design and construction. They had also participated in 
previous contracts with the same partners. With the experience, they were able to respond to 
the problems they encountered on the project. One of the problems was that they found 
pockets of poor ground on the river bed and on one river bank. The response of the team was 
to re-programme activities so that labour moved to other areas whilst designs were carried 
out. The result was that the overall timeline of the project was not affected at all. 
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Figure 7.1 Effect of project team's preparation on project management 
Having qualified and experienced consultants and contractors was seen by most 
respondents as key to the successful delivery of the project (Figure 7.1). This started with the 
competence in the client’s organisation which led to good preparation for the project by the 
client. There is a back and forth relationship between the client’s preparation for the project 
and the competence of the client (Figure 7.2). Their experience which improved their 
competence made them prepare for the project adequately. Equally, their good preparation 
for the project impacted on their competence as well as in the follow up activities of the 
consultant and the contractor. In this case, the competence is historical or based on the 
accumulated experience gained in the far and near past by the individuals and the 
organisations. Especially individual knowledge, since organisations are poor at knowledge 
management (Kuo, 2012). 
 
Figure 7.2 Relationship of experience, preparation, competence and performance 
7.8 Insufficient Time 
Time limitation was not a factor on this project apart from the contractor’s limited time 
during tendering. There was no date set by the client for completion of the contract as in the 
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case of the stadium project, and the high-speed rail project. The major factor, however, was 
the need to meet the date of impounding to catch the winter rains and this was achieved 
successfully. The project start was not delayed and the project permits had all been handled 
before project commencement on site. 
7.9 Community Resistance 
There was extensive resistance from the community due mostly to the perceived influence 
of the project on the community. The respondents said that this was mostly from the affluent 
community. Their major fears were that the dam would disfigure the valley and that the 
contractor’s labour would lead to erosion of morals in the community. Their views were based 
on a previous project in the area which resulted in an upswing of moral degeneracy like theft, 
rapes and pregnancies. The affluent community managed to raise a big movement in the area 
to discourage the project and many joined in the resistance. 
The result of this was that the project team found it difficult to promote the project due to 
misunderstandings and perception difficulties. In spite of the many benefits the project would 
bring to the valley such as employment for the youth, suppliers, improved water volume and 
quality in a water scarce region. This dam would give them clearer water than the poorer 
quality and mostly muddy water from a nearby dam they had been using. The results give a 
hint to how organisations and individuals resist projects. Influential community members or a 
group of community members with partial information get to the community and raise their 
fears regarding a project that is to be carried out thus influencing their perceptions and 
judgement. This suggests that to get the community to cooperate in the project, using 
influential members of the community would help in engaging the community to support the 
project. 
A major breakthrough was achieved when the project team decided to use an influential 
personage to speak to the community. They engaged the ex-mayor and he helped turn the 
community to support the project. Eventually, they set up recruitment centres to employ 
artisans and suppliers of materials. 
The employment of the local community, however, had unintended results. The 
productivity and quality of work was affected because the local labour were used to working 
on simple building projects which mostly lacked supervision. Much retraining was therefore 
required and this again affected productivity and tended to increase the costs of the contractor. 
There was also a mismatch between the labour available, based on the project implementation 
manager’s labour database and what the contractor needed. For example, whilst one was 
indicated as a concrete mixer operator, they could only operate the basic mixers. 
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7.10 Design Changes 
There were no major design changes on this project. The respondents indicated that this 
was because extensive feasibility studies had been carried out prior to the commencement of 
the design. It was also because the client and consultant were experienced and prepared. 
Another reason was that the site location had been identified and the feasibility concepts were 
based on the chosen location. However, the ground conditions changed in spite of the trial 
bore tests they had carried out. They found that the ground conditions between the trial holes 
were different. Further, they found that the right bank soil was very poor as well as patches of 
clay here and there which required stabilising and removing respectively. 
The team responded by reprogramming the activities so that resources were drawn to 
other areas whilst investigations of soil conditions and subsequent designs were carried out 
without disrupting the construction process. The response was also facilitated by the 
understanding of the client who was experienced in these types of projects and in project 
management. The client is said to have supported the geotechnical investigation carried out 
prior to the commencement of construction. The contractor’s project manager said that most 
clients do not understand the importance of geotechnical surveys as a result they are not 
funded or carried out extensively as required. This, he said, was because most clients and 
their representatives are from non-technical/non-construction backgrounds.  
The results show that identification of the project site, extensive feasibility studies before 
commencement of design, client and consultant experience and preparation were important 
factors in avoiding design changes on the project. They also suggest that the response of the 
project team, which is related to experience, determined how the particular project issues that 
cropped up were managed. Lastly, the results also show that geotechnical studies were 
carried out because the client, due to their experience in dam construction and their 
construction/technical background, appreciated their importance. 
7.11 Multiple Contracts and Competitive Tendering 
Multi-procurement and competitive tendering was used on this project. The client 
appointed the consultants as well as the contractors. Consultants: Consultants’ joint venture 
(three consulting firms); dam construction: dam project joint venture (four contractors); pump 
stations: client construction directorate; mechanical and electrical: one contractor; pumps/ 
pipelines: one contractor. 
The project was carried out within the budget and planned duration and met the dam 
impounding date. 
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7.12 Factors Seen to Have Led to Meeting Time and Budget Targets 
Several factors were seen to have led to successful delivery of this project. These include 
experience and adequate preparation of the project team for the project, teamwork, 
commitment and institution of a management structure to handle the project (Table 7.2). 
Table 7.2 Dam Case Study facilitators of successful project delivery 
 
Preparation for the project 
The client, the government water affairs department, was adequately prepared for the 
project. They took several years before they eventually carried out the project. In the 
intervening period before embarking on the project, they carried out extensive studies on the 
possibility of constructing a dam in this region. Furthermore, earlier, when undertaking a 
previous similar and larger dam project, they had set up a semi-autonomous institution to 
finance and manage the project on their behalf. The team in the semi-autonomous institution 
teamed up with experienced professionals from Canada and built up their experience profile 
during the execution of the project. When the current project under study was carried out later, 
the institution had extensive experience in both project financing and project management. 
This institution was the managing client for the project both financing and project management 
and was adequately prepared for the project. Water, environmental, financing, funding and 
project approvals were all managed before the project was started. Identification of the actual 
project site, feasibility studies on the actual site, investigation of possible dam types had been 
carried out. 
Factors that led to successful project delivery
The client had project specific experienced
The client carried out thorough studies and preparation for the project
The client was understanding and supported the work of consultants and the contractor
The client and project team followed project management traditions and principles
The consultant had autonomy and authority to design and supervise work in spite of 
client's knowledge and experience
The consultant was qualified and experienced and keen to have project carried out 
successfully
The consultant was driven by commitment and pride to carry out the work well
The consultant was prepared to carry out the project and had worked with the joint venture 
partners before
The consultant project manager instituted a system of recruitment of personnel, integration 
of the design process and the construction process and was present full time on site to 
drive the project
There was commitment from all team members of the project
There was teamwork in the project and the dedication and experience helped them to 
manage the challenges faced on site
The project management structure of meetings, anticipation of issues and planning and 
communication helped in the team response 
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The consultants and the contractor were equally prepared for the execution of the project. 
The designs and drawings were complete before the commencement of construction and the 
final cost was not very different from the planned cost. 
Qualifications and experience 
The project participants were experienced in this type of work starting with the user client, 
the managing client, the consultants and the contractor. They had all worked on the previous 
similar dam as partners which improved their definition, project strategy formulation and 
management of the project execution process. The experience improved their competence 
which also impacted on their preparation and eventual project implementation. The process 
started from the client’s organisation into the consultant’s organisation and eventually the 
contractor and the worker pouring concrete on site. 
Project manager and the project management process 
Starting with the pre-design process up to construction, the project manager and his team 
set up processes and procedures of how the work was to be carried out. Previous engagement 
with other consultants and extensive experience helped in designing and delivering the project 
design concept as well as the project management process. Furthermore, the project manager 
established a design office where all consultants would meet to develop the concept, selected 
the consultants’ personnel with his partners and crucially, initiated and implemented a detailed 
design development strategy to be in line with the construction progression strategy on site to 
avoid information delays to the contractor. They also set up the required project management 
structures of calendar of meetings, anticipation of issues, planning and communication of 
information in the project system to avoid delays. 
Commitment and teamwork in the design and construction process 
The project manager, the consultants and the contractor, including the client, were all 
committed to ensure that the project was delivered as efficiently as possible. The reason for 
the commitment was the pride they had of carrying out the work. This ensured teamwork and 
dedication to the speedy delivery of the project and handling any problems they encountered 
on site. 
7.13 Conclusions 
In this case study, it was found that the client, the project development manager (managing 
client), the consultants and the contractor were prepared to carry out the project. The drawings 
and the tender documentation were complete. The feasibility studies had been carried out 
based on the identified project site. The owner client and the project development manager 
had extensively carried out the project preparatory works. These include identifying and 
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locating the project site, investigating the possible dam types and sourcing for funding, 
carrying out and managing project, funding and environmental approvals for the project. The 
consultant and the contractor, through market intelligence had information of the imminent 
project and prepared themselves. Lastly, the project participants had the specific project 
experience having worked on a similar, but larger project before. 
The participants followed the traditional project management principles. Short cuts were 
not an occurrence on this project. The major factors behind were that the site had been 
identified before the project was embarked on, the design concept was complete before tender 
and based on the identified site, the project permits had been thoroughly managed before 
commencement of construction and the client did not impose a completion date on the project. 
There was therefore less pressure to use short cuts. 
The project participants had project specific experience. They all had worked on a similar 
and even large dam project before. The project development manager had set up systems 
and built experience, skills and the numbers of professionals in the management of financing 
and construction of projects. Equally, the consultants formed a joint venture with organisations 
and people they had worked with on the previous project. These organisation and individuals 
had extensive experience in the design and supervision of dams. The same was true with the 
contractor joint venture. They had worked as partners on the previous project and they shared 
the experience and knowledge of managing such projects. 
Time limitation was not a factor on this project and the client did not set a completion date. 
The project start was not delayed and the project, funding and environmental approvals had 
all been managed by the time they started construction. An important date that they had to 
meet was that of impounding to catch the winter rains which they successfully met. 
There was community resistance on this project as is common on large projects. The 
resistance was driven by the community’s fear of the impact of the project on the environment 
and public morals due to the experience they had on a previous project. Led by the affluent 
community in the area, a big resistance movement was raised. The resistance was managed 
when they used an influential personage to engage the community and managed to turn the 
community to support the project. 
Multiple procurement and competitive tendering was used on this project. The project 
structure was that the project development manager sat at the top. Below him were the project 
manager then consultants and the contractors. The project manager was given the autonomy 
to manage the project. The development manager employed the project manager, all the 
consultants and the contractors. The contractors were not numerous on site. They each had 
a particular site they were working on. 
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The budget was sufficient. The contract was even lower than the planned expenditure on 
the project. The project was ultimately completed within the time and cost planned at tender. 
The results show that the project participants were prepared to carry out the project. They 
also show that the factors found to have led to time and cost overruns on the overrunning 
projects were missing in this project. Furthermore, factors that led to the project’s successful 
implementation were that the client and the project members were prepared and experienced 
in the project type, had carried out extensive studies before embarking on the project, followed 
project management principles and there was teamwork in the project. 
The results also showed that a public project could be successfully carried out without time 
and cost overruns rejecting the rival explanation that success in a project is dependent on 
whether it is public or private. Furthermore, the results showed the influence of the involvement 
of the project development manager in the formulation and execution of the project beginning 
with financing, design and construction. Their experience and involvement in the project from 
the client’s organisation environment to the project environment as well as their involvement 
in other projects in the external environment was important in the successful delivery of the 
project.  This suggests that a successful strategy in the management of large projects in South 
Africa potentially needs to incorporate the involvement of an organisation with gained 
experience of several projects in the external environment to help the client in the organisation 
environment as well as in the project environment to formulate and execute projects. 
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Chapter 8 Case Study V 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a case study of a project team working in a private commercial 
building project. The project was completed within planned time and cost. Similar to the case 
study in the previous chapter, the dam project (Case study 4), this study was undertaken to 
understand the factors that led to its successful delivery and to confirm the theory that 
preparation and use of project management principles by the client leads to delivery of a 
project within time and cost. This was the last theoretical replication study. The case study will 
show why qualifications and experience of the project team were instrumental in successful 
project preparation, implementation and management of the design and construction process 
and how that enabled them to devise a project management strategy that promoted a 
structured approach to the management of the project using project management principles. 
It will also show how the use of the project implementation manager early in the project led to 
improved definition and delivery of the project and how a successful construction delivery 
environment was created leading to completion of the project within time and cost. This study 
aided in formulating the eventual proposed strategy for management of large projects. 
8.2 Project Description 
The project was an office block of 32 floors constructed to provide office space for 3000 
people. The project started in 2011 and was completed in 2014. It was estimated to cost 
R1.6bn. The project was three months late, but had cost savings of about R60m.  
8.3 Respondents 
Nine respondents were interviewed. These included the client’s representatives, 
consultants and the contractor (Table 8.1). The respondents were all involved in the project 
and are representative of the personnel that was involved in this project. The experience of 
the respondents ranged from 8 years to 45 years. 44% had experience above 40 years, 22% 
more than 10 years and 22% less than 10 years. The results show that the project was 
managed by very experienced people with most of them leaders of the organisations they 
represented showing the importance they possibly attached to the project or the high-profile 
nature of the project. Their experience also indicates that their testimony regarding the 
management of projects could be relied upon. 
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Table 8.1 Commercial Building Case Study respondents 
 
With regard to reading of research journals, only one respondent indicated they do, 
representing 11% of the respondents. Most read magazines and other literature from their 
affiliated professional institutions. How they keep abreast with research and new 
developments, the respondents explained that they speak to suppliers on new products, 
attend seminars and CPD meetings, read documentation from head office, popular magazines 
such as Engineering News and the Structural Engineer. This suggests that most of the 
research output in journals is not read by most professionals in the industry. 
With regard to experience in similar works, the client organisation and representatives had 
been involved in similar projects before. Consultant organisations and their representatives 
had equally been involved in similar projects before. The same was found to be true with the 
contractor and the representatives. This project, however, was bigger and had more floors 
than they had worked on before. It had 32 floors compared to the 10-15 floors they worked on 
before thus making it a more complicated project to them (Morris & Hough, 1987). 
8.4 Contract Data 
The project had two phases. In the first phase, one client, owned the site and wished to 
construct offices, a hotel and a gymnasium. The designs were carried out but they could not 
get the required 50% pre-let contracts the financiers desired. This was from 1999 until 2009 
when a banker came along as they wanted to house their group companies in one building. 
After agreeing on 50/50 sectional title sharing, phase two was launched and the designs were 
revised. The project was finally constructed and completed below budget and about three 
months after the planned completion date (Figure 8.1). 
Project Position Organisation Position Qualifications Experience
Project Engineer - structures, façades Director MISTE 12 years
Quantity Surveyor Associate B Tech 15 years
Electrical Engineer Director B Eng 8 years
Client's Rep - Lead Development Manager Development Manager B Arch 40 years
Senior Project Manager Director B Sc 40 years
Client Rep - Development Manager National Development Manager
Mechanical Engineer Engineer B Eng 8 years
Project Manager - Contractor Managing Director B Sc 43 years
Project Leader Contract Diploma 45 years
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Figure 8.1 Commercial Building Case Study contract data 
8.5 Preparation for the Project 
All the respondents were in agreement that the client was prepared to carry out this project. 
This is related to the amount of time they took before they actually went into the construction 
process. They had been working on the project for a period of about 10 years when they were 
seeking tenants. This enabled them to continue working and developing the concepts before 
they decided to build. The long period of preparation helped them to have the project 
thoroughly planned so that, though every project is different, they did not have significant 
surprises on site. This concurs with Söderlund (2002) quoting Cova and Holstius (1993) that 
the early phases of project work require much time and strategy. 
The other reason was that the clients carry much property developments and have thus 
specialised personnel to handle the projects. Not only were the clients experienced in property 
development, they also recruited development managers to manage the construction process 
which included the appointment of consultants and the contractor. This was similar to the dam 
project. The owner client appointed a project development manager to finance and manage 
the project in totality. Though in this case the development managers did not finance the 
project, but they totally represented the client on the project. Each client had their own 
preferred development manager and these two managers worked together and formed a 
unitary client by appointing personnel to be involved on the project with one playing a leading 
role. All the respondents were in agreement that the development managers knew what they 
were doing and managed the project well. The results were, a well-defined brief, completed 
concept and construction designs, an approved site, funding and project permits. 
The results suggest that the preparation of a client for the project is a product of the length 
of time they take before they begin construction, the experience they have and the 
appointment of competent client representatives who are experienced and carry out this type 
of work regularly. This was seen in the dam project case study and was mostly absent in the 
three overrunning projects. 
Estimate R800m
Contract Sum R942m
Final R880m
Planned start November 2010
Actual start November 2010
Planned completion 31 March 2014
Practical completion May 2014
Final handover July 2014
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The consultants were also prepared for the project, though they had less time before the 
start of phase II which somehow affected the detail design process. The work of the 
consultants was helped with the client’s clear brief. They also had extensive experience in 
multi-storey construction. 
The contractor was also prepared to carry out the project. The organisation and individuals 
had carried out similar high-rise buildings before, though it was their first time to use flush plate 
façade construction. What also helped was the discussion they had during project interviews 
at tender submission of how they were going to carry out the works. The contractor also 
profited from the previous contact he had with Phase I where he provided input to the client 
on how the work could be carried out. 
8.6 Use of Project Management Principles 
The participants followed project management principles and similar to the dam project, 
case study, the project manager was given autonomy and authority to manage the project. All 
communications to the contractor were done through the project manager. The design concept 
was complete before the commencement of construction and was based on the identified and 
approved site. The long preparation for the project had helped in refinement of the design. 
Equally, the environmental and funding approvals had been managed before the start of 
construction on site. As a result, the participants were not under pressure of delayed start of 
the project due to funding bottlenecks or delayed approvals. 
They used the JBCC form of contract to manage the project. They also set up a structured 
method of meeting and resolving issues and coordination required. This included setting up a 
payment cycle that everyone adhered to. 
8.7 Qualifications and Experience 
The participants were qualified and experienced in this type of project. The major 
difference though, was that they had not built up to 32 floors high rise in the country. Most of 
the respondents pointed out the structured approach to managing the project processes such 
as communication, meetings, reporting cycles, rules and regulations and approach to variation 
management to be due to the experience of the project managers and the quantity surveyors, 
to the efficiency in the payment systems and reports. There was a calendar of meetings and 
regular reports where all members attended. This helped in improving the competence of the 
project team. It was also explained that the architects and the project managers were very 
experienced at coordination meetings and the engineers at ensuring that all important design 
matters were not overlooked. 
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The development managers, the client’s representatives, due to their experience in the 
financial systems brought in a system of “management by value” where each consultant was 
responsible for their budget so that they develop their design within that value and after tender, 
ensure works are carried out within the bill of quantities amount allocated to their section. This 
gave them an incentive not to exceed their budgets. Similarly, the development managers 
agreed with the client a guaranteed amount for the project firstly at design and then tender 
which if exceeded, the manager would be liable to pay the difference. This created the 
incentive to work within the budget but also gave the client security. This concurs with 
Flyvbjerg (2011) who said participants should be made accountable by sharing in the 
increased cost should the project cost more. 
8.8 Insufficient Time 
The completion date was fixed by the client because they wanted to benefit from the Urban 
Development Zone (UDZ) incentive which required the owner occupier to get into their 
property before April, 2014. They therefore set March 31, 2014 as the closing date and the 
contractor agreed. The contractor had overlooked the city’s rainy and windy weather in which 
they would not operate cranes or hang out and clean the building. The pressure to meet the 
external requirements of the tax incentive led the team to have optimistic behaviour and 
overlook the weather. The pressure from the client which was also pressure from the 
government incentive policy affected the decision making in the project team. This confirms 
what was observed in the overrunning case studies. 
8.9 Community Resistance 
There was community resistance on this project as well. As noted by scholars, large 
projects have extensive impacts on the community and country as a whole (Capka, 2004; 
Merrow, 2011; Morris & Hough, 1987). This is usually the main reason the public shows 
concern when such a project is embarked upon without them being consulted or listening to 
their concerns. This is recognised by the various project management standards such as the 
PMBOK, which encourages stakeholder management (PMBOK, 2004). The main contention 
of the community was with the height restrictions in the city to avoid obscuring the city 
landmark. The resistance was more spirited during Phase I than Phase II. Using consultants 
and the involvement of the contractor, they managed the resistance. The experience of the 
project participants and the preparation for the project was instrumental in the resolution of 
the resistance. 
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8.10 Design Changes 
There were few design changes on the project and these were mostly from the request of 
the client. He requested to move the building from a 4 star to 5-star green building as well as 
installation of a gymnasium on the 12th floor. The respondents pointed to the completed 
design concept, the experience and preparation of the project team as the reasons for the 
fewer design changes. 
8.11 Multiple Contracts and Competitive Tendering 
The project team used multi-procurement and competitive tendering on this project as well. 
The selection of the consultants however was on the basis of negotiation with the personnel 
and institutions the client had worked with before. The aim was to use organisations with a 
proven track record of management of a large project. For contractors, they used selective 
competitive tendering. They first recognised the organisations they deemed capable of 
carrying out a complex multi-storey project and invited them to bid. The selection process 
included interviews where the contractor was to present how the work was to be carried out, 
especially the procurement and management of equipment and approach to construction in 
the restricted city centre site. The selection method helped them obtain qualified and 
experienced consultants as well as a very innovative contractor. 
8.12 Reasons for Delay of Three Months 
There were three main reasons for the project delay. Firstly, due to the UDZ requirement 
mentioned earlier under section 8.8, the client set a completion date which was difficult to 
achieve. They agreed to this date, but according to the construction project leader it was 
difficult to match due to the city’s inclement weather of wind and rain. They assumed that they 
would easily get resources such as skills, labour and materials it being in a city. Thus, they 
ignored the problem of weather and were hopeful the target would be met. The rainy and 
windy days, however were more than they had planned for. This affected all the construction 
activities. It was worsened by the type of building that required use of cranes, and to suspend 
men on ropes to clean the façade as they proceeded which could not be done. 
Secondly, there were some changes to the project arising from the client’s requirements. 
The client requested for the building to be a 5-star green building instead of 4-star. This had 
multiple implications such as light fittings, fire detection equipment, façade/curtain wall window 
colours and air-conditioning systems which all led to design changes, delay in construction 
and increased costs. He also requested for installation of a gymnasium on the 12th floor which 
led to design changes and longer project duration. The client also insisted that the lifts should 
be clean when they take over. It meant the contractor was not to use the lifts for transporting 
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materials and they would have to rely on the hoists and cranes, but with the town’s inclement 
weather, it was a difficult task. It was clear to the contractor that they had not fully understood 
the complexity of the project. 
The third was that the complexity of the project was under-estimated. The building was 
designed with its various systems interdependent on each other and the participants did not 
understand this at the beginning because some details were not available that time. It was 
also due to the lack of experience in large high-rise buildings. It was also compounded by 
having two clients, each with their own set of requirements. 
The banker client was to occupy the top ten floors and the other client the lower ten floors. 
The owner-occupier, the banker, was required to move in the building earlier, but their offices 
were to be ready later being on the top floors. They could not build the shell and go up to 
complete the banker’s section. The building needed to be water tight to avoid water ingress. 
Therefore, they needed to reach the roof and clad the building as well before moving to install 
the services inside. Secondly, they needed to install the plant room on top floor, basement 
and mid-way. They could not install the plant room until they had completed the roof and thus 
they could not service the floors below until the plant was installed. The building was not 
designed to be built in stages, but as a complete whole. 
A combination of a lack of experience in large high-rise buildings, client’s requirements 
and a traditional approach to designs made the process more complicated. The bank could 
have occupied lower floors. Equally an attempt could have been made to design the building 
to be built in stages as they progressed. This approach though would be hampered by the 
restricted site and weather. 
The last complication was that each client had their own building and security systems. 
After practical completion, the client’s personnel had to come in and install the systems before 
the project could be handed over. 
8.13 Factors Seen to Have Led to Meeting Time and Budget Targets 
The respondents mentioned several factors that led to the project being completed below 
the contract cost (Table 8.2). 
Careful budgeting 
The project team had careful budgeting at the beginning due to the experience of the 
development managers and the consultants. The respondents noted that it was only the 
façade and the complications of a larger high-rise building where they were doing something 
new. The experience of the project team was also said to have been instrumental in the 
preparation for the project. Another factor was the client took long before starting the 
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construction process. This enabled them to complete the various pre-contract activities such 
as funding and project permits. 
Table 8.2 Factors that led successful delivery of commercial project 
 
Use of experienced consultants and contractor 
The client used experienced consultants and contractor. These were selected based on 
record of accomplishment, skills and workload. They only considered those whom they 
deemed capable of managing a large high-rise project. A development manager explained 
that another way would have been to break up the project into packages, but that required 
having a good construction or management contractor. This suggests that they reasoned out 
the decisions before adopting them. 
Preparation for the project 
The client and members of the project team were prepared to carry out the project. The 
client spent about 10 years in preparation as they were investigating the future tenants for the 
building. In this period, the client appointed consultants who developed design concepts, 
which provided the basis for decision-making. Furthermore, the client appointed development 
managers who were instrumental in preparing the project formative processes and the 
eventual management of the project. The managers then appointed the consultants and the 
contractor. With their experience, the necessary project permits and statutory requirements 
were managed. 
Project permits 
The project team managed to get all the necessary permits before they started 
construction work. The site had been selected and the necessary approvals done. The 
environmental impact assessment and the public participation processes had all been 
completed. This ensured that there was no delay to start the works or interruptions in the 
Factors that led to successful project delivery
Client experienced in project type
The clients used experienced development managers
Client carried out thorough studies and preparation for the project
The client and project team followed project management traditions and principles
The consultant had autonomy and authority to design and supervise work
Careful budgeting at the beginning
Use of experienced consultants and contractor
The project team was prepared to carry out the work
Structured management of the project
Comptent quantity surveyor and other project members
Teamwork and consolidated effort
Efficient construction process
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design and construction process. This was related to the length of time it took them before 
they began construction works on site. 
Structured management of the project 
Structured management of the project was seen by most respondents to have been critical 
to the success of the project. The project team had set up a calendar of activities to aid in the 
management of the project which included, planning meetings, site meetings, technical 
coordination meetings and, valuation and payment cycles. The team set up a system that 
required the consultants to think through costs, time and other potential implications of any 
additions or changes to the project before presenting the requests to the management 
meeting. This meant that by the time the consultant was presenting the additions needed, he 
had already carried out the preliminary investigations and coordinated with the contractor on 
time and cost implications. It was also in line with the cost management system set up that 
required each consultant to manage their budget. This set up started from the development 
managers to the consultants, the contractor and the supervisors down to the person placing 
concrete. Each had a budget and was responsible and self-monitoring to be within their time 
and cost environment. 
The project team also used JBCC, a contract form that is known by practitioners in the 
country. Everyone understood and knew what their roles and duties were unlike the use of a 
bespoke form of contract. The factors behind the successful structured project management 
were that the consultants were experienced and knowledgeable, the project manager was 
competent and the contractor was experienced and competent as well. Having an inefficient 
project manager and inexperienced engineers was said to be a harbinger of project problems 
since the project delivery method assumes the consultant is knowledgeable and prepares 
competent tender documents. The competence of the project manager, the quantity surveyor 
and the engineer was seen to be especially critical to the delivery within time and cost. The 
project manager with the help of the development managers and other consultants set up the 
system of management described earlier. The quantity surveyor was instrumental in project 
estimates, budgets and payment system instituted in the project. The engineer’s experience 
was noted to have helped in considering the design solutions and implications not only on 
their area of specialisation but also design and cost implications on other project areas. This 
was found to be very useful in ensuring that nothing was overlooked in the planning meetings. 
The results suggest that qualifications, training and experience are critical to the success 
of the project and that there is a close link between project success and use of project 
management practices confirming results by Papke-Shields et al, (2010), Crawford (2005). It 
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shows that having a structured method of project management contributes to effective delivery 
of a project within time and cost. 
Teamwork and consolidated effort 
Teamwork and consolidated effort was seen by most respondents as important in the 
successful delivery of the project. The Project Manager said, “Success was not dependent 
upon one person but on consolidated team effort where all team members understood the end 
objective.” This view is said to have been achieved through management and communication. 
The communication within the project team was essential to get people to “buy-in” to the 
project. 
In this complex project with diverse components handled by different expertise, teamwork 
was essential. The components were all inter-linked, yet managed by different individuals and 
organisations. The delay or readiness of one system would stress, delay or accelerate the 
progress of other elements. Individuals, however, are trained in isolation of other 
professionals. This not only affects the understanding of the integrated nature of the whole 
project, understanding the role of other parts, but also understanding how their elements affect 
or are affected by others.  
In this project, the members worked as a consolidated team. This was achieved through 
project management and communication. The result was an assembly of diverse players with 
the singular objective, willingness and motivation to complete the project. The respondents 
however explained that this did not happen overnight. It took the project manager to guide the 
process in the early stages where differences and power plays were common amongst the 
team members until there was unity in the tribe later (Logan, King & Fischer-Wright, 2008). In 
contrast, the power project case study, whilst there was a project management structure, there 
was a lack of consolidated team effort. Most participants did not know what the details of other 
contracts were. Details of when other contracts would start or end were unknown, but they 
knew when their contract would begin. Whenever they were delayed possessing the site on 
the planned date, they claimed from the client. The result was the client received numerous 
claims from several contractors for delays by other contractors. 
Teamwork was also achieved through relationships in previous contracts. Several 
consultants had worked together in previous assignments in joint ventures or project teams. 
These relationships made it easier for them to find common ground and easily relate to each 
other. In this project, when the architect started his work, the moment he knew who the 
structural engineer was, whom he had worked with before, he approached him to sort out the 
sizing of the core and columns in a rational way and working out the parking and office grid. 
They had a lot of informal meetings in this iterative process. Coordination of the design 
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process occurred at two levels: the informal meetings between one consultant and another 
and at coordination meetings iteratively until the concept was finalised (Figure 8.2). 
Teamwork was also achieved through the use of software called Revit which helped in 
coordinating the development amongst the consultants (Figure 8.3). 
 
Figure 8.2 Design coordination in the team 
 
Figure 8.3 Preferred Revit conceptual design evolution 
Experience and relationships were seen as instrumental in coordination of meetings and 
the management of the project. On relationships, the electrical engineer said that working in 
a multi-disciplinary organisation is the same as working in separate organisations. It is not a 
matter of “having a desk next or being a telephone call away, but relationships.” 
A review of the above suggests that certain circumstances stimulated teamwork and 
consolidated effort: (1) the project manager was instrumental in coordinating the team, (2) 
there was determined project management and communication effort by all, (3) previous 
engagements with individuals or organisations, (4) coordination and adhoc meetings, (5) vast 
experience and qualifications of the project team. These circumstances were also seen in the 
dam case study. The consultants had worked together in previous engagements with the same 
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consultants in joint ventures like at the present. Equally, they had worked for the same client 
as a team. It was said that they understood and anticipated each other’s requirements and 
those of the client. Their relationship made it easier to formulate the bidding vehicle and the 
design management strategy. 
In contrast, in the overrunning projects however, there was less teamwork. They relied 
more on contracts to enforce performance. This is especially true of the power plant project 
case study where both the client and contractors used contracts for work to be done. In some 
cases, the client got into the contractors’ organisation to get them to perform. A process they 
called “micro-project management.” In the high-speed rail project case study, after the 
breakdown of teamwork, they resorted to use of contracts to enforce performance. 
Thus, the less successful projects had these characteristics, (1) participants lacked a 
defined agreed end goal, (2) there was a lack of appreciation of other elements and how they 
tie in to the whole project, (3) they used contracts to enforce performance, (4) the client was 
more involved in the project. 
The construction process 
The factors that were seen to be influential in the successful delivery of the construction 
within time and cost were, (1) resolution to complete the project as required and the creative 
ability to solve challenges they faced, (2) creation of an environment for successful project 
delivery, (3) experience of the construction team, (4) influence of the development managers. 
Using risk management as the anchor for their project delivery, the contractor dealt with 
each risk by not only identifying the risk and the determination of the cost, but also investigating 
measures of minimising the risk or eliminating it from occurring. The risks they faced included 
the “tight” construction programme which was difficult to achieve. The quality of information 
from the design team which would affect the first risk and the problem of lack of skills to carry 
out the work to the standard required which included sub-contractors, professional skills, 
artisans and productivity of the workers. 
For the first risk, which also affected the others as well, they resolved that they could 
achieve the delivery of the project by investigating the various ways this could be achieved. 
Using scenario planning, they considered best, medium and worst cases and went with the 
worst case which was that due to bad weather in the city, the programme would be restricted 
and the number of productive days therefore reduced. Since this work was to be done by 
artisans, they decided that they should involve them not only in the execution, but in the 
planning aspect as well so that the resolution is not only by management but that the workers 
“buy-in” the idea as well. Thus, creating an environment for successful delivery of the project. 
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Recognising that communication is normally difficult amongst the workers, they decided to 
use graphics to simply explain processes and what was hoped to be achieved. This work 
involved a two-stage process. The first was to determine the global programme, then carry 
out a programme, and risk analysis per trade by considering safety, health and weather. 
Secondly, prepare a revised programme with the task leaders and engage the workers on how 
the programme could be achieved to meet the reduced time frame. This was then followed by 
assignment of responsibility to task leaders of the programme down to the worker who had 
his daily or hourly programme to meet. The influence of the budgeting and planning of the 
development managers can clearly be seen in this process. Each person had a budget and 
programme to manage whose formulation they were involved in and this made them “own” 
the programme and budget thus ensuring that productivity was managed as well. They 
decided to use concurrent building processes to shorten the process. 
Slow information flow is a known cause of delay on projects (Le-hoai, Lee & Lee, 2008). 
The contractor had two options, (1) use the contract to claim, should the design information 
from the consultants be delayed, (2) take a proactive approach and pressurise the system so 
that drawings and any queries they may have are relayed in a timely manner. They decided 
that they would take the proactive approach so that information is delivered in time since their 
interest was to complete the project in time. They therefore employed a document manager 
who would follow through the processes and remind the project manager and the consultants 
concerned with the required information in good time as well as give them notice of costs 
before the end of the day when changes were made to the design. 
A last aspect of creating an environment for success was to get the right mix of people on 
the project starting with the project leader down to the artisans. The contractor decided to 
appoint people on the basis of previous performance and not on the basis of names or 
qualifications. They found a project leader who would take up ownership, responsibility and 
accountability for the project. Someone who would stand and fix the project problems and 
manage them as his own. With the help of the leader, the lower positions were filled with 
people they considered competent to carry out the tasks. The project leader considered 
selection of competent people as the biggest determinant of meeting objectives. This was said 
to have been a difficult task due to limitation in skills. The project leader therefore decided to 
find one or two competent individuals from previous experience and used the concept of 
influence to up-lift the competence levels in the others. 
8.14 Conclusions 
The results show that qualifications and experience of the project team were instrumental 
in the successful formulation and management of the design and construction processes. The 
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experience enabled the project team to devise carefully structured management processes 
that improved the competence in the management of the project. The experience of the client 
was equally seen to be important in the formulation of the budgets and permits before the start 
of the project. The results also showed that there is an apparent correlation between the time 
it takes the client to prepare for the project and how successful the preparation and hence 
expedition of the project is. The longer the period of preparation, the better the implementation 
of the project, within cost and time. When the permits and project and fund approvals are 
managed prior to the commencement of construction, there is reduced pressure on the project 
team to make shortcuts and the team is inclined to use project management principles. This 
proved the proposition that preparation and consistent use of project management principles 
leads to reduction in time and cost overruns on large projects. 
The results also showed that teamwork and consolidated effort were instrumental in 
delivering the project within time and cost. This is teamwork in both the design and 
construction processes. The factors that promoted teamwork included previous engagements 
of the participants, competent project manager and other consultants and efficient 
communication within the project. 
The results also showed that the efficiency of the construction process was anchored in 
the effective use of risk management in combination with teamwork and communication in the 
process. Not only were the risks identified, but measures were also implemented on how to 
mitigate and remove the risks from occurring. Thus, in the management process they included 
the measures to remove the risks. In this process, they involved the task leaders and the 
artisans to get them to “buy-in” to the process and the result was effective delivery of the 
project in time and within cost. 
The results suggest that a successful project management strategy needs to consider the 
management of the experience of project participants, management of the preparation 
process of the client and the participants, management of the teamwork process and 
management of the construction risk. The results also suggest that the strategy should lean 
towards the proactive approach than the reactive approach.  
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Chapter 9 Case Study Comparison 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a comparison of the case studies. The comparison is made with 
reference to reasons for overruns and management methods adopted by the project teams. 
9.2 Comparison Across the Case Studies 
Table 9.1 shows the comparisons across the case studies presenting both the reasons for 
overruns and the methods that were used in managing the projects. The various factors 
identified as causing overruns and the management methods relating to the topic of overruns 
are listed in the first column under the categories of external, organisation and project 
environment. The case study projects are indicated at the top in columns 2 to 6. A tick is 
indicated or the factor description written in the project’s column where a factor affected that 
project. The measure used is that of overrunning factors. Therefore, a higher figure indicates  
Table 9.1 Comparison across the case studies 
 
Factor Stadium Power Plant High Speed Rail Dam Commercial Building
1 2 3 4 5 6
External Environment
Project pressure World Cup Power shortage World Cup Dam Impounding Occupier's tax incentive
Delayed start √ √ √ -- --
Lack of time √ √ √ -- --
Public pressure against project √ √ √ √ √
Lack of similar jobs √ √ √ -- --
EIA approval √ √ √ √ √
Resistance from locals √ √ √ √ √
Procurement requirements √ √ √ √ √
Health and safety √ √ √ √ √
8 8 8 5 5
Organisational environment
Tendering method Open 
competitive
Open 
competitive
Open 
competitive
Open competitive Selective competitive
Lack of experience √ √ √ -- --
Client's lower budget √ √ √ -- --
Under-estimating complexity √ √ √ -- √
Procurement requirements √ √ √ √ √
Lack of preparation √ √ √ -- --
5 5 5 1 2
Project Environment
Lack of preparation √ √ -- -- --
Ground conditions √ √ √ √ --
Procurement requirements √ √ √ √ √
Lack of experience √ √ √ -- --
Design changes √ √ √ -- √
Insufficient time √ √ √ -- --
Constructability problems √ √ -- -- --
Interface management  problems -- √ -- -- --
Lack of team work √ √ √ -- --
Enforcement of cooperation Contracts Contracts Contracts Teamwork Teamwork
Incomplete design concept √ √ √ -- --
Time overruns -- √ √ -- --
Cost overruns √ √ √ -- --
Under-estimating complexity √ √ √ -- √
11 13 10 2 3
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that this is an overrunning project and a lower figure indicates that the project performed better.  
Under external environment, all the projects had a project pressure, public pressure, and 
resistance from the community. Equally, they all had to abide by EIA, procurement and health 
and safety requirements. The better performed projects did not have delayed start, time 
pressure and lack of similar projects. Under organisation environment, the most prevalent 
method of tendering used is the open competitive. The projects had similar procurement 
requirements relating to project approvals and permits before embarking on the project. There 
is an apparent difference in terms of experience, project budget, estimating project complexity 
and preparation for the project. 
In the project environment, the overrunning projects exhibit similar characteristics and the 
most affected is the power plant project. It had more project related factors leading to time and 
cost overruns compared to the other projects. 
9.3 Comparison of Overrunning and Non-overrunning Projects 
From the researcher’s observation and examination of the data, using a qualitative 
assessment of the factors in both the overrunning and non-overrunning projects, the factors 
causing overruns were valued and depicted in Figure 9.1. The factors leading to overruns 
were graded by the researcher qualitatively for each project and tabulated. The higher figure 
is indicative of the prevalence of that factor in the project. The grades were from 1 to 10.  
 
Figure 9.1 A qualitative comparison of overrunning and non-overrunning projects 
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The comparison shows that overrunning projects had similar characteristics as shown in 
the banding of the case study projects in Figure 9.1. The overrunning projects occupied the 
higher values compared to the non-overrunning projects which had lower values.  
9.4 Reasons for Overruns 
The cross-case comparison shows that the reasons for overruns are similar in the three 
overrunning projects (Table 9.1, Figure 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 9.4). Figure 9.2 shows the stadium project 
was affected by location problems, public pressure, lack of project experience, lower client’s 
budget, lengthy procurement processes and under-estimating the project’s  
 
Figure 9.2 Condensed factors causing overruns on stadium project 
complexity. From Figure 9.3, the power plant project case study was affected by the same 
factors with the addition of ground conditions, strikes and productivity, safety requirements 
and project start delays. Equally, the high-speed rail project, as shown in Figure 9.4, was 
affected by public pressure, land acquisition problems, environmental concerns, World cup, 
water in the tunnels and client’s lower budget. This confirms what was seen in the replication 
analysis discussed under each case study (Refer to Chapters 4, 5 and 6). The factors 
observed in the first case study were also identified in the other two case studies. It was also 
found that the factors leading to overruns were mostly absent from the better performed 
projects (Refer to Chapters 7 and 8). The problem of time and cost overruns emanates from  
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Figure 9.3 Condensed factors causing overruns on the power plant project 
 
Figure 9.4 Condensed factors causing overruns on the high-speed rail project 
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the external environment and the response of the project team largely determines how 
successful the project will be. The response is mostly affected by the experience and 
competence of the team. 
9.5 Management of the Project 
Under management methods adopted by the project team, there is an apparent difference 
in the approach by the teams in overrunning projects compared to those in the better 
performed projects. The former used contractual agreements for enforcement of performance 
and the latter predominantly used teamwork and consolidated effort (Table 9.1). Furthermore, 
on the non-overrunning projects, the project teams used a structured approach to 
management of the project. They used development and project managers and the permits 
such as project approvals, funding approvals and environment impact assessment were 
addressed prior to start of construction on site. The results also reveal that the project team 
was better prepared and experienced for the specific nature of the project, the design concepts 
were complete at an early stage, sites had been identified before commencement of 
construction and clients took longer in preparing for the project in the non-overrunning projects 
compared to overrunning projects. This supports the view that the project teams in the better 
performing projects had higher levels of project specific competence compared to the teams 
in the overrunning projects. 
The results also show that the project team’s management of the project was influenced 
predominantly, by factors in the external and organisation environment. They also show that 
the behaviour of the team was often altered by these external factors leading to their failure to 
prepare adequately for the project and to use project management principles consistently.  
The results showed that the clients determined the project strategy and approach adopted 
in managing the large projects. From the results, the effect of these strategies on the 
management of the project were clearly seen. For instance, in the power plant case study, the 
client adopted a procurement approach of packages with many contractual dependencies 
leading to inefficiency and incompetence in the management of design data and actual 
construction. Many feeder contracts were delayed resulting in overruns in design and 
construction data in all the subsequent contracts. Furthermore, the client in the board room, 
determined the alignment of the packages based on specialisms and not power blocks 
resulting in the project’s failure to meet the organisational objective of supplying power per 
block (see section 5.5.6 for details).  
The results also showed the effect of the client’s experience and preparation for the 
project. Where the client lacked the project specific experience, project budgets and the 
complexity of the project were under-estimated and the client and the rest of the project team 
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were ill-prepared to carry out the project. Where the client was experienced, the projects had 
better budgets and execution strategy and the project team were better prepared to carry out 
the works.  
Therefore, the results show that the involvement of the client is a parameter of 
consideration in the effective management of large projects.  
The results also confirmed that the training, qualifications and experience of the project 
participants as a whole had a role in the management of large projects as this affected the 
competence of the team and their eventual performance. This was clearly seen in both the 
overrunning and the non-overrunning projects. Firstly, the effect of training as well as 
experience of the different consultants and contractors, was visible in their lack of large view 
understanding or impression of the project. Most understood their area of specialisation, for 
instance, structures or boilers and not other specialisms such as air cooling systems or 
turbines or fire installation and management systems. This made them have difficulties in 
evaluating the complexity of the project. Whilst previous study showed that management of 
projects is affected because there is concentration on technical fields at the expense of soft 
skills (Cywinski, 2009; Edum-Fotwe & McCaffer, 2000; Pant & Baroudi, 2008, Ramazani & 
Jergeas, 2015), this research also revealed that management of the project was also affected 
by the general failure of project participants to appreciate the whole project process because 
of the training that confines them to their limited fields of specialisation as well as lack of project 
specific experience. This was also visible between consultants and contractors. Certain issues 
only came to be appreciated and understood when the contractor began constructing. In 
several cases, certain consultants raised issues of constructability and how their area would 
fit in the whole process, but were not fully appreciated. The contractor equally raised some 
issues even before construction was embarked upon but were only embraced by other 
consultants later.  
Secondly, the effect of training, qualifications and experience was also seen in the 
advanced and better management exhibited in the non-overrunning projects. The dam project 
and the commercial building project showed how successfully the projects were managed 
using experienced and qualified project development managers. These managed the project 
starting in the client’s organisation to the final execution and implementation of the projects. 
They obtained their experience from managing several large projects on behalf of the client. 
This made them build up various organisational and individual professional portfolios over time 
which gained them the necessary experience to manage projects on behalf of the client. They 
were trained and experienced not only in civil engineering design and construction but also in 
project finance and community management. 
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The effect of the trained and experienced project manager and other consultants was also 
clearly visible in both the overrunning and non-overrunning projects. This enabled them set 
up effective project management systems that aided in the delivery of the projects which 
included a calendar of meetings and harmonisation of the detailed design evolution and 
construction implementation process to avoid lapses in information delivery and management. 
It was also found that the character, vision and drive of the project manager was instrumental 
in effective implementation of the project management process which included assigning 
works and harmonising the different specialisms, who are predisposed to work in isolation due 
to their training, to work collaboratively with others. Furthermore, it was noted that the 
experience of the individual consultants was important in terms of their contribution to the 
united work they presented. For instance, it was noted in the Stadium and Commercial 
Building case studies, that apart from the project manager, the architect, the structural 
engineer and the quantity surveyor were very instrumental in chairing the meetings, 
understanding the design and change ramifications and cost management approach and 
implications respectively. This was useful in the speedy management and execution of the 
project and in a large measure, aided in the project management structures that were set up. 
Thirdly, it was seen that, where the project teams had worked together on previous 
engagements, they were more successful at team working than those where they had not 
worked together before. Where they had worked together before, they easily set up joint 
ventures and project bids as well as execution strategies, they understood and anticipated the 
needs of the project as well as those of the partner organisation. This was equally true in the 
case of the client and the consultants and contractors. It tended to promote team work and 
consolidated effort. It was, however, noted that competitive tendering tended to lessen the 
spirit of teamwork in the project. It was highly visible under the power plant project where 
teams concentrated on their contract to the exclusion of others in their endeavour to meet their 
contractual objectives. It was also seen that where teamwork was lacking, the participants 
depended on contracts to enforce performance in the project, which led to claims and counter 
claims, promoting further tensions and time and cost overruns. 
The results also showed how the contractor was instrumental in managing the local and 
public community as well as the teamwork and consolidated effort in the construction process. 
It was seen in most of the projects that the community resistance was often put to rest with 
the coming in of the contractors in the project. It was also seen that where the contractor 
approached the construction process as a member of the team and adopted a proactive 
strategy of creating a successful delivery environment with both the consultants and his own 
workers, the project was successfully delivered. In the commercial building case study, the 
contractor, rather than adopting a claims strategy, he adopted a strategy of pressurising the 
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system to provide drawings in time. He also ensured all the workers were involved as 
important members of the project team by enabling them to get involved not only in the 
implementation but in the planning of the whole work and the budgets. This was achieved in 
part by using the graphical communication and also in daily communications with workers to 
agree work targets which they were party in their formulation, thus ensuring worker “buy in.” 
Lastly, the results showed that certain practices at work affected teamwork and work 
behaviour in the projects. These included outsourcing, influence of training, far-spaced large 
project activities, cultural dynamics, reduced worker productivity, government incentives and 
influence of the trade unions.  
It was found that outsourcing affected the competence of the organisations and 
supervisors of project tasks. In the power plant project, due to outsourcing of certain 
competencies (contracts/packages), the executing team became far removed from the work 
and had less understanding of the activities thus affecting their role of supervision. Equally, 
due to outsourcing project tasks such as design and construction of boilers and turbines, the 
organisation (power utility) became less proficient in the design and management of these 
activities which affected their planning and preparation for the new projects.  
It was also found that the practice of separate training of the construction industry 
professions tended to foster the spirit of working in isolation from other members of the 
industry. This often resulted in lack of a balanced understanding of the construction process 
in totality affecting the wholesale planning and execution of projects. 
Large projects were found not to be a common occurrence in South Africa. The 
construction activities could be 30-50 years apart so that when such a project is embarked 
upon, most of the skills, both in terms of organisational and individual expertise is lost through 
relocation to other industries and regions of the world or due to retirement. This affected the 
planning and delivery of the projects under study.  
Added to this, was the impact of the cultural dynamics on the productivity of workers in the 
workplace. This was clearly exhibited in the power plant project between the expatriate 
supervising managers and the implementing managers, local South Africans, as well as 
between the expatriate construction supervisors and the artisans, local South Africans. The 
approach to work of the supervising managers was impersonal, militant and commanding 
which was at variance with the democratic and personal approach of the implementing 
managers. This was equally true with the construction expatriates and the local artisans. The 
effect of the militant approach on the South Africans was that they would leave work and 
boycott or refuse to work or involve unions and strike leading to numerous work stoppages. 
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This was also related to the reduced worker productivity, government incentives, the trade 
unions and the problem of numerous staff changes. It was found that due to lack of 
supervision, lack of self-discipline by the workers, the effect of government promises on the 
workers, the growing power and influence of trade unions and the numerous staff changes in 
the contractors’ organisations, the productivity of workers was affected. The workers could 
stop work at any time which affected the productivity at work leading to time and cost overruns. 
In summary, the results show that certain factors within the macro and micro project 
environment either promoted or inhibited effective management of the large projects. Thus, 
the approach of the project team, the external pressure on the project participants, particularly 
lack of time and resistance by locals and other professionals, the experience and preparation 
of the client and the project team members, the influence of training, qualifications and 
experience of the consultants and contractors, outsourcing of competencies, far-spaced large 
project activities, and work dynamics in the work place all affected how the was the project 
was managed. However, it was seen that the experience and preparation of the client and the 
rest of the project team was instrumental in ensuring effective performance and creating a 
conducive environment for successful project delivery. 
9.6 Conclusions 
The comparison of case studies shows that the factors causing overruns were similar 
across the case studies. It also reveals that these factors were mostly absent from the better 
performed projects. Furthermore, the comparison shows that there was a difference in the 
approach to management between the overrunning projects and those of the non-overrunning 
projects. In the overrunning projects, contractual agreements were used to enforce 
performance whereas in the better-managed projects, teamwork was used. It was also 
revealed that project teams in non-overrunning projects had project specific experience and 
used structured management which were mostly absent from the overrunning projects. The 
project teams were prepared for the execution of the projects and they used project 
management principles consistently which led to reductions in time and cost overruns. The 
client and the rest of the project team had project specific experience and were prepared for 
project delivery compared to the overrunning projects where the teams did not have 
experience and were ill-prepared to carry out the projects. 
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Chapter 10 Questionnaire Survey 
10.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the results from the questionnaire survey. The purpose of the survey 
was to understand from the views and opinions of project professionals in South Africa how 
large and small projects are managed and what the general factors are that cause overruns 
to complement the case study research. 
The questionnaire survey was used sequentially with the case studies in a triangulation of 
data, of research methods and of results (Robson, 2011; Love et al, 2002). Whilst the case 
studies were chosen to get in-depth understanding of the actuality of projects, the 
questionnaire survey was used to gain an understanding of how large projects are managed 
in South Africa as well as the perceptions of professionals in the construction industry on the 
time and cost overruns problem and how it could be solved. The results were used to confirm 
the validity of the case study results and also provided input to the proposed solution to the 
problem of time and cost overruns on large projects. 
The total response counts vary in the tables presented. This is because some 
respondents opted not to answer certain questions. 
10.2 Response to Questionnaires 
The responses to questionnaires are presented in Table 10.1. 
Table 10.1 Summary of survey responses 
 
The lowest response rate was from the CIDB contractors at 15% followed by consultants 
at 24% and the highest was from CMP at 53%. Although the combined response rate of 26% 
is acceptable, the number of response rates may also influence the outcome of the survey, 
the investigation was qualitative rather than quantitative. 
 
 
Summary of Responses
A B C D E F
Group Sample Population Completed Not completed Attempted Not attempted Total B+C Response
CIDB Contractors 98 9 6 4 83 15 15%
CESA 46 4 7 3 35 11 24%
CMP 40 11 10 3 19 21 53%
184 24 23 10 137 47 26%
Responses
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10.3 Respondents 
Industry sector 
Figure 10.1 shows a sectorial representation of respondents from the survey. The majority 
of the respondents were from the private sector (62%). In terms of category of industry, the 
respondents were from a diverse background with the majority project managers (28%) 
followed by engineers (22%). 18% came from owner organisations. The respondents were 
thus well-represented (Table 10.2). 
Total Response Total Count 47 
Answer Count Percent 
Public 18 38,3% 
Private 29 61,7% 
Figure 10.1 Respondents' industry sector representation 
Table 10.2 Respondents' construction industry profession category 
Total Response count 50  
Answer Count Percent 
Owner organisation 9 18,0% 
Architect 1 2,0% 
Engineer 11 22,0% 
Project Manager 14 28,0% 
Quantity Surveyor 2 4,0% 
Construction Manager 8 16,0% 
Contractor/Builder 5 10,0% 
Work experience, qualifications and work position in organisation 
Most of the respondents had a bachelor’s degree (41%) followed by master’s and diploma 
(24%). The minimum qualification was a matric certificate (4%), (Table 10.3). The minimum 
qualification was a matric certificate (4%). Regarding experience, the majority had experience 
of more than 20 years (46%) followed by those with 10 to 20 years’ experience (35%). Thus, 
those with more than 10 years’ experience constituted 81% of the respondents (Table 10.4). 
The responses can therefore be relied upon coming from experienced and qualified 
professionals from most sectors of the construction industry. 
Most of the respondents held the position of Programme/Project Manager/Project  
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Table 10.3 Respondents' highest qualifications 
Answer Count Percent 
Total Response Count 47  
Matric certificate 2 4,4% 
Diploma 11 23,9% 
Bachelor's degree 19 41,3% 
Master's degree 11 23,9% 
Other 3 6,5% 
Table 10.4 Respondents' experience in the industry 
Total Response Count 46  
Answer Count Percent 
Up to 5yrs 3 6,5% 
5 to 10yrs 6 13,0% 
10 to 20yrs 16 34,8% 
More than 20yrs 21 45,7% 
Engineer (33%) followed by Managing Director/Director/Associate (27%) then 
Procurement/Contracts/Commercial Manager (24%). This may be indicative of the importance 
the organisations attached to the topic at hand and that their responses could be relied upon 
by virtue of their position in the organisation (Table 10.5). 
Table 10.5 Respondents' position in the organisation 
Total Response Count 45  
Answer Count Percent 
Project/Programme Manager/Project Engineer 15 33,0% 
Procurement/Contracts/Commercial Manager 11 24,4% 
Director/Managing Director/ Associate 12 26,7% 
Company Lawyer/Company Secretary 2 4,4% 
Administrative Estimator 1 2,2% 
Human Resource Administrator 2 4,4% 
Chief Financial Officer 2 4,4% 
Organisational information 
Most organisations have been in existence for more than 20 years with the majority of 
respondents spending more than 5 years with the same organisation. This suggests that most 
organisations are mature especially seeing that the project management personnel have 
stayed in the same organisation for 10 or more years (Table 10.6, 10.7). 
Table 10.6 Organisations' operational life 
Total Response Count 47  
Answer Count Percent 
Up to 5yrs 1 2,13% 
10 to 20yrs 17 36,17% 
More than 20yrs 29 61,70% 
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Table 10.7 Years served with the organisation 
Total Response Count 46  
Answer Count percent 
Up to 5yrs 16 34,78% 
5 to 10yrs 8 17,39% 
10 to 20yrs 16 34,78% 
More than 20yrs 6 13,04% 
10.4 Definition of a Large Project 
The majority of the respondents describe a large project as one financially large (39%) 
followed by complex (29%), larger size (21%) and then geographically spread (9%). (Table 
10.8). Financially, most defined large projects as those whose value exceeds R100 million 
(Figure 10.2). This was followed by R1billion then R2 billion. The lowest was R10 million. 
Table 10.8 Description of a large project 
Total Response Count 70  
Answer Count Percent 
Financially large 27 38,6% 
Large project size 15 21,4% 
Geographically spread 6 8,6% 
Complex project 20 28,6% 
Other 2 2,9% 
 
 
Figure 10.2 Financial definition of a large project 
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10.5 Performance of Large and Small Projects in South Africa 
Success on small and large projects 
The respondents viewed large projects to be barely successful in South Africa and small 
projects to be just about successful (Table 10.9). On time and cost overruns, 8 out of 10 large 
projects in South Africa have overruns compared to 6 out of 10 small projects (Table 10.10). 
This concurs with Flyvbjerg (2011) who found that 9 out of 10 large projects have overruns. 
Public projects, 8 out of 10 have time and cost overruns compared to 5 out of 10 private  
Table 10.9 Respondents' view of success of large and small projects 
Question 
# 
Responses Mean Median Mode 
Standard 
Deviation 
On a scale of 1-5 with 1 being failed and 5 
successful projects in South Africa, where 
would you put the category 
 
      
Large Projects 36 3,3 3,5 4 0,9 
Small Projects 36 3,9 3,5 4 0,9 
projects. The results show that most large projects have time and cost overruns compared to 
small projects. Equally, most public projects have time and cost overruns compared to private 
projects. The variation in the responses was not significant. 
Table 10.10 Numbers of projects with time and cost overruns in South Africa 
Question 
# 
Responses Mean Median Mode 
Standard 
Deviation 
Out of 10 projects, in your opinion, how 
many projects of the category would you 
say have time and cost overruns in South 
Africa?      
      
Large Projects 29 7,9 8,0 10 1,8 
Small Projects 29 5,9 5,0 5 2,3 
Public Projects 28 7,6 8,5 10 2,8 
Private Projects 28 5,2 5,0 5 2,5 
Perception of a successful project 
The completion criteria of time and within budget was considered by the respondents as 
the basis for their description of a successful project (Lim and Mohamed, 1999). This was 
followed by the satisfaction criteria of conformance and satisfaction (Table 10.11). The results 
suggest that, a project is judged successful if it has met the completion criteria of time and 
cost as well as the satisfaction criteria of quality and approval from the client and other 
stakeholders. 
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Table 10.11 Respondents' success criteria 
Total Response Count 40  
Answer Count Percent 
Completed on time 29 26,1% 
Completed within budget 28 25,2% 
Met quality requirements 25 22,5% 
Satisfied client 25 22,5% 
Other 4 3,6% 
10.6 Management of Large Projects in South Africa 
Public and private projects 
There was no conclusive difference on how the respondents viewed the management of 
public and private projects (Table 10.12). This question was viewed from two perspectives, 
the approach to management of the project and the effectiveness or efficiency of the 
management process by either the private or public client. On the approach, most who felt  
Table 10.12 Management of public, private, large and small projects in South Africa 
Total Response Count 40 
Management of public and private projects Count Percent 
Similar 18 45,0% 
Not similar 22 55,0% 
   
Total Response Count 38  
How large and small projects are managed Count Percent 
Large projects are managed the same way small projects are managed 14 36,8% 
Large projects are not managed the same way small projects are managed 23 60,5% 
Other 1 2,6% 
   
Total Response Count 37  
Effect of size on management of a project Count Percent 
The size of the project affects the way it is managed 29 78,4% 
The size of the project does not affect the way it is managed 8 21,6% 
   
Total Response Count 37  
How large and small projects should be managed Count percent 
Large projects should be managed the same way small projects are managed 16 43,2% 
Large projects should not be managed the same way small projects are managed 21 56,8% 
the projects were similar were of the view that the legislation processes and project 
management principles are the same. That all follow a methodology whether private or public 
and that all projects have experienced similar challenges. Those who viewed the approach to 
be different saw that the type of client determined the mandates and objectives, procurement 
strategies, priorities and variables in their execution of the project. 
On effectiveness or efficiency of the management process which relates to performance, 
most were of the view that private projects are better managed compared to public projects. 
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Public projects experience budget overruns due mainly to designs and scope creep. Private 
projects do not have delays and cash flow problems. The reasons for better management of 
private projects were seen from the execution process itself and the end goal of the project. 
In the process, it was said that they still have competent people managing the projects 
resulting into better planning and control and, better management and execution of the 
projects. The end goal of the private entities is to make money and thus, they ruthlessly 
manage the projects inspecting timelines and budgets daily. Furthermore, private clients were 
said to be results-driven and that they treat non-completion as non- negotiable.  
For public projects, on the other hand, the reasons for poor performance were seen to be 
rooted in the project initiation and definition, employment of personnel, project execution and 
political influence. The public projects were seen to be often poorly defined, lack business 
cases, poor stakeholder management and interaction, which was compounded with an 
inflexible supply chain process resulting into poorly conceived projects. The public sector was 
also seen to lack management skills and experience. One of the reasons was that in the public 
sector, there was a tendency to employ people on the basis of political affiliation rather than 
experience and known competence. Furthermore, the changes in political leadership at district 
and provincial level after elections, often lead to changes in project implementation strategies 
as a result of change of project leaders. This then, leads to poor execution of the project 
resulting into overruns and sometimes, suspension of projects due to lack of funds. 
The results suggest that the process of management of public and private projects may 
be the same, but the performance is different. Public projects are seen to be poorly managed 
whilst private projects are better managed. This may suggest that the management approach 
to these projects should not be the same. In one, there is a tendency towards poor definition 
of projects, employment of less competent personnel and poor project execution whilst in the 
other there is employment of competent people and focus on the end goal which drives 
management to put in measures to ensure the goal is attained. This however, is at variance 
with the results from the case study of the dam project. Though it was a public project, it was 
successfully planned and managed. This suggests that successful management of the project 
may not be because it is private or public, but it does indicate that there could be other factors 
that affect the performance in the projects. 
Size of the project 
Nearly all respondents said that the size of the project affects the way it is managed and this 
was further confirmed by two follow up questions on whether large and small projects are 
managed and should be managed the same way. The majority of the respondents said large 
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projects are not managed the same way and also that they should not be managed the same 
way as small projects (Table 10.12). 
The reasons given for managing them the same way were that the basic principles of 
project management are the same irrespective of size or complexity of the project and that 
projects are the same. The smaller projects may be less complex than the larger projects, but 
the basic management tools remain the same. Larger projects might require a few more 
people due to the workload to cope with the documents. 
The reasons given for managing them differently were centred on the nature of the 
projects. These were: the resources required or used, the skills and experience and the 
complexity of the projects. Large projects were said to require more resources and processes 
than smaller projects. They require more planning and control, more experienced and qualified 
personnel to design and construct and more time is usually invested to manage time, cost, 
quality and benefits due to the complexity of the project. Secondly, they involve more multi-
disciplinary professions than smaller projects. These projects have many unknowns, 
uncertainties and risks and, therefore, require more collaboration thus making them more 
difficult to manage. Thirdly, large projects are more complex compared to smaller projects due 
to the various processes required, the multi-organisation and multi-disciplinary nature making 
them difficult to manage. Thus, they require high skill sets to manage them, more planning 
and control, more experienced and qualified personnel to design and construct the projects. 
Furthermore, they require project management tools to assist the project manager to keep the 
project on track with the multiple dependencies and interfaces in the project parts. 
The results suggest that large projects are not managed the same way as smaller projects 
in South Africa. Therefore, the proposition that large projects are managed the same way as 
small projects is not supported. The results, however, concur with previous research that large 
projects need to be managed differently from smaller projects (Capka, 2004) due to their 
nature. The results also suggest that experience and high skills are required to manage large 
projects due to their complexity, multi-disciplinary nature and resource requirements. This also 
confirms the results from the case studies that experience of project participants is cardinal to 
the effective delivery of these projects. 
Involvement of the client in projects 
This part was divided into two sections. The first was to find out the respondent’s views of 
the owner’s or client’s management of large projects in terms of success or not. The second 
was the involvement of the client and the factors that would require the client’s more or less 
involvement in projects. 
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On the owner’s management of projects, half said it was successful and the other half that 
it was not (Table 10.13). They pointed to the evidence of several projects that are not 
successfully completed, and several projects as well with time and cost overruns, scope creep 
and many changes to the initial project plans. Most respondents were of the view that some 
projects have been well managed and others not. It was dependent on the type of client as 
well as the project team used. Private clients were said to manage their projects well compared 
to public clients. This is because the owners were more fully involved in the projects and 
experienced compared to their counterparts. Having the right team was also seen to be 
important in effective client management of the project especially that these projects are 
carried out by consultants or contractors on behalf of the client. Competent teams are able to 
assist the client in project definition and fill in any gaps and help in its implementation. Some 
organisations were identified which were said to have competence and capacity to carry out 
large projects successfully. 
The reasons for unsuccessful management were that the industry lacks local skills and 
this affected the owner’s management of the project as he was dependent on those skills. 
Most clients were not well-informed, the quality of planning and control was often inadequate 
and that owners lacked project management competence especially in the public service such 
as local government. 
Table 10.13 Client's involvement in projects 
Total Response Count 40 
Owner’s management of projects Count Percent 
Successful 20 50,0% 
Not successful 20 50,0% 
   
Total Response Count 25  
Client’s involvement in the management of projects Count Percent 
The client is sufficiently involved 10 40,0% 
The client is not sufficiently involved 14 56,0% 
Other 1 4,0% 
Most respondents said that the client is not sufficiently involved in the management of 
large projects in South Africa (Table 10.13). The reasons were that information is not given 
out when required, the client does not attend meetings, there is no full-time dedicated sponsor, 
the client lacks knowledge about the project and his briefs are often not clear enough thus 
requiring him to be more involved. Most respondents said that the client should be involved in 
the project most of the time but especially in circumstances where the project risks were higher 
and the need for prompt decisions was required. Most further said, there is no time that the 
client should be less involved in the project, but that he should delegate his responsibility. It 
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was also indicated that sometimes the client gets too involved when he should use delegated 
responsibility. 
10.7 Time and Cost Overruns 
Has the problem been solved? 
All the respondents except for one who was not sure said the problem of time and cost 
overruns has not been solved (Table 10.14). The evidence was said to be visible on most 
projects. Scope creep, time and cost overruns still affect many large projects. Various reasons 
were given to be behind this state of affairs. These were collapsed into four categories. (1) 
Problems at project inception, (2) problems at document formulation, (3) problems at tender 
pricing and, (4) problems at project and construction execution. 
Table 10.14 Respondents' view on the problem of time and cost overruns 
Total Response Count 29  
In your opinion, has the problem of time and cost overruns been 
solved? Count Percent 
No 28 96,6% 
Not sure 1 3,4% 
At inception, it was said that there were problems of inadequate client and design briefs 
which often resulted into scope creep, time and cost overruns in the later parts of the project 
life cycle. At document formulation, there were problems of lack of information, incomplete 
documentation, inaccurate planning and inaccurate bills of quantities and a lack of 
competence by professionals assembling documents. Some of the specific issues mentioned 
were the failure to cater for many unknowns at design stage, big imbalance between the 
planned work and the actual. At tender pricing, there were problems of low pricing due to lack 
of professionalism and low-tender pricing tactics hoping to recoup the cost later. There were 
also problems of lack of information in the documentation and culture of tendering on 
incomplete information. At project management and construction execution, there were 
problems of inherited poor quality of planning and information, imbalance of planned against 
the actual, allowing scope creep in the projects, poor management and lack of use of project 
management tools. There were also problems of power of unions, labour unrest and economic 
conditions. 
The results suggest a problem of competence of the project system starting with the client, 
then the consultants and the contractors. This confirms the results from the case studies that 
preparation and use of project management principles may be at the heart of time and cost 
overruns in large projects. 
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Major causes of time and cost overruns 
Various causes of time and cost overruns were identified by the respondents (see 
Appendix D). These were collapsed into five categories. (1) Inception, (2) document 
formulation, (3) tender and pricing, (4) project management and construction and, (5) others. 
From the responses, causal maps were developed showing how the overruns evolved 
from the root cause to time and cost overruns. Whilst in reality, the causes and their effects 
are inter-related, for purposes of explanation, these are discussed and indicated in isolation 
from the others for ease of comprehension. 
 
Figure 10.3 Causes of overruns at project inception 
At inception, the causes of time and cost overruns were that inadequate briefs at inception 
and design were made and that the client was mostly unfamiliar with work scope and the 
necessary requirements to complete a planned project. Most were of the view that there was 
insufficient planning upfront leading to poorly conceived projects and poor scope definitions 
which resulted in scope creep later. It was also said that there were delays in conceiving and 
defining projects resulting in pressure to deliver projects quickly and to spend less time on the 
early stages. Lastly, it was said that there is inexperience amongst the professionals which 
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leads to failure to define work scope upfront. The causal map (Figure 10.3) shows that the 
root cause of overruns was inexperience of professionals and the client’s unfamiliarity with 
work scope. 
Under document formulation, the causes were incomplete designs and inaccurate bills of 
quantities, poor professionalism by professional teams resulting into lack of timely design 
information, appointment of unsuitable or inexperienced contractors due to lapses in 
contractor selection, lack of planning, not catering for project unknowns, lack of upfront 
planning, inadequate briefs at inception and design, lack of time and pressure to complete 
work, the culture of going to tender on uncompleted designs and inexperience among the 
professionals which lead to failure to define work upfront and failure to implement projects 
effectively. All these causes appear to reflect the competence problem in the professional 
team in preparing for the projects. Some of them are typically effects of the causes at inception 
for instance incomplete designs due to lack of time resulting from delays in conceiving and 
defining projects at inception. The causal map (Figure 10.4) shows that the root cause of 
overruns was inexperience of the professionals and lack of time. 
 
Figure 10.4 Causes of overruns at document formulation stage 
Under tender pricing, the causes were that contractors keenly price the tenders hoping to 
recoup the cost later in claims. They also put in low bids with exclusion clauses to the detriment 
of the client. Appointment of an experienced and competent consultant was said to be a 
solution and also that the recommendations should be followed by the client. The last cause 
was that contractors had a culture of tendering on uncompleted drawings. 
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From the survey, the major driver for low tenders and bids is the competitive environment 
(Figure 10.5). This was also the reason for the culture of tendering on incomplete information. 
Should a contractor fail to tender, others willing to tender would easily be found. The result of 
these is under-estimated tenders and budgets and contractor’s claims leading to time and cost 
overruns. Under document formulation, other reasons for the culture of tendering on 
incomplete information was the lack of time, late design information and pressure on the 
consultants to complete the work. 
 
Figure 10.5 Causes of overruns at tender pricing stage 
 
Figure 10.6 Causes of overruns at project management and construction stage 
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Under project management and construction, poor planning, poor management and 
insufficient planning, poor project control, appointment of inexperienced contractors, 
managing projects the traditional way, and failure to use project management tools were said 
to be causes of time and cost overruns. It was also said that inexperienced professionals failed 
to implement projects, to manage the process as well as to manage contractors. 
The main drivers of overruns under this category, as shown in Figure 10.6, were 
inexperienced professionals and the practice of managing projects the traditional way. These 
resulted into poor planning, poor management and failure to use project management tools. 
These further led to appointment of inexperienced contractors, insufficient planning, poor 
project control, failure to implement projects and time and cost overruns. 
Lastly, other causes were identified which could not be classified under the above 
categories. These were, corruption, economic conditions, power of trade unions, labour 
demands and unrest and, having many stakeholders. The respondents were of the view that 
these also led to time and cost overruns as the projects cost more than they should at 
tendering stage as well as during construction due to corruption practices driven by poor 
economic conditions. The power of trade unions and labour unrest were seen to result in 
increased demands and the culture of work stoppage amongst the workers. The number of 
stake holders was also seen to have a potential for scope creep due to the many interests 
which could result in design changes and consequential time and cost overruns. 
Most of the causes identified by the respondents are in the organisation and project 
environment with a few in the external environment. This may be because these are the 
causes they typically deal with. The results suggest that time and cost overruns are caused 
by insufficient planning and project definition upfront by the client and the consultant, 
inadequate document formulation, poor project management and external factors such as 
labour unrest and economic conditions. At the centre of these causes is the competence of 
the project team affected by lack of experience. The implication for project management and 
strategy formulation is that the improvement of competence in the project may lead to reduced 
time and cost overruns. 
The results confirm the earlier results from the case studies that time and cost overruns 
are caused by lack of preparation by the project team when they embark upon the projects. 
The lack of preparation is due to lack of experience which affects the project team’s 
competence to manage large projects. Furthermore, they show that the problem starts with 
the project formulation in the client’s organisation called inception in the above discussion of 
results and then to the project implementation parties: the consultants and the contractor. 
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Ways of reducing time and cost overruns 
Respondents mentioned various ways of reducing time and cost overruns (see Appendix 
E). These were mostly centred on improvement in the organisation and project environment, 
which included improvements in planning upfront, early involvement and use of competent 
personnel, stakeholder management, document preparation, monitoring and control and 
labour relations. 
Most respondents said that there should be better and adequate planning in the early 
stages of the project by the client and the professional team, to improve on scope definition 
and project management plans which concurs with the observation of Morris & Hough, (1987). 
It was also said that planning should be complete before the award of projects to contractors 
and a change in the delivery method of contracts be considered. Early involvement of 
consultants and contractors and use of experienced and competent professionals was also 
said to be important to planning and management of projects. 
For improvements in document and tender preparation, the solutions suggested were that 
construction should only start after well-prepared and complete tender documentation has 
been finalised. There should be early assembly of a complete experienced and competent 
design team and, an experienced and competent contractor to be part of the designing team. 
The contractor would bring in his knowledge of bill of quantities preparation and pricing. They 
further proposed selection and procurement processes, which include detailed geotechnical 
investigations, selecting the project team on competence basis and not on lowest bidder and, 
moving away from the traditional project procurement methods. The results suggest that the 
client holds the potential solution to improvement of the documentation and tender 
preparation, which lie in employing a competent project team early in the project’s life cycle 
and ensuring that the construction is embarked upon after the preparations for the project 
have been finalised. 
Under execution and management, most respondents said that there should be better 
implementation of monitoring and control of projects, better project execution planning, use of 
experienced project managers, better coordination and management of stakeholders 
throughout the project life cycle, use of gated and controlled project environment and better 
labour agreements with unions and workers excluding politicians to avoid work stoppages. 
The results suggest that improving the organisation and project environment has potential 
to improve the management of large projects and eventual reduction in time and cost overruns 
whereas the results from the case studies showed that management of external, organisation 
and project environments is a potential solution to reducing time and cost overruns on large 
projects in South Africa. This also suggests that, a project management strategy for large 
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projects may need to incorporate more than the management of the project environment. With 
this information from the questionnaires coupled with the results from the case studies, the 
project management strategy should incorporate the management, not only of the project 
environment, but of the organisation and external environment as well. It should involve the 
management of the micro as well as the macro project environments. 
10.8 Use of Project Management Principles 
The majority of respondents said that project participants do not use project management 
principles consistently, though there was a narrow difference between those who affirmed and 
those who did not (Table 10.15). However, in the follow up question of inadequacies in project 
participants, the majority said there were project management inadequacies and most were 
said to be in the client’s organisation followed by the consultants, then contractors and sub- 
Table 10.15 Use of project management principles in the project 
Total Response Count 25 
In your opinion, do project participants use project management 
principles consistently? Count Percent 
Yes 12 48,00% 
No 13 52,00% 
   
Total Response Count 25  
In your opinion are there any project management inadequacies in 
project participants Count Percent 
Yes 20 80,00% 
No 3 12,00% 
Not sure 2 8,00% 
   
Total response count 50  
If the answer to project management inadequacies was “yes,” where 
would you say most inadequacies are? Count percent 
Owner organisations 15 30,00% 
Consultants 12 24,00% 
Contractors 9 18,00% 
Sub-contractors 9 18,00% 
Suppliers 4 8,00% 
Other 1 2,00% 
contractors. This concurs with the results from the case studies where project participants, 
particularly the client lacked specific project experience. 
Those who said the principles were used consistently mentioned that there were 
guidelines and project management standards, which the project managers followed. On the 
other hand, those who said they were not used consistently mentioned that most project 
managers did not have the full training, qualification and experience and that, not all client 
bodies have thorough project management standards. They also said there is incompetence 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
153 
 
in the project teams, the bigger picture of the project is not understood by the teams and that 
the evidence of overrunning projects and incomplete designs before execution were indicative 
that the principles were not used consistently. 
On inadequacies in the project teams, most mentioned that the project teams lacked 
experienced personnel, particularly in the owner and consultant organisations. In state-owned 
project teams, it was said that some personnel were appointed to positions before they had 
acquired sufficient experience. It was also said that the project management profession has 
not been embraced as a specialised profession.  
10.9 Training, Qualifications and Experience of Project Participants 
The majority of the respondents were of the view that training, qualification and experience 
of project participants in South Africa was inadequate (Table 10.16). The results concur those 
observed above where the respondents were of the view that most participants were 
inexperienced in the management of large projects. 
Table 10.16 Adequacy of training and qualifications of project participants 
Total Response Count 33 
Answer Count Percent 
Adequate 15 45,45% 
Inadequate 18 54,55% 
Those who said the training, qualification and experience were adequate said that the 
participants were competent and have the necessary qualifications to handle large projects 
and that the qualifications were recognisable globally which concurs with Ofori et al (1996). 
One third of the respondents said the participants are competent but that there are 
inefficiencies in the management system. 
Those who said the training, qualifications and experience were inadequate pointed to the 
evidence of projects being behind schedule and the general non-success rate. Most of the 
respondents said that there were inadequate skills and experience amongst contractors, 
consultants and owners, particularly, public sector clients whose capability and capacity was 
said to be poor on average. It was said that many government and SOEs have severe 
shortages of skilled and experienced personnel. Most experienced personnel have in the past 
20 years relocated due to lack of large projects in the country. The other reasons given were 
that there is a lack of professionalism in that project participants fail to resist political 
interference, employers rush to implement projects before the project concepts are developed 
fully and that the project participants are not trained to manage large projects. 
The results suggest that the participants may be qualified, but may not be trained to 
manage large projects and generally lack experience in managing large projects. 
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10.10  Conclusions 
From the questionnaire survey, large projects are defined from the financial point of view, 
complexity as well as size. Financially, large projects are considered to be those costing more 
than R100m which is slightly lower than the amount used in this research of R250m. 
On the question of success of projects, small projects were seen to be more successful 
and large projects barely successful. 8 out of 10 large projects were found to be with time and 
cost overruns compared to 6 out of 10 small projects. This concurs the results from Flyvbjerg 
(2011) who found 9 out of 10 large transport projects had cost overruns. Regarding public and 
private projects, 8 out of 10 public projects have time and cost overruns compared to 5 out of 
10 private projects. The criteria that is most used to define success on projects is the 
completion criteria and then the satisfaction criteria (Lin & Mohamed, 1999). 
Most view the management of public projects to be different to the management of private 
projects in terms of approach and efficiency whilst legislation and procurement processes 
were similar. Private projects are better managed compared to public projects due to the 
employment of competent personnel and determination of the owners to reach the end goal. 
Similarly, large projects are not managed the same way as small projects are managed in 
South Africa. The result suggests that time and cost overruns on large projects may not be 
due to managing large projects the same way small projects are managed, but that large 
projects require high skilled, qualified and experienced personnel to manage them. 
There were mixed results on whether the client’s management of projects was successful 
or not with half agreeing and the other half disagreeing. From the comments, most were of the 
view that success depended on the type of client and employment of a competent team. 
Private clients managed their projects better than public clients and this was because private 
clients were fully involved in the projects and were more experienced compared to their 
counter parts. 
The results also showed that the problem of time and cost overruns has not been resolved 
as projects are still plagued with scope creep and time and cost overruns due to problems at 
inception, document formulation, tendering and pricing and, project execution. The results 
confirm that poor preparation and lack of use of project management principles is at the heart 
of the problem of time and cost overruns in large projects. 
The causes of overruns were identified as insufficient planning and project formulation 
upfront by the client and consultant, inadequate document formulation, poor project 
management and external factors such as labour unrest and unions and economic conditions. 
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At the heart of all these is the lack of competence of the project team due to lack of experience 
thus confirming the results from the case studies. 
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Chapter 11 Synthesis of Case Studies and Questionnaire 
Survey Results 
 
11.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a summary of the results from the case studies and the 
questionnaire survey. The chapter starts with a discussion of the results from the case studies 
followed by one from the questionnaire survey. The final section provides a synthesis of results 
from the literature, case study and questionnaire survey research. 
11.2 Case Study Results 
Research strategy 
Case study research was used as the principle method of research based on the 
hypothesis that a representation of factors that lead to time and cost overruns could be 
developed from an in-depth investigation of project teams working in a large construction 
infrastructure project. The thesis statement was that by preparing for projects and 
implementing appropriate project management strategies on large projects, and, consistently 
implementing project management principles, the client can improve the delivery of projects 
and reduce time and cost overruns. 
The strategy that was used to analyse was, firstly to identify a typical overrunning project 
and compare it with other overrunning projects using replication analysis and, secondly, 
identify non-overrunning projects and see whether these would confirm the opposite results 
from the typical and overrunning projects. Five cases were identified for the research. Three 
were overrunning projects and two, non-overrunning projects. 
Results 
Time and cost overruns 
Results obtained were that several factors led to time and cost overruns and these had 
multiple inter-relationships. From the typical overrunning project, it was found that the root 
cause was: (1) Public and local community resistance; (2) EIA location change requests; (3) 
Pressure from the public and media; (4) Lack of project specific experience;(5) Insufficient 
budget; (6) Under-estimating project complexity;(7) Lengthy procurement requirements; (8) 
Client change requests. The combined effects of these factors were found to affect the project 
team’s management of the project leading to time and cost overruns. For instance, due to the 
first factor, the project team in Case study 1 moved the project from one location to another 
due to local community resistance and the EIA change request made them to relocate to the 
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first location the community had resisted. By then, the team had advanced in the design and 
had to start again, thus reducing their design production time since the project had a fixed 
completion date. With pressure from the public combined with lack of experience, which made 
them under-estimate the project’s complexity, they could not submit a higher budget. With a 
lower budget, the change of location twice meant the project was overrun even before 
construction started. 
Similar factors leading to time and cost overruns were found in the other two overrunning 
projects. Typically, there was lack of project specific experience, insufficient client budgets, 
pressure from the public against the project, under-estimating project complexity, change 
requests, procurement method problems and different ground conditions. These factors were 
found to be largely absent in the non-overrunning projects. Rather in those two case studies, 
it was found that the project participants had project specific experience, the client had 
sufficient project budgets, the project team was prepared before the start of the project, the 
project had less change requests and they did not use short cuts. 
The results from the overrunning and non-overrunning projects showed that there were 
conditions that promoted the prevalence of time and cost overruns and those that did not. 
Those that promoted were: lack of project specific experience, insufficient client project 
budget, delayed project approval, starting construction with incomplete design concepts, 
insufficient time to prepare for the project, use of short cuts, under-estimating project 
complexity, use of contractual agreements to enforce performance and, a lack of a holistic 
appreciation of the project and role of other participants. Those that inhibited time and cost 
overruns were: sufficient client budget, project specific experience, use of a structured 
approach to project management, having a complete design concept before construction start, 
teamwork and consolidated effort, proactive contractor and construction process to create a 
successful delivery environment, appreciation of other members’ roles and place in the project. 
It was also found that the root cause of time and cost overruns stem from the external 
environment which are, lack of experience due to lack of similar work, pressure and resistance 
from the public and change requirements from stakeholders. The effects of these are shortage 
of time to design and construct, delays to project start, insufficient budgets, incomplete 
drawings, higher contractor tenders and, constructability problems during execution. The 
results also showed that there was interplay of factors as observed by Steyn (2009). 
The results show that there were high levels of public resistance to these projects which 
suggest that large projects require high levels of communication with the public to avoid 
disruptions, delays to project start and rushing to start the project before proper project 
document finalisation. It was, however, shown that there was a concentration of technical 
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capabilities in the project teams, without sufficient competencies of communications and 
public relations. This resulted in difficulties of managing these communication risks. 
Management of projects and use of project management principles 
It was also found across the projects that in the management of large projects, the project 
participants’ behaviour was affected by various pressures and was often altered by pressure 
such as inadequate budget, lack of time and public resistance to the project or perception of 
costliness of the project. This pressure affected the way decisions were made and 
consequently affected the project strategy. The pressure often led to participants using short-
cuts and not following the project management principles consistently. Furthermore, policies 
and decisions past and present in the external and organisational environments, as well as 
the experience and competence of the development managers and other participants, had an 
influence on how project teams managed the projects. 
Client involvement, experience and preparation of project participants 
The results confirm that the involvement of the client is a parameter of consideration as 
their lack of project specific experience and preparation affected the formulation of project 
procurement strategies and budgets. The results also confirm that the training and experience 
of the project participants has an important role in the management of large projects as it 
affects the project competence and eventually performance. This concurs with the results from 
Crawford, (2005). The results further showed the relationship between experience and 
preparation. Lack of experience leads to poor preparation for the project. The experience and 
the size of the project were also related to the form of organisation used on the project. 
Consultants formed joint ventures to increase their project competence and financial 
capability. Furthermore, the results showed that the principles of project management were 
not used consistently in the overrunning projects. 
11.3 Questionnaire Survey Results 
Research Strategy 
The questionnaire was the secondary research method. It was chosen to complement the 
case study method to be able to give a complete understanding of the phenomenon of time 
and cost overruns in line with the advice of Love et al (2002) that a blend of methods of 
research is best adapted to construction management research since it dealt with both the 
natural and the social sciences. It was also chosen to validate the case study results as well 
as to aid in the formulation and gauging of the practicality of the solution to the problem. 
The strategy that was used to collect data was to identify organisations and individuals 
that were involved in large projects in South Africa. These would be the client, the consultant 
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and the contractor. Since consultants represent clients, it was considered adequate to collect 
data from consultants and contractors. Using the affiliate institutions of consultants and 
contractors, CESA and CIDB, individuals involved in large projects were invited to participate 
in the research. Furthermore, personnel involved in the Construction Management 
Programme (CMP 2014) who were senior managers in their organisations in the construction 
industry were invited. Those who accepted filled in the questionnaires using the university 
online questionnaire survey platform. 
Results 
Specific issues investigated 
The specific issues arising from the research results were the problem of time and cost 
overruns in South Africa, the nature and management of large projects in South Africa, the 
use of project management principles in the industry, client involvement in the management 
of projects, public and private projects and, training, qualifications and experience of project 
participants. 
Time and cost overruns 
On the problem of time and cost overruns in South Africa, 97% of the respondents said 
that the problem of time and cost overruns had not been solved in the country. They pointed 
to the apparent scope creep and time and cost overruns which affected many large projects 
in the country. Various causes of time and cost overruns were mentioned by the respondents. 
These have been categorised into causes at inception, document formulation, tender pricing, 
project management and construction and, other factors. 
The root cause under inception were identified as inexperienced professionals and clients 
unfamiliar with projects and work scope. This confirms the results from the case studies which 
showed that the root cause of time and cost overruns was the lack of project specific 
experience by the project team. The lack of experience is what affects the way the project 
team prepare and execute projects. 
Under document formulation, the root cause was identified as inexperienced 
professionals, insufficient time and poor professionalism amongst the project team members. 
The combined effect of these is the failure to determine work upfront, pressure to complete 
works, lack of and late design information, lapses in contractor selection and a culture of 
tendering on incomplete information. Similar reasons were observed under the case studies: 
lack of specific project experience and pressure of insufficient time on the project team which 
led to incomplete designs and inaccurate tender documents which resulted into higher 
tenders. 
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The root cause under tender pricing was the competitive tendering environment. 
Contractors submit keen prices hoping that they will recoup the costs later. Similarly, they 
submit low bids with exclusion clauses for risky areas and sections where information is 
insufficient. Contractors were also said to have a culture of tendering on incomplete 
information. The links in the chain of causes can be easily seen starting with lack of time by 
the design team which inevitably leads to incomplete designs and tender documents. 
Contractors, in competition, submit keen and low bids on incomplete information but put in 
exclusion clauses to cover themselves for any changes in the prices, quantities and other 
unforeseen risks in the documents. When the work is finally carried out, not only are the prices 
and construction programmes under-estimated but the volume of work is different from what 
was planned with the complete information now available.  
This reinforces what was observed earlier and under the case studies that reduced time 
to prepare for projects, in combination with the lack of project specific experience, led to ill-
preparation for projects by the project team who often resorted to short-cuts and not to 
thoroughly complete tender documents leading to design changes and eventual time and cost 
overruns in projects. 
The root cause of time and cost overruns under project management and construction 
were similar to the previous three: inexperience amongst professionals and, additionally, the 
tendency of managing projects using the traditional design-bid-construction method with its 
attendant problems of reduced competence in estimating and pricing project costs, 
constructability and holistic project risk management. The result is poor planning, poor project 
management and construction leading to time and cost overruns. 
Other factors which did not directly relate to the four areas discussed above were; 
corruption, the power of trade unions, labour demands and unrest and the problem of having 
multiple stakeholders commonly encountered under large projects. These factors lead to 
increase in project costs, disruption in work activities and scope creep and design changes 
due to many users and requirements. 
The results show that the root cause of time and cost overruns is the lack of project 
experience which results into poor professionalism, poor project plans and inadequate project 
management as well as pressure on project professionals, due to lack of time to design and 
prepare for projects adequately. These are essentially, external environment factors which 
affect both the organisation and project environments as was seen under the case studies. 
The results confirm the case studies results that project participants were ill-prepared when 
they embarked on projects due to lack of time and that they lacked project specific experience, 
especially the client and the consultants. 
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Various solutions were proposed by the respondents. The solutions were mostly centred 
on improving the organisation and project environment. This included the need for adequate 
planning in the early stages of the project by the client and the project team, the need for 
completing tender documents before the start of construction, the need for a change in the 
delivery method of projects to incorporate early involvement of consultants and contractors 
and the use of competent and experienced professionals. 
Reviewing the causes of time and cost overruns and the suggested solutions from the 
respondents, the results suggest that the organisation and project environment should be 
improved which validates the suggested approach to the solutions (see section 4.6 and section 
8.14) further confirmed by the deviant case studies (see chapter 7 and 8).  
The suggested questionnaire survey solutions, however, centred mostly on what the 
project team members could do in the project environment whereas, the results from the case 
studies showed that there were other factors outside the project environment that needed 
attention. These include the low and unregulated numbers of large projects in the country 
which result in poor organisational and individual project management experience, the lack of 
project specific experience in the client’s organisation both in private and public departments 
as well as the public and local community resistance to projects. 
Nature and management of large projects in South Africa 
On the nature of large projects in South Africa, a large project is described based on its 
financial size, its complexity and its physical size. Most defined large projects as those costing 
more than R100m. In terms of performance of large projects in comparison to other categories, 
large projects are viewed to be barely successful compared to small projects which they 
viewed as successful. In terms of time and cost overruns, 8 out of 10 large projects have 
overruns compared to 6 out of 10 small projects. For public projects, 8 out of 10 have time and 
cost overruns compared to 5 out of 10 private projects. This shows that most large projects 
and most public projects have time and cost overruns. 
The completion and satisfaction criteria was the basis for the respondents’ description of 
how successful a project was. They judged a project to be successful if it met the completion 
criteria of time and cost as well as the satisfaction criteria of quality and approval from the 
client and other stakeholders. 
 On the size of the project, most respondents were of the view that size affects the way a 
project is managed. They further said that large projects in South Africa are not managed the 
same way small projects are managed. It came out that the principles of management are the 
same irrespective of the size, but what differentiated the projects was that large projects 
require more resources and higher skills due to their complexity compared to small projects. 
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They require more planning to design and execute, involved multi-organisations and were 
more multi-disciplinary compared to small projects. They thus required more experienced and 
qualified personnel to design and construct and more management tools to assist in project 
formulation and execution to keep them on track due to multiple dependencies and interfaces 
in the project parts. 
This concurs with the results from the case studies which showed that experience of 
project participants is cardinal to effective preparation and execution of large projects. The 
results, however, disproved the rival explanation that time and cost overruns could be due to 
project teams managing large projects the same way small projects are managed. 
Use of project management principles 
There was a mixed response on whether project management principles are used 
consistently in the South African construction industry. 48% were of the view that project 
management principles are used consistently whereas 52% disagreed. Those who said the 
principles are followed pointed to the availability of guidelines and project management 
standards which participants followed. Those who said they were not followed said that most 
managers did not have the full project management training, qualifications and experience 
and that not all client bodies had thorough project management standards. They further said 
there was incompetence in the project teams and the lack of understanding of the bigger 
picture of projects by teams. They pointed to the occurrence of time and cost overruns as 
evidence that principles were not being followed. 
On a follow-up question which was on inadequacies in project teams, 80% said that project 
teams had project management inadequacies. The majority said that most inadequacies were 
in the clients’ and consultant’s organisations. Most said that project teams, particularly the 
owners and consultant organisations, lacked experience. In state owned project teams, the 
view was that some personnel were appointed to positions before they had acquired sufficient 
experience. 
Client’s involvement 
Two issues were considered under client’s involvement: their view on whether the owner’s 
management of projects was successful or not and whether they felt the client was sufficiently 
involved in projects or not. Respondents’ views were not conclusive on whether the owner’s 
management of projects was successful or not. Most, though said that the client is not 
sufficiently involved in projects. They pointed to delays in information flow, client’s failure to 
attend meetings, lack of dedicated project sponsors, the client’s lack of project knowledge and 
unclear briefs. There was also concern of lack of skills in the industry which affected the 
owner’s management of projects. It was said further that most clients were not well-informed 
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and lacked project management competence. This affected the quality of planning and control 
in the project especially in the public service such as local government. 
Private and public projects 
The respondents were asked on their views on whether public and private projects were 
similar or not. Similarities were viewed from two perspectives: approach to management and 
effectiveness of management. 
On approach to management, the majority were of the view that public and private projects 
were similar in terms of the legislation process and project management principles. They all 
follow the same project life cycle and project management principles. The major difference 
was said to be in the type of client and how they manage the projects. On effectiveness or 
performance, most were of the view that private projects are better performed than public 
projects. They pointed to the visible budget overruns due to design changes and scope creep 
in public projects compared to lack of delays and cash flow problems of private projects. The 
reasons for better execution of private projects were said to be rooted in the employment of 
competent personnel as well as the drive the owners have to achieve end goals. Public 
enterprises were said to lack management skills and experience and suffered from a tendency 
to employ unqualified employees. Private enterprises, on the other hand, employed competent 
personnel with management skills and were mostly driven with the desire to accomplish 
project end goals of completing within time and cost. 
The results concur with the commercial building project case study, a private project which 
was better performed but are at variance with the dam project which was a public project but 
better performed as well as the high-speed train project, a private managed project but 
incurred time and cost overruns. This suggests that there are more reasons to what affects 
the competence and performance of large projects apart from whether it is public or private 
managed. 
Training, qualifications and experience of project participants 
The respondents were asked on their view of the adequacy of the training and experience 
of project participants. 55% were of the view that it was inadequate and 45% said that it was 
adequate. Those of the view that the training and experience was adequate said that the South 
African qualifications were recognised globally which concurred with Ofori et al (1996). They, 
however, said that there were inefficiencies in the management system. Those of the view 
that it was inadequate pointed to the evidence of general no-success rate and projects being 
behind schedule. Most said that there were inadequate skills and experience amongst 
contractors, consultants and owners especially the public-sector clients whose capability they 
rated as poor on average. The reasons given were that government and state-owned 
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enterprises had severe shortages of skilled and experienced personnel, most personnel had 
in the past 20 years (as at 2014) relocated due to lack of large projects in the country. It was 
further said that there was lack of professionalism as participants failed to resist political 
interference, employers rushed to implement projects before project concepts were fully 
developed and that participants were not trained to manage large projects. 
These results confirm what was observed in the case studies. The major factors brought 
out are that there are inefficiencies in the system. These come about mostly due to lack of 
enough large projects to encourage individual and organisational project participants’ 
experience which was observed in the case studies. The effect of the behaviour of the 
participants was also brought out. Employers often rush projects before concepts are fully 
developed and that participants are not trained to manage large projects. This potentially 
points to some inefficiency in the training of project professionals which may merit further 
research. From the case studies, the complexity of the projects was often under-estimated in 
both the overrunning and non-overrunning projects. Overall, the questionnaire survey results 
have confirmed the results from the case studies. 
11.4 Time and Cost Overruns Model 
The results showed that the root cause of time and cost overruns start in the external 
environment. There are certain circumstances that promote the origin and existence of time 
and cost overruns in the external environment. The presence of these are a harbinger of time 
and cost overruns in the project. These are insufficient numbers of large projects, pressure 
from the public or other national pressure such as dwindling power reserves, delayed funding 
and project approvals, past decisions or policies of government, parent organisation (client) 
or other external entities such as training institutions and local authorities. These have 
immediate impact in the project in that they set seeds of time and cost overruns, but they 
further affect the decisions and behaviour in the organisation environment which, in turn affect 
the project environment and the individuals involved in the project, leading to time and cost 
overruns. 
Figure 11.1 is a simplified illustration of how time and cost overruns develop in the large 
project environment. It shows that time and cost overruns have their origin in the macro project 
environment going into the micro project environment. They start in the external environment 
spurred on by circumstances that create an environment conducive for time and cost overruns. 
From research results, these were found to be lack of large projects, past government and 
parent organisation decisions and policies, project approval and funding delays and pressure 
from the public due to national importance of large projects. These affect the organisation and 
project environments above. They result in lack of experience of organisations and individuals 
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both in the organisation and project environments leading to time and cost overruns at the 
three levels: organisation, project and individual indicated by the arrows to the right.  
 
Figure 11.1 Overruns development model on large infrastructure projects 
Similarly, pressure from the public in combination with other factors result in under-
estimating budgets and project complexity by both the organisation and project environments, 
delays to project starting which further up the project environment results into reduced project 
time, pressure to complete the project, use of short cuts, incomplete design and eventually, 
time and cost overruns. Thus, starting with the lower level external factors, these affect the 
ones above. At each level, circumstances for overruns are sown and lead to time and cost 
overruns. These are indicated by arrows to the right from each environment. The arrows on 
the left, from the external to the individual, show the influence of the circumstances and factors 
from the lower level to those above. There is a ripple effect beginning from the lower levels to 
the ones above. The model shows that overruns start in the external environment, affect the 
organisation and project environments above and at each level, they lead to time and cost 
overruns. 
Circumstances affect the behaviour of project members at each level and the level above, 
which creates a conducive environment for overruns. For instance, due to project approval 
and funding delays emanating from the external environment, the project start was delayed 
which created a conducive environment for the onset of time and cost overruns as a large 
project of national interest, often with a fixed completion date cannot be delayed. The project 
at this stage was already late even before it was started. Furthermore, the delay made the 
client in the organisation environment to rush the procurement process using virtual designs, 
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shorter procurement route and start the project before detailed geotechnical surveys and 
concept designs. This affected the behaviour of the consultants and the contractor to further 
use short-cuts in the project environment. 
 
Figure 11.2 Effect of circumstances on project delivery 
Figure 11.2 shows how circumstances in the different large project environment affect the 
behaviour of project participants. As explained earlier, certain circumstances affect the 
behaviour of project participants which leads to the creation of a conducive environment to 
time and cost overruns. The diagram shows that unless there is an intervention using a project 
management strategy, the project will experience time and cost overruns which will result into 
project failure. In Chapter 12, the project management strategy for a client managing large 
projects is proposed. 
11.5 Summary 
In summary, the explanation of management and development of time and cost overruns 
is shown in Figure 11.3. From literature, it was seen that the project environment factors and  
the actions of team members affect the management of the projects and lead to time and cost 
overruns. The project manager is seen as the executor of the task handed down from the 
business case. 
From the results of this research, the initiating factors are resident in the external 
environment and then translate to the organisation environment and then to the project. The 
external and organisation factors affect the project teams’ upfront decision-making and these, 
together with project environment’s factors, lead to time and cost overruns. This is summarised 
in Figure 11.4. 
The results show that the time and cost overruns phenomenon is complex and involves 
various factors in more than one environment and cannot be reduced to a singular solution as 
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often done in previous studies in what some scholars call reductionist tendency (Busby & 
Payne, 1999; Fellows & Liu, 2012). 
Management of these factors in the three environments therefore, is important in reducing 
time and cost overruns. To improve the management of large projects, there is need to  
 
Figure 11.3 Time and cost overruns model from literature review to final results 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
168 
 
 
Figure 11.4 Final summary of identified problem 
 
manage the external environment to overcome project resistance, public pressure and project 
permits and approvals. There is need to manage the organisation environment to improve 
participant experience, budgeting and project conception. Finally, there is need to manage the 
project environment to improve the project team competence that will lead to better delivery 
of the project. Thus, an integrated project management strategy is required to manage all the 
three large project environments that affect how the team plans and executes the project. This 
is discussed further in the proposed integrated project management strategy in Chapter 12. 
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Chapter 12 Proposed Project Management Strategy 
 
12.1 Introduction 
The results show that time and cost overruns on large infrastructure projects are often due 
to poor preparation by the client and consultant as a result of lack of project specific 
experience. The problem was observed to originate from the external environment leading to 
the organisation environment and then into the project environment. The detailed results are 
presented in Chapter 11.  
Chapter 12 introduces the proposed project management strategy that could be used to 
manage time and cost overruns on large projects. It is believed the use of the strategy by the 
client when carrying out large projects will lead to reduction in time and cost overruns and 
eventual improvement in the management of these projects. 
12.2 Proposed Project Management Strategy 
As presented in Chapter 11, the typical issues that promote the occurrence of overruns or 
the pathogens (Love et al, 2009), from the external environment are, resistance from the local 
community, public pressure against the project, delays in environmental impact approvals and, 
project and funding approvals and other permits (Figure 11.4). The issues from the 
organisation environment are insufficient client’s budget, project start delays, under-estimating 
project complexity, lack of experience, lack of preparation. Lastly, from the project 
environment, the issues are insufficient geotechnical surveys and different ground conditions, 
poor worker performance and safety requirements. 
These issues may vary from project to project, but emanate from the three environments: 
external environment, organisation environment and project environment. This suggests that, 
the improved management of these environments would lead to reducing time and cost 
overruns. This was observed in the better-performed case studies in this research. 
The proposed strategy is, therefore, aimed at improving the management of the macro 
and micro project environments. This proposed strategy is illustrated in Figure 12.1 and is 
elaborated upon further in Figures 12.2 to 12.6 to show how the different components fit into 
the integrated process: 
Macro project environment 
Figure 12.2 – Large project screening and approval process 
Figure 12.3 – Traditional project participant involvement 
Figure 12.4 – Improved participant involvement 
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Micro-project environment 
Figure 12.5 – Large project procurement process 
Figure 12.6 – Concept formulation process 
The proposal in summary is: 
▪ Establishment of a Project Implementation Organisation (PIO) 
▪ Establishment of a Project Risk Management Agency (PRMA) 
▪ Increased project management role in client’s organisation 
▪ Revision of the concept formulation and development process 
Each of these, will be elaborated upon in the subsequent sections. Thereafter, a 
practical implementation of the solution will be presented in section 12.3. 
 
Figure 12.1 Proposed project management strategy 
12.2.1 Macro-project environment management 
The macro project environment constitutes various players and influences which impact 
on the project directly or indirectly. These include the suppliers of materials and labour, 
professional bodies, unions, environmental pressure groups, governmental bodies, training 
institutions and other economic, financial and legal institutions in the external environment. 
Morris and Geraldi (2011) included the client organisation in this external environment and 
called it the institutional level management. They exclusively emphasised the institutional 
environment because other areas in the external environment such as government bodies and 
training institutions were considered beyond the influence of the project management team 
and, therefore, difficult to control. On the other hand, the client body and other project 
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organisations are considered part of the micro-project environment in this research, as they 
are amenable to project management influence. The macro-project environment, however, 
may require a different type of intervention as it is mostly beyond the control of a single project 
manager or project implementation organisation. 
12.2.1.1 The problem 
The major problem of large project management as observed in literature, case studies 
and questionnaire survey, is the lack of project specific experience due to lack of sufficient 
repetition projects (see Sections 11.2 & 11.3). After graduate professionals obtain their 
qualifications, they need to work under a mentor to obtain the required experience. This, 
however, requires them to work in a reputable organisation, which in turn needs to have 
projects. Large project experience is important, but it is dependent on the availability of large 
projects. In South Africa, large projects are spaced far apart and not a common occurrence 
which affects infrastructure growth (Groenveld, 2006, Ofori et al, 1996). If infrastructure is 
growing or the need for infrastructure growth is there, it creates opportunities for reputable 
firms to undertake projects and thus to build on the experience of the work force. 
Where there are few large projects and spaced far apart in time, such as in the case of 
stadia, power plants and high-speed railways, this results in lack of project specific experience 
for organisations and professionals in the industry. For instance, in the stadium case study, 
the client’s representatives were highly experienced with over 30 years, but in municipal 
engineering and not stadia construction. 
12.2.1.2 The solution 
To address the lack of project specific experience at macro-project environment level, the 
proposal entails improving expertise in three ways: (1) coordination of numbers of projects, 
(2) establishment of a project implementation organisation to manage projects and, (3) 
establishment of a projects review institution to promote project risk management. 
Coordination of projects 
Coordination of projects is aimed at the policy level. A two-fold step is proposed: (1) 
Coordinating the number of large projects in the country to avoid the cyclic nature of high and 
low volumes of work often experienced in infrastructure development (Groenveld, 2006; Ofori 
et al, 1966). (2) Encouraging more labour intensive methods of project delivery to increase the 
numbers of people exposed to project experience. 
The proposed policy is expected to lead to improvement in the experience of various 
personnel. The coordination could be done by the central and local government in conjunction 
with the Construction Industry Development Board (CIDB), Council of the Built Environment 
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(CBE) and other project management bodies. Further research may be required to investigate 
the actualisation of the policy. 
Project implementation organisation 
To improve the management and execution of projects, the setting up of an institution to 
manage the execution of large projects on behalf of the client both at macro and micro project 
level is recommended. The project implementation organisation when set up, works in the 
macro project environment as well as in the micro-project environment. Section 12.2.2.2 
elaborates further the role of the implementation organisation under the micro-project 
environment and how it is appointed. 
The aim of the project implementation organisation at macro project level is to prepare and 
execute all large projects on behalf of the client who may be a public or a private entity. The 
project implementation organisation and individual professionals working there build their 
organisational and individual professional experience as they manage the various projects 
nationally or over a large geographical area and over time, as was the case in the more 
successful case studies. The implementation organisation and individuals had capability in 
this role from the experience they gained from managing several projects on behalf of the 
client over time. 
However, there is need to investigate further whether this entity would be set up for all 
national projects or based on specialisms such as building projects and civil engineering 
projects or per province. 
Projects review institution 
It was seen from the results that large projects need more project management 
competencies and have much impact on the environment compared to smaller projects. It was 
also seen that there was no unified approach to the management of project risks. 
The proposal entails setting up a semi-autonomous institution to foster project 
management proficiency based on risk management competency called Project Risk 
Management Agency (PRMA). It could follow a legislative process similar to that for 
environmental impact assessment. The main aim of the agency would be to encourage 
formulation and auditing of risk management plans for large projects. The advantage of such 
a board is that it would encourage the client and the consultants to plan for project risks at 
large and not just environmental risks. 
The semi-autonomous institution is recommended to be an authority to house both the 
environmental and infrastructure project risk management personnel to review and approve 
large projects. The process of approval and verification of preparedness to embark on projects  
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Figure 12.2 Large project approval and implementation process 
Adapted from EIA generic process, Aucamp, P.T. (2009). 
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is to follow a process outlined in Figure 12.2 starting with project screening, review, decision 
and approval for project implementation. The first step is to determine whether approval is 
required under this authority by considering the size of the project. Where approval is required, 
together with stakeholders, an assessment of the execution and management plan comprising 
the risk factors for the project at large would be carried out. A Project Risk Management report 
(PRMr) submitted to the authority by the project owner then follows this. The authority then 
reviews the document. Where the plan is approved, the project is certified for implementation. 
The authority would provide infrastructure clients with a single entity for review and 
approval of both environmental and project risk management plans. Furthermore, the single 
authority would give prospective clients a less complex environmental management 
compliance process by dealing with one entity compared to the processes entailed by the 
Environmental Management Act 1998 of different competent authorities depending on the 
nature of the activity. 
12.2.2 Micro-project environment 
The micro-project environment comprises both the project and organisation environments. 
This is similar to the technical and strategic levels discussed by Morris and Geraldi (2011). As 
discussed under the macro project environment, the micro-project environment is within the 
influence of the project implementation manager. This environment includes the client’s 
organisation, project design and construction consultants and the individuals involved in the 
project such as contractor’s construction workers. 
12.2.2.1 The problem 
Lack of project specific experience 
The project participants, especially the client, lacked project specific experience in the 
case studies. This affected their preparation and competence for execution of projects. This 
was confirmed in the questionnaire survey where inadequacies were found in the members of 
the project teams especially that of the client and the consultant. 
Reduced project team competence 
The major problem identified from the results was that in the micro-project environment 
there was reduced competence in the project team evidenced by insufficient budgets, under-
estimating project complexity and insufficient geotechnical surveys. This was due to the 
delivery approach adopted, which divided the design and the construction processes in 
problem solving and the practice of late involvement of design and construction teams in 
project formulation. The results of this approach, as shown in Figure 12.3, is that the client 
and consultants conceived design solutions without the involvement of the contractor and the 
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construction solutions were conceived by the construction team without the involvement of the 
design team. 
Furthermore, the project management experience and knowledge during project 
formulation was absent as project participants were appointed after the business case, and 
after the initial concept had been defined. The contractor was appointed much later after the 
design concept had been defined. This position was confirmed in the questionnaire surveys 
that the contractor is appointed much later in the delivery process and this affects the 
formulation of solutions such as estimates and construction programmes. This situation 
created problems in the project decision making process due to lack of requisite skills and 
knowledge at project initiation stage because the project manager’s and consultant’s and, 
contractor’s experience and knowledge, was not available at project conception and at design 
stage respectively. 
 
Figure 12.3 Traditional participant involvement in a project life cycle 
Teamwork and collaboration 
There was also a lack of teamwork and collaboration amongst project participants. This is 
between the design team and the construction team as well as within the sub-systems 
themselves. The results indicate this may have been due to reliance on contracts for 
performance enforcement as well as the influence of procurement approaches adopted. 
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The results also showed a lack of a unified process to risk management with the client 
concentrating on environmental risks leaving out construction risks to the contractor. 
Furthermore, there was no unified review of the project as a whole, of the various processes 
and subsystems within the organisation and the project environments. The factors behind the 
lack of a unified process, as revealed from the case studies and the questionnaire survey 
were: 
▪ The training and culture of professional affiliation of project participants where 
candidates for each profession are trained and work in isolation from other 
professionals in devising design and construction solutions, 
▪ Procurement systems embarked on at the direction of the top management and, 
▪ The decisions made in the past or in the external environment. 
12.2.2.2 The solution 
The proposed solution is aimed at improving the project and concept formulation process 
in the micro-project environment. The solution comprises two parts. Firstly, the 
recommendation entails creating an improved project formulation process in the organisation 
environment. Secondly, it involves the revision of the concept formulation process in the 
project environment. 
Organisation environment: improvement of project formulation process 
Appointment of the project implementation organisation 
Further to the setting up of the project implementation organisation at macro project level, 
as explained under Section 12.2.1.2, this section explains this organisation’s role at micro-
project level and how it is appointed. 
The project implementation organisation is proposed to be appointed immediately as the 
need for a project is established to facilitate the management of key factors in the client’s 
organisation environment as well as oversee the development of the project from design up 
to construction. This will help in providing the missing project management experience and 
knowledge required in the formulation of the project definition and addressing of important 
questions in the boardroom which Merrow (2011) found pitifully missing. It will also help in 
moving away from the reactionary and restricted execution role of the project management 
function discussed by Morris et al (2006) to that of the formulator of the project strategy as 
well. 
This organisation manages the project on behalf of the client and it is they that interact 
with the various project participants. The project implementation organisation then, becomes 
the client and manager of the project on behalf of the user client and guarantees the 
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completion sums and completion dates to the client and delivers the completed project to the 
client. The advantage is that this organisation will have the project management experience 
which, from the results, has been seen to be essential to the preparation and execution of 
large projects. 
From the case studies, the results have shown that the use of such an organisation was 
instrumental in the successful delivery of projects mostly because the implementation 
organisation had the experience and was focussed to ensure that the project was delivered 
on time and within cost. Another factor is that the implementation organisation will have an 
undertaking with the client and guarantee delivery within time and cost to the client which if 
not achieved, they will contribute to the extra cost or risk losing future work with the client. 
Involvement of the project implementation organisation in the client’s business case 
It is proposed that the project implementation organisation be involved in the management 
of the organisation environment to guide in the formulation and definition of the project strategy 
as well as the concept formulation process discussed later. This will provide for the lack of 
experience and project management competence that was seen to be absent in the project 
formulation process. 
From the results, it was shown that in the project initiation processes where project 
approval and funding approval are managed, the project consultants are excluded. This is 
where project approval and funding approval are managed. Even though consultants may help 
write the project charter, project approval and funding approval are done external to the project 
management boundaries. The obvious disadvantage of this approach is that the team in the 
project boundary has much experience in planning and delivering projects yet their input in 
the business case is not available. This affects the planning and execution for the project as 
was seen in the case studies. Furthermore, it was seen that the client lacked project specific 
experience and this affected their planning and shaping of the project strategy. 
Project environment: revision of the concept formulation process 
Early involvement of project participants 
The early appointment of project participants is considered important to deal with the 
problem of poor decision-making due to lack of requisite skills and knowledge in the project 
formative stages. The early involvement of contractors and other consultants will be useful in 
preparing for the project in terms of budgets, project scopes and schedules and thus help 
eliminate the conducive environment for time and cost overruns observed in the case studies. 
 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
178 
 
Integration of the concept formulation process 
The project management strategy is that both design and construction professionals be 
involved at design and construction stage as shown in Figure 12.4. This will lead to improved 
project supply chain management as well as project delivery as all the critical steps, methods 
of construction and availability of resources will be pre-viewed and essential risk management 
strategies and mitigation measures be formulated. This forms part of the decision support 
system required in the formulation of the procurement options which also consider the 
synergising of the operational sub-systems up-front as observed by Kumaraswamy, Love, 
Dulaimi and Rahman (2004). 
 
Figure 12.4 Proposed project management participant involvement 
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Teamwork and consolidated effort 
The results showed that there was a lack of teamwork and collaboration amongst project 
participants in the overrunning projects. They also showed a lack of a unified approach to risk 
management of the project at large. The client concentrated on the environmental risks and 
left the construction risks to the contractor who got involved in the project much later after the 
project concept had been finalised. 
The primary reason for lack of teamwork and collaboration was seen to be the divide 
between design and construction and the orientation to discipline isolation in design and 
construction solutions. 
The solution, therefore, entails having a concept formulation process that will involve all 
the participants together under initial concept development and detail concept development. 
The project participants, who are not identified on the basis of their disciplinary names but on 
the roles that they play, work together to conceive the project character and plan. The 
implementation of this solution is further described and discussed under Section 12.3. This 
will ensure that it is not only the environmental risks that are considered in the front-end, but 
also construction risks (Akintoye & Mcleod, 1997). 
The focus of the risk management approach would then be, not only to minimise the impact 
or transfer to other parties, but also to reduce or eliminate them. A preliminary risk plan is 
formulated by the project implementation organisation, which the bidding team develops 
further at initial, and detail concept development phases outlined in Figures 12.5 and 12.6. 
12.3 Proposed Implementation of the Solution 
The major components of the solution were discussed above. To demonstrate how the 
implementation process could proceed, the procurement process and the concept formulation 
process are used to describe how the proposal could be carried out. 
The procurement implementation process is depicted in figure 12.5 and the concept 
formulation process is shown in Figure 12.6. The numbers highlighted in orange in Figure 12.5 
relate to the steps shown in the complimentary Figure 12.6. 
The procurement process starts with the establishment of the need in the client’s 
organisation, then the appointment of the project implementation organisation (step 1) who 
defines the preliminary scope, environmental and risk management plans (see Figure 12.5). 
The implementation organisation requests from the Project Risk Management Agency 
(PRMA) approval and then from the National Treasury in the case of public organsations as 
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recommended in the SIPDM (2015). This will be followed by step 2, requests of interest and 
proposals from organisations. Step 3 is the submission of initial concepts from joint venture or  
 
Figure 12.5 Large projects procurement process 
*PRMA stands for Project Risk Management Agency 
alliance partners further highlighted in Figure 12.6. Step 4 is the evaluation of offers and 
selection of preferred bidders which may involve some negotiations. This would be followed 
by step 5, the development of a detailed concept and step 6, construction of the project. 
In the concept formulation process, the task of the project implementation organisation 
would initially be to set up the preliminary project scope. The next would be to invite 
expressions of interest from consortia or joint ventures or organisations in a loose alliance, to 
formulate an initial project concept. Once the concept is evaluated and accepted, it would be  
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Figure 12.6 Concept formulation process 
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developed further and then approved for construction. These are shown in Figure 12.6 as 
steps 1 and 2 respectively. At step 1, the outputs from the process are the scheme concept, 
the budget and schedule or programme. These would provide the initial information which the 
bidders will use at step 3.  
In Figure 12.6 the deliverables rather than the professional names of the participants are 
identified to de-emphasize the delivery approach based on professional affiliations. Similar to 
the design and construct, and public private partnership arrangements, these participants 
prepare and submit the initial project concept, broadly delineating the project technically and 
financially at step 3. Step 4, the project implementation organisation evaluates the initial 
concepts and selects the preferred bidders at step 5. The preferred bidders then develop the 
detailed concept which after negotiations leads to step 6, construction of the project. 
The measures proposed are in line with the National Treasury Standard for Infrastructure 
Procurement and Delivery Management (SIPDM) Section 4, Control Frameworks, which 
seeks to promote value for money and efficiency in the procurement of infrastructure projects. 
The principles advocated in the SIPDM include stages and gates for control of procurement 
flow with emphasis on proceeding only after approval or gate review and use of competitive 
tendering. 
12.4 Validation of Proposed Project Management Strategy 
Validation of the research results and the project management strategy was done through 
the method of triangulation using case studies, documentary analysis and questionnaires. In 
case studies and documentary analysis, firstly, results from the typical overrunning case were 
confirmed in the literal replication case studies which showed that the factors that led to time 
and cost overruns and the management approach of the typical case study were similar with 
the replication studies. Secondly, the non-overrunning case studies, using theoretical 
replication, showed the absence of those factors seen in the overrunning projects. They also 
showed the management approach that led to improved performance in these projects. 
Furthermore, the successful projects were instrumental in the formulation of the final proposal 
having had components of the suggested solution as part of the project strategies. 
The questionnaire was used as a benchmark for confirming the general nature of the 
results from the case studies. The general factors that lead to overruns were confirmed. The 
questionnaire also provided insights into the methods that could be used to improve the 
management of projects and reduction of overruns from the views of the respondents. 
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Chapter 13 Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
13.1 Management of Large Projects and Occurrence of Time and Cost Overruns 
The recurrent problem of time and cost overruns on large projects has been noted by many 
practitioners and scholars over the years and several studies carried out (Dahl et al 2017; 
Merrow, 2011; Morris & Hough, 1987; Mukuka et al, 2015, Senouci et al 2016). Most have 
attempted to understand by investigating singular, independent causes or most significant 
factors that lead to time and cost overruns. However, not many have attempted to understand 
in depth, the actuality of why and how time and cost overruns develop in large projects (Love 
et al, 2014), and how a holistic view of the problem would provide understanding of the 
interaction of the various variables leading to time and cost overruns (Ahiaga-Dagbui et al 
2015). 
There is therefore an incomplete theory and understanding of the phenomenon of time 
and cost overruns (Love et al, 2016) as conventional research has not taken account of human 
factors which could explain project behaviour that leads to time and cost overruns (Ackermann 
& Alexander, 2016). This has affected the approach to project management strategies and 
solutions proposed. To fill in the identified knowledge gap, this research was carried out in 
South Africa using a mixed research method of case studies and a questionnaire survey. This 
was to gain a holistic understanding of the forces and factors at play in the management of 
large projects in South Africa and how they lead to time and cost overruns. 
The main aim of the research was to understand how the actions of a project team affect 
the delivery of the project and to develop a project management strategy to manage these 
projects. The specific objectives were to study the nature of large projects, investigate the root 
cause of time and cost overruns on large construction projects in South Africa, investigate how 
a project team plans and executes projects and then formulate a project management strategy 
the client can use to improve the delivery of large projects and reduce time and cost overruns. 
This was successfully addressed in the research and further areas of study were 
recommended. 
The methodology was to investigate the problem in case studies and then use 
questionnaires to understand how to generalize the results in South Africa. In the case studies, 
the approach was to identify a typical overrunning large project by using causal mapping to 
understand how the project team managed the project, and how time and cost overruns were 
incurred on the project. This was followed by identification and investigation of other 
overrunning projects for literal replication to see whether they would confirm the results in the 
typical case study and then generation of a potential solution to the problem. The next stage 
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was the investigation of better performed projects, non-overrunning projects for theoretical 
replication to see whether they would confirm the opposite of what was observed in the 
overrunning project. Simply, whether they would prove the theory generated from the 
overrunning projects or not. The results helped in the generation of the final proposed solution. 
The final part was the questionnaire survey to understand generally, in South Africa, how 
large projects are managed and what are considered to be the factors that lead to time and 
cost overruns and poor performance on large projects in South Africa. The results were also 
used to understand the accuracy of the proposed solution in comparison with the view of the 
project professionals. 
Outcome of investigation 
How actions of the project team affected project delivery 
From the study of overrunning projects, it was observed that project teams took certain 
actions that affected the delivery of the projects. These actions were in response to external 
factors. 
Firstly, the project team spent a considerable amount of their time managing external 
factors; the government, the local community and media resistance against the project. 
Secondly, the government and local community resistance delayed the uptake of the 
commencement of the project. This delayed the team in the selection and identification of 
project sites which in turn affected the project teams’ adoption of feasibility studies, preparation 
and completion of design concepts. 
Thirdly, the projects had fixed completion dates and in response, the project teams 
instituted acceleration measures and ignoring of phase/gate reviews and investigation of 
alternative project solutions before deciding. Due to pressure of lack of time, they adopted 
short-cuts to project planning and execution. 
The results of the investigation showed how the actions of the project team affected the 
delivery of the project. The results also showed the factors or the reasons that made the project 
teams take such actions or behave in that particular way. In most cases, decisions made in 
the past by external entities such as the government and decisions made in the higher levels 
of the client organisation, had an effect in the way the project was effected and how it was 
managed by the project team. Thus, the results give an indication or understanding of why 
and how the project teams managed the project in this particular way. This, therefore, gave 
insight into understanding the interaction of historical and external factors on project 
participant behaviour and its influence on project delivery which is important in devising 
solutions to project delivery improvement. This in a way, answers the concerns of Ahiaga-
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Dagbui et al (2015) and Love et al (2016) of the need for project management research to 
understand the actuality of projects to enable the formulation of solutions to the project 
management problems. 
The results add knowledge to the management of large projects. Already in 1984, Tatum 
(1984) had found that project teams use intuition rather than rationalisation in decision-making. 
In this research, it was found that the project team’s decision-making was affected by external 
pressure of lack of time, insufficient budgets and negative pressure from the public, media and 
local community. The project teams made short-cuts in designing feasibility studies in the 
procurement process and how they prepared and used project management principles. Often, 
in the overrunning projects, due to pressure of lack of time and insufficient budget, the project 
team did not adequately prepare for the project and did not use project management 
principles. This was also compounded by their lack of project specific experience which 
affected their ability to carry out the projects. On the other hand, the better performed projects, 
whilst they had pressure from the community, project start was not delayed, project teams 
were better prepared and they used project management principles. This was found to be 
because, the client, the development manager, the project manager and consultants had 
project specific experience. Furthermore, they instituted a structured management of the 
project and used teamwork to enforce performance as opposed to reliance on contracts for 
enforcement used by the overrunning projects teams. 
There were, however, two situations with conflicting results. The first was that in comparing 
results from the overrunning and non-overrunning case studies, it was found that in one 
overrunning project, the client’s project manager had instituted prudent and high level 
structured project management principles and regulations, but the project still incurred time 
and cost overruns. The second was that the same contractor had worked in one project which 
overrun and in the other project which was better executed. From the interviews, it was learnt 
that the same principles of proactive risk management, teamwork and avoidance of delays the 
contractor instituted on the better project were also instituted on the overrunning project. Whilst 
the answer may not be conclusive and may require further research, this was indicative of the 
interactivity of the causes of overruns and why a holistic understanding of the whole project 
situation is important as advised by Ackerman and Alexander (2016) and Ahagia-Dagbui et al 
(2015). 
It was found in the first case that by the time productive project management principles 
were instituted by the project executing team, the seeds of overruns had already been planted 
due to project start delay, insufficient budgets and lack of project specific experience both in 
design evolution and project management. This equally applied in the second case. The 
prudent management of the contractor helped in mitigating the poor results but was not 
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sufficient to stop them altogether not only because the seeds had been planted but also 
because the contractor came in later when the design solution and management strategy had 
already been established by the client and consultant, who in this case lacked the experience 
of designing and managing a project of this nature. 
The results from the research also established that the collective competence of the client, 
the development manager, the project manager, the consultants and the contractor is at the 
heart of the success or failure of the project as postulated in the conceptual framework in 
Chapter 1. This collective competence, which largely impacts the eventual project team’s 
response, strategies and preparation for the project, was found to be influenced by the external 
environment, the organisation environment and the project environment. It was found to be 
affected by the qualifications and experience of the client, the client’s representative or 
development manager, the project manager, other consultants and the contractor. This in turn, 
influenced how the project team responded to the external influences, as discussed earlier, 
and how they prepared for a project, the strategies and actions they adopted to manage it. It 
was also found that the behaviour of project participants was often altered by circumstances 
such as shortage of time, public pressure, delayed start of the project, the national importance 
of the project and the negative sentiments from media and other bodies. This made them often 
take short-cuts to ensure the speedy delivery of the project which unfortunately led to 
incomplete designs, failure to carry out thorough feasibility studies, higher tenders, 
constructability problems and eventual time and cost overruns. 
The nature and management of large projects in South Africa 
From the results, the nature of large projects was that these are multi-disciplinary living 
organisations with several interactive elements in constant motion that require to be managed. 
Unlike, smaller projects, these require experienced and high-level skills to manage them due 
to their complexity, multi-disciplinary, multi-organisational and large resource requirements. 
Large projects, although not viewed as a distinct class on their own, therefore, merit separation 
and study on their own as earlier observed by Loots (2013). Large projects were considered 
to be those costing more than R100m. Respondents were of the view that 8 out of 10 large 
projects compared to 6 out of 10 small projects have time and cost overruns in South Africa 
which concurs with 9 out of 10 on large transport projects in Europe (Flyvbjerg, 2011). 
From the questionnaire survey, most respondents were of the view that large projects are 
managed and should be managed differently compared to small projects indicating that time 
and cost overruns may not be due to large projects being managed the same way smaller 
projects are managed. Furthermore, the results from the questionnaire survey showed that 
most respondents were of the view that large public projects are managed poorly compared 
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to private projects. The case studies however showed that even public projects could be 
successfully implemented and private projects poorly executed and result in time and cost 
overruns on the project. This suggests that time and cost overruns on large projects may not 
be due to whether the project is public or private. 
How the project team plans and executes large projects in South Africa 
The results showed that the involvement of the client as well as the experience and 
competence of the consultants contributed significantly to the management of projects. It was 
found that where the client and the rest of the project team had project specific experience, 
project teams prepared for projects and used project management principles consistently. 
Where the experience was lacking, project teams were ill-prepared and did not use project 
management principles consistently. 
It was also found that implementation of risk management practices was not project-wide. 
The client and consultants concerned themselves with environmental risks and left the 
construction risks to the contractor which affected the wholesale planning and execution of 
project risks. Furthermore, incidences of power games in behaviour of team members, 
optimism bias and overconfidence were found which affected the budget estimates and 
preparation for the projects. 
The results also showed that training, qualifications and experience of the client and the 
rest of the project team affected the competence of the team and the eventual execution of 
the project. Furthermore, it was found that most team members lacked a project-wide broad-
view understanding of the project due to the industry-wide training practice that limits their 
understanding to their areas of specialisation. This affected the planning and execution of 
large projects which are complex with diverse yet inter-linked components managed by 
different expertise. The delay or readiness of one component in both design and construction 
potentially leads to stress or delay of the other. This was commonly seen not only amongst 
consultants, but also between consultants and contractors and amongst different contractors. 
Competitive tendering is commonly used by the client in the industry to select both 
consultants and contractors. Furthermore, the procurement practice commonly used on large 
projects is that of design-bid-construct. Both these practices affect the employment of 
teamwork between the competing parties as well as the eventual involvement of participants 
on the project engagement path in the project lifecycle, eventually affecting the project team 
in preparing and implementing the projects. 
The results also showed that there was a concentration of technical fields in the design 
and management of large projects leaving out other equally important roles such as 
communication and public management. The results confirm observations in previous studies 
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of unbalanced concentration of technical skills in the training of industry participants (Cywinski, 
2009, Edum-Fotwe, 2000, Ramazani & Jergeas, 2015). This affected how teams managed 
public resistance and perception of the project. 
The results showed that outsourcing, far-spaced large project activities, work cultural 
dynamics and external influences such as trade unions and public pressure affected worker 
productivity as well as how the project teams managed projects in South Africa.  
The root cause of time and cost overruns 
The root cause of time and cost overruns in large infrastructure projects in South Africa 
was found to be, (1) lack of project specific experience by the project team due to insufficient 
numbers of large projects and often far-spaced apart, (2) external and organisation 
environment decisions in the far and immediate past as well as in the higher organisational 
levels of the client which affected the project start, project approval and project funding, (3) 
pressure and resistance from the public as well as from other external environment factors 
which affected project start and, in combination with the other two factors, led the project team 
to use short-cuts in their delivery of projects resulting into incomplete designs and 
consequently, time and cost overruns, and (4) change requirements from the stakeholders 
often in combination with lack of project specific experience leading to time and cost overruns. 
All these factors stem from the external environment. These led to poor preparation by the 
client and the consultant teams and, inconsistent use of project management principles by the 
project team. In general, the effects of the external factors were shortage of time to design 
and construct, project start delays, insufficient budgets, incomplete designs, higher tenders 
and constructability problems. The results show that the factors such as incomplete designs 
and design changes often cited as the root cause of overruns in previous research were found 
to be effects of the root cause in this research, confirming the results from Flyvbjerg (2011). 
Rather than singular factors working in isolation, the results showed that there were many 
inter-relationships amongst the originating causes as well as amongst the effects suggesting 
that the root cause of time and cost overruns happened before incomplete designs or 
incomplete tender documents. The implication of this on the management of projects is that, 
the recommendation often made by scholars on the problem of time and cost overruns for the 
client or consultants to complete designs or avoid design changes, fails to address the real 
problem.  
From the case study results, it has been established that the problem of time and cost 
overruns has vertical and horizontal dimensions. Vertical, being from the external environment 
to the organisation and then the project environment, and, horizontal being in the far and the 
immediate past to the present. From the questionnaire survey, the overruns were seen to be 
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mostly caused by factors in the organisation and project environment, or by actions of 
participants, which is the commonly held view in previous research (AlSehaimi et al, 2013). 
Therefore, an integrated management of the external, organisation and project environment 
is important for the client to successfully manage large projects and reduce time and cost 
overruns. 
Proposed strategy 
The results from both the case studies and questionnaire survey suggest that an effective 
management strategy for large projects to reduce time and cost overruns needs to incorporate 
the management of the external, organisation and project environments. The strategy can in 
summary be described as: 
 External Environment 
▪ Institution of a policy to regulate numbers of large projects in South Africa 
▪ Establishment of a project implementing organisation (PIO) 
▪ Establishment of a Project Risk Management Agency 
 Organisation Environment 
▪ Appointment of the PIO 
▪ Increased role of the PIO in client’s organisation 
Project Environment 
▪ Revision of project procurement process 
o Early participant involvement 
o Integration of project concept formulation 
o Teamwork and consolidated effort 
The proposal is aimed at addressing the client’s relevant experience, obtaining early 
collaboration and consideration of project risks and constructability in the formulation and 
execution of large projects. 
13.2 Novelty of the Research 
The novelty of this research is that it gives a detailed view of how time and cost overruns 
develop in a large project and how the interrelatedness of the causes and effects together 
lead to time and cost overruns. The research provides a fresh insight on an old problem using 
an intensive research method of case studies and questionnaires to understand how a project 
team’s approach and management could lead to overruns. Most previous studies sought to 
determine or confirm the most significant causes of delay on projects in general (Love et al 
2016). Fewer studies examined this problem in the context of large construction projects. 
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The uniqueness of this research was that, unlike many studies which focussed on 
identifying the significant and singular factors of delay on construction projects in general using 
opinion surveys (see the review by AlSehaimi et al, 2013), a mixed research strategy of case 
studies of actual projects and industry wide questionnaire survey was used in this research. 
This enabled a detailed and holistic understanding of forces at play in the large project 
environment and how they interact leading to time and cost overruns. The information provided 
is useful in advancing the knowledge of the theory of time and cost overruns causation which 
is important in understanding the root cause of time and cost overruns and of the management 
of large construction projects. The results provide a strategy for clients to improve the delivery 
of these projects. 
The major contributions of this research to knowledge of management of large projects 
were: 
1) Contributed knowledge to the theory of how time and cost overruns are caused in 
projects. By using a combination of documentary analysis, interviews and 
questionnaire surveys, the research has conveyed a rich understanding of the root 
cause of overruns and how the various environments impact on the project team’s 
management of the project. This understanding is useful in formulating and 
executing project and management strategies with holistic interventions. 
2) Contributed to the knowledge of how large projects should be managed by 
proposing a project management strategy that can be used by a client. 
Other contributions of the research were: 
1) Actual projects were investigated, both overrunning and better performed projects 
to reveal the conditions in the macro and micro project environments that facilitate 
the occurrence of overruns. This provided empirical evidence of how the 
circumstances in the project environment, which include the actions of the project 
team, contribute to the occurrence of time and cost overruns in large projects. 
2) Traditionally, the approach used in studying project delays and time overruns is 
opinion or questionnaire surveys. This method has been criticised for its inability to 
help identify the root cause of the problem (Love et al, 2016, Ramanathan et al 
2011). In this research, a combined approach of case study and questionnaire 
surveys was used which helped in carrying out an in-depth study using the dualistic 
approach that is important for construction management research 
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13.3 Implications for Project Management Strategy Formulation 
The results from the case studies and questionnaire survey suggest that the management 
of large projects involves not only the management of the project environment but the 
management of the parent organisation as well as the external environment. The results also 
suggest that time and cost overruns begin in the external environment then extend into the 
organisation and project environments. The results imply that the potential solution to reducing 
overruns in large infrastructure projects may not reside in effecting improved techniques in the 
project environment but in perfecting the whole process from the macro to the micro project 
environment. Thus, having a project management strategy that integrates the various 
processes in the macro and micro project environment which improves effective delivery of 
large projects. 
The results suggest further that the project team’s preparation for a project, teamwork and 
consolidated effort, use of project management principles and management of construction 
project risks lead to improved execution of the project as seen in the better performed case 
studies. This is enhanced by the experience of the client, the consultant and contractor. It 
implies that a successful strategy needs to consider the management of: the experience of 
project participants, the preparation process for the client and participants, the teamwork 
process and the construction project risks which require early appointment of project 
participants. The results also showed the interplay of factors from the external to the 
organisation and eventually, to the project environment. Furthermore, the drivers of time and 
cost overruns originate from the external environment into the organisation and then into the 
project environment. 
The proposed strategy thus entails management of the external, organisation and project 
environments to improve the competence in both the project formulation and execution 
processes. It incorporates the management of the experience of project participants and 
organisations, the management of project team preparation, teamwork and the execution 
process from the macro to the micro-project environment. At the macro project environment, 
it was seen that insufficient repetition of large projects leads to lack of organisational and 
individual project experience. The strategy at this level is aimed at policy level to coordinate 
the volumes of large projects in the country and encouragement of labour intensive methods. 
The other part is the setting up of a project implementation organisation (PIO) as well as a 
projects risk management agency (PRMA) to improve project formulation and project risk 
management competence in the implementation of large projects. At the micro-project 
management level, the strategy is aimed at managing the lack of experience in the client 
organisation, late involvement of project experts and lack of teamwork and collaboration in the 
project team. The strategy at this level is aimed at improving the project formulation process 
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by appointing a project implementation organisation (PIO) to work in the client’s organisation 
in the business case and at board room level, as well as revision of the concept formulation 
process by incorporating early involvement of project experts, integration of the project 
formulation process, teamwork and consolidated effort. 
13.4 Limitations of the research 
Time and financial constraints were the major limitations in this study. Therefore, only a 
few projects were investigated in the case studies. The projects were purposively selected 
and limited to five to enable an in-depth investigation of the phenomenon of time and cost 
overruns on large projects. To deal with the limitation, the questionnaire survey was used to 
generalise the case study results to the whole of South Africa. Not all project participants were 
available for the interviews, but in all cases, it was sought to have representation from the 
three categories of client, consultant and contractor to have a balanced view of the results. 
Furthermore, the research was confined to infrastructure construction projects in South 
Africa. It is, however, believed that the results are applicable to other countries in SADC and 
elsewhere in the world.  
Finally, the proposed management strategy was not tested in the industry. Ideally, the 
opinions of the government institutions and professionals should be sought to test the 
practicality of the PIO and PRMA. It is proposed that this be taken up in further research. 
13.5 Suggestions for Further Research 
The setting up of a project implementation organisation was recommended to improve the 
project experience and competence in the macro project environment. It was, however, not 
possible, due to time constraints, to investigate further whether the implementation 
organisation should be set up at national or regional/provincial level as well as whether the 
organisation should be mono or multi-specialism based. Further research work is 
recommended to determine the best mode of implementation for South Africa. 
In the same manner, a projects review institution called Project Risk Management Agency 
(PRMA) was proposed to house both the environmental impact assessment and 
project/construction risk assessment and management components. The research however, 
did not go further to investigate the merits and demerits of having a combined entity of 
environmental impact assessment and project risks assessment and management or having 
a separate project risks assessment and management entity altogether. It is therefore 
recommended that further research work be carried out. 
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In the micro-project environment, at the request proposal stage, the level of information 
that would be required from the bidders and the number of parties to be chosen as preferred 
bidders was not determined. It is recommended that further research be carried out to 
determine the level of detail and the numbers of preferred bidders required. 
Lastly, the review of literature has revealed consistently that the problem of time and cost 
overruns has been persistent in spite of much research carried out over the years (Klakegg & 
Lichtenberg, 2016). From the investigation in this research of how many respondents read 
journals, it was found that less than 6% read journals. Most read magazines such as 
Construction News, Engineering News and information they get from their organisation 
through emails and work-related correspondence. It is recommended to investigate further 
whether there could be a link between the lack of reading of research journals by practising 
project implementers and the persistence of the problem. 
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Appendix A Case Study Protocol 
 
Typical Case Study Protocol – Power Plant 
A Overview of the case study 
The aim of the case study was to investigate the management of the design and construction 
process from inception up to project handover. The project is current or ongoing/completed. It 
was desired to see the factors that may have led to project time and cost overruns and whether 
these are the same as observed in literature and the other case studies. 
This case study was chosen because it is one of the largest projects embarked on in South Africa. 
The value of the project is about R118bn. The other reasons are that that it has experienced time 
and cost overruns and is of major significance to the country. The project was also chosen to 
investigate the theoretical replication logic from the stadium case study. 
The research proposition was that by preparing and consistently using project management 
principles by the client, time and cost overruns on large projects can be reduced. The reverse is 
that poor preparation and inconsistent use of project management principles by the client leads 
to poor project delivery and ultimately time and cost overruns. 
B Data Collection Procedures 
Data is to be collected by the researcher: S Simushi. 
Data Collection Plan 
• Initial review of preliminary information, July/August, 2014 
• Type of evidence expected: 
o Reports, minutes, interviews 
• Access procedures: 
o Contact former CMP student :Ms.. 
o Travel to project, interview and collect information 
o Get permission to research 
• Data collection period 
o August/September 2014 depending on the schedules from power plant personnel 
and management 
▪ Planned 18-30 August, 2014 
▪ Actual 8-19 September, 2014 
• Persons interviewed 
o Executing team personnel 
o Contractors personnel 
• Prior preparation for fieldwork 
o Review of articles and other documents on project. Specifically, documents written 
by personnel on the project, reports, minutes, information sheets, on-line web 
information 
• Establishing logistics 
o Writing pads, pens, stapler and paper puncher, files 
o Getting a quiet place to write up observations and other notes: 
▪ Office/desk at plant project office 
▪ Accommodation near the site 
D Data collection questions 
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• Concept/initiation of the project 
o When did the project start? Who initiated it? What was the estimate? When was it 
planned to be carried out? 
o What management structure was used on the project? What effect did it have on 
the project? 
o What was involved in the client’s/consultants’ preparation for the project? How 
prepared was the client/consultant for the project? 
o At what point was the consultant brought in? How was he selected? 
o Which consultants were involved? What was their experience? 
• Design development 
o When did detail design commence? Who was responsible? How long did it take? 
Was duration sufficient? Did duration go as planned? If not, reasons? Consultant 
done similar work before? Individual experience. Comments on client’s brief, 
clarity? Any problems with client’s brief? 
o Any challenges during design development? Qualifications and experience of 
consultants? Any issues? 
o Did the client have a deliberate project management strategy? What was the 
consultant’s strategy? Project manager’s strategy? 
o Was the design completed? Before tender? During tender? During construction? 
o Any design changes? Before tender? During construction? What were the 
reasons? 
• Construction management 
o When did the tendering process begin? How long was it? How was the contractor 
selected? When did the contractor get involved in the project? When did he move 
on site? 
o When was work planned to start? What was the actual start date? Any reasons for 
the difference? What was the contract price/tender sum? Comparison with 
feasibility figure? Comments? 
o Experience on contractor’s supervision of work (by consultant/contractor)? 
Experience with quality of work and competence of constructors (artisans and 
contractor organisation). Productivity? 
o Any changes to the work? Reasons? 
o When was the work completed? What was the planned completion date? What 
was the final project cost?  
o Any cost overruns? What were the reasons? 
• Selection of the site 
o How was the site selected? Any problems encountered in this process? How were 
they resolved? Did the problems affect the project in any way? 
• Decision making 
o How was decision making in the client’s organisation? How was it in the project 
manager’s organisation? In the project management process? Were there any 
delays due to decision-making? Examples? 
D Guide for the case study report 
• International journal of Project Management/Journal of Construction and Architectural 
Engineering/SABINET 
• PhD research committee/supervisor/civil engineering department requirements 
• Give a list of documents/data forming part of the report: 
o Audio interviews 
o Written transcripts 
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o Documents 
• List of persons/organisations interviewed or targeted: 
o Design personnel 
o Contracts personnel 
o Construction personnel 
• Chronology of events leading to project start and completion 
• Exhibit to be developed: Logic of events leading to time and cost overruns 
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Appendix B Case Study Guide 
 
1. Personal data 
o names and position of the interviewee  
o position in the project  
o information on qualifications and experience  
o information on journals and other literature of interest 
2. Project specific issues 
o information on organisation structure (project)  
▪ what form of structure was used: dedicated team, matrix 
▪ who communicated with community, press and outsiders? 
▪ how was the project affected by the form of structure used? 
o consultant involvement:  
▪ start and end dates, 
▪ bidding duration 
▪ criteria of appointment of project manager, what was their 
experience/background 
o experience on design of the works  
▪ done similar work before? (individual, organisation)  
▪ clarity of information from concept, communication to and from other 
consultants  
▪ challenges in design work, materials, products availability, site factors, 
project type factors  
▪ duration of design process. as planned? how was the duration arrived at? 
▪ any changes to design and reasons 
o experience of project members 
▪ was experience/qualification any factor in members’ execution of the 
works? 
▪ were these two factors of any influence on time and cost overruns on the 
project? 
o involvement of the client on the project 
▪ who was client’s representative, their experience and qualifications, 
project management experience? 
▪ how involved was the client in the project? how did this affect the project? 
o project management  
▪ principles were followed?  
▪ design  
▪ construction 
▪ any guides available for contract formulation, were they followed? 
▪ was there a deliberate strategy from client’s side, consultant’s side? 
contractor’s side? 
o preparation for the project 
▪ in your opinion, how prepared was: 
▪ the client? 
▪ the consultant? 
▪ the contractor? 
▪ if not, what was not attended to? 
▪ what things would you consider necessary to prepare for a project such 
as this one? 
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o Tendering process 
▪ how long was the process? did it proceed as planned? 
▪ how was the contractor selected? 
o construction and installation  
▪ when did the contractor get involved in the project? did this affect the 
project in any way? 
▪ experience on supervision of construction work 
▪ comments on quality of work and competence of constructors (artisans 
and contractor)  
▪ any changes to works and reasons  
▪ start and completion dates? achieved? If not, reasons. 
▪ construction costs, achieved as planned? If not, reasons. 
▪ If there were overruns on the project, which elements were the most 
affected? what would you consider the major source of these overruns? 
o selection of the site 
▪ any problems encountered with site selection? 
▪ how were these resolved? did these problems affect the project in any 
way? 
o decision making 
▪ how would you describe decision making process in the client’s 
organisation? 
▪ how would you describe the project manager’s decision making process? 
o were there any delays due to decision making? examples? 
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Appendix C Questionnaire Survey Questions 
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Appendix D Causes of Time and Cost Overruns 
  
What would you consider to be the major causes of time and cost overruns on large projects in South 
Africa? 
 
Same 
 
1. Late information and design changes 
2. Labour disruptions 
 
Client not fully familiar with the scope of work and the necessary requirements to complete a planned project. 
 
Inaccurate BOQ's 
 
Poor planning. 
Poor controls. 
 
scope changes 
 
Similar reasons to above plus shrewd contractors bidding low with exclusions that they use to nail the client. 
An experienced professional can weed out this contractors if they are involved with the adjudication process 
and their recommendations are implemented correctly 
 
IR 
 
Same as above, lack of timeous information from the professional teams, as well as the wrong contractor 
being appointed on public projects. 
 
Too many Scope changes 
 
To many players that need to share in the proceeds.   
Power of the trade unions. 
 
Many and complex causes.  Most significant come from scope definitions and business plans.  Poorly 
conceived projects with clear business plans lead to scope changes, scope creep and consequently cost 
overruns. 
Also delays in conceiving and defining the project, then results in time pressure to deliver quickly, with 
insufficient time spent on early project stages.  The biggest influences on project costs occur at the start of the 
project.  Too little time is spent on early stages. 
 
• Labour demands 
• Planning and control 
 
As above 
 
Scope definitions and skills 
 
Design 
 
Managed the traditional way 
 
Incomplete design and errors in quantities 
 
Corruption 
 
Insufficient planning 
Major change in scope 
 
same as above 
 
Same as above 
 
no upfront planning and scope 
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What would you consider to be some of the effects of time and cost overruns on large projects in 
South Africa? 
 
Project costs more than it should and is completed too late 
 
The projects are late and over budget 
 
Impact on people who should benefit from the project. 
People are negatively affected when service delivery is not on time as planned. 
 
Unhappy clients who possibly paid the correct amount but was misinformed by the original tender value 
 
Culture of leniency or acceptability of overruns. 
 
not applicable 
 
1. client not paying the contractor on time 
2. inadequate scope definition 
3. inadequate or incorrect delivery time frames 
4. incompetent contractors e.g. For Kusile and Medupi penalties for late delivery have been applied bankrupting 
some contractors and contractors using welders that do not follow quality procedures required by the client. 
Contractors using young inexperienced engineers to work on the project. how difficult is it to turn a turbine 
using steam? 
5. Casual approach by global companies to deliver projects in South Africa 
 
In the power industry, insufficient power generation capacity for the country's needs. 
 
so many. late in handing over and being occupied, cost the tax payer so much more than should have. 
 
More money is being spent and the Tax payer eventually pays for this misuse 
 
Lowers the growth of the country 
 
• Waste of tax payers money. 
• Electricity shortages 
• Water shortages...to become critical in the near future. 
 
Poor design quality 
 
Margin erosion 
 
Resourcing issues and lengthy periods of plant and people stay on longer on a project 
 
Managed the trading way 
 
Extension of time with cost 
Disputes, Claims and arbitration 
 
delays to commissioning of the projects 
 
The major one for me is Labour unrest and the currency value 
 
Define the scope and get the contractor up front involve and then do proper planning. 
 
Service delivery gets delayed because fiscal resources are concentrated into one project 
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Appendix E Ways of Reducing Time and Cost Overruns 
 
  
Please indicate three most significant factors or methods that could be used to help overcome the 
problem of time and cost overruns in South Africa 
 
Competent Employer staff supervising the project 
Advance the information timeously (to also avoid changes) 
 
1. Proper scope of work definition 
2. Proper tender evaluation of at least three tenders received based on technical competence and not necessarily 
on lowest bidder 
3. Proper project execution planning 
 
Make use of the Contractors knowledge at time of setting up BOQ's for tenders. 
 
Better planning during early stages. 
Proper implementation of monitoring and control systems 
Comprehensive stakeholder engagement throughout project 
 
1. Adequate front end loading of projects 
2. leaning from our shortfalls 
3. Having a good mix of new entrants, mid tier experienced individuals and highly experienced individuals with 
skills transfer taking place across the board 
 
Better management of resources. 
 
1. Better planning by the owner and his professional team 
2. selecting the best contractor for the project. 
3. Well prepared and complete set of drawing and documentation before the project starts. 
 
Hold people responsible for their actions. 
Reign in the power of trade unions. 
 
• Appoint experienced Consultants and qualified contractors 
• The client should employ competent Project managers whether internal or external. 
• Planning should be completed prior to award of projects. Co-ordination stake holders. 
• Labour agreements to be made by Contractors and Clients, without Politicians getting involved. 
 
Changing the delivery model of the contracts 
 
Car get involved at design stage and concentrate on executing all projects on design and construct basis 
 
Move from traditional methods to new method. 
 
Detailed geotechnical 
Complete tender documentation 
Early assembly of complete design team 
 
procurement 
sufficient planning to avoid scope changes 
simplistic designs 
 
Early procurement of the a contractor to be part of the designing team 
Have designs completed before starting construction 
Use proper project management tools to manage the projects 
 
Stick to the schedule, Ban Labour Unions and have a different strategy of dealing with labour and have 
experienced project managers 
 
early involvement, people knowing there field, experience 
 
Gated Controlled Project Environment 
WBS 
Activity Schedule Pricing 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 226 
 
 
  
Please state below any recommendations for improving the management of large projects in South 
Africa 
 
1. Proper scope of work definition 
2. Proper tender evaluation of at least three tenders received based on technical competence and not necessarily 
on lowest bidder 
3. Proper project execution planning 
 
A simple but effective solution is to ensure that all project participants are appointed on the basis that they have 
the competency to carry out the roles assigned to them.  
It is also important that the entire team is aligned to the project goals and no other organisational or personal 
agendas compete for the focus and priority. 
 
Employing not only qualified people but people with the correct experience as well. 
 
Enhanced public sector capacity and capability. 
Professional recognition and credibility of Statutory PM body - currently just fulfilling regulatory role and not 
adding professional value.  
Improved project governance 
 
A clear definition of all stakeholder expectations and objectives from the inception of all projects. the other is 
skills, skills and skills 
 
• Employ experienced people 
• Train less experienced people 
• Clients should consult competent project managers both internally and externally 
 
Training required 
 
I stakeholder involvement 
 
There should be collaboration at inception for all stakeholders (Owner, Consultant and Contractor) 
 
We need 1 person to lead wrt management. build trust among all stakeholders. involve contractors early in the 
process. 
 
Early engagements of contractors and other stakeholders. 
designs to be completed before the execution stage. 
people involved in project management should have a crush course on project management 
 
Get qualified project managers. 
 
Improve Scope Development 
Use WBS 
Cost into Elements not entire project 
Improve stakeholder engagement 
 
  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 227 
 
Appendix F Ethics Approval Form Guide 
 
Department of Civil Engineering 
Stellenbosch University 
Departmental Ethics Screening Committee questionnaire. 
 
This questionnaire shall be completed by each researcher (and or student) who wishes to 
involve persons/animals in their research. 
 
1. General information: 
a. Name and surname: ______________________________ 
b. Application date:  ______________________________ 
c. Project title:  ______________________________ 
d. If for degree purposes, which degree: 
 ______________________________ 
e. Study leader (if applicable):   ______________________________ 
 
2. Type of people to be surveyed: 
 Adults 
 Children 
 Stellenbosch university students 
 Professionals in industry 
 General population 
 Other? 
_____________________________
_ 
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3. Roughly how many involved? 
 
4. Form of survey: 
 Qualitative interview with individual       a) face-to-face 
b) telephone interview 
 Qualitative interview with group (focus group) 
 Quantitative survey tool  a) hard copy form 
b) electronic online survey 
5. How will you ensure the participants are well informed about the purpose of the 
research and how the research results will be disseminated? 
6. How will you record their consent to participate? 
(This is difficult with phone interviews but may be necessary to have a record of) 
7. Communication issues 
 Are there likely to be any communication issues due to language or education? 
YES/NO 
 If YES, how will you ensure that the person is fully informed of their rights? 
________________________________________________________________ 
8. Nature of information requested: 
 Any personal information recorded (name, address, id number)? Yes/No. 
 If Yes, what information? __________________________________ 
 Any information of a personal nature (personal experiences?) Yes/No 
 If Yes, what information? __________________________________ 
 Any information of a particularly sensitive nature (relating to traumatic experiences, 
potentially triggering memories of traumatic events; relating to unsafe or illegal 
activities?) 
 If Yes, what information? __________________________________ 
 Any information relating to other identifiable people? 
_____________________________ 
 If Yes, what information and from what people? 
__________________________________ 
9. How will you ensure rights to privacy and confidentiality? 
_________________________________________ 
 
10. How will you keep data safe and available for future auditing? 
_________________________________________ 
11. Will the respondents benefit in any way – directly – from participating? i.e. do they 
stand to gain financially/ are you providing an incentive etc.? 
_________________________________________ 
12. How will you ensure fair selection of research participants? 
_________________________________________ 
13. Provide details of a risk benefit analysis/disadvantages. 
_________________________________________ 
14. How will research in a community be coordinated in order not to place unwarranted 
burden upon such community? 
_________________________________________ 
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